Ing. Salih CAVKIC
Paris nor Brussels!
We want to live in peace with all
regardless of their religion, color and origin.
Therefore, we condemn any
kind of terrorism!
Ne više Pariz ni Brisel!
Mi želimo živjeti u miru sa svim našim
bez obzira koje su vjere, boje kože i porijekla.
Zato mi osuđujemo svaku vrstu terorizma!
Prof. dr. Murray Hunter
University Malaysia Perlis
Years to Trade Economic Independence for Political Sovereignty -
Aleš Debeljak +
Defense of Cross-Fertilization: Europe and Its Identity
Contradictions - Aleš Debeljak
ALEŠ DEBELJAK - ABECEDA DJETINJSTVA
ALEŠ DEBEJAK - INTERVJU; PROSVJEDI, POEZIJA, DRŽAVA
Rattana Lao holds a doctorate in Comparative and International
Education from Teachers College, Columbia University and is currently teaching in Bangkok.
Director of Middle-East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) in Ljubljana, Slovenia
Rakesh Krishnan Simha
Géométrie variable of a love triangle – India, Russia and the US
Amna Whiston is a London-based writer specialising in moral philosophy. As a
PhD candidate at Reading University, UK, her main research interests are in ethics, rationality, and moral psychology.
Eirini Patsea is a Guest Editor in Modern Diplomacy, and
specialist in Cultural Diplomacy and Faith-based Mediation.
Can we trust the government to do the right thing, are they really
care about essential things such as environmental conditions and
education in our life?
Univ. prof. Dubravko Lovrenović is one of the leading European Medievalist specialized in the Balkans, pre-modern and modern political history.
Postgraduate researcher in International Relations and Diplomacy at the Geneva-based UMEF University
professor of IT law and EU law at Banja Luka College,
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Studied in Belgrade (Political Science) and in Moscow (Plekhanov’s IBS). Currently, a post-doctoral researcher at the Kent University in Brussels (Intl. Relations). Specialist for the
MENA-Balkans frozen and controlled conflicts.
Dr. Swaleha Sindhi is
Assistant Professor in the Department of Educational Administration, the Maharaja Sayajirao University of
Baroda, India. Decorated educational practitioner Dr. Sindhi is a frequent columnist on related topics, too. She is the Vice President
of Indian Ocean Comparative Education Society (IOCES). Contact:
It is an Ankara-based
journalist and notable author.
She is engaged with the leading Turkish dailies and weeklies for
nearly three decades as a columnist, intervieweer and editor.
Her words are prolifically published and quoted in Turkish,
French an English.
By İLNUR ÇEVIK
Modified from the original: They killed 1 Saddam and created 1,000 others (Daily Sabah)
Aine O'Mahony has a bachelor in Law and Political Science at
the Catholic Institute of Paris and is currently a master's student
of Leiden University in the International Studies programme.Contact:
Elodie Pichon has a
bachelor in Law and Political Science at the Catholic Institute of
Paris and is currently doing a MA in Geopolitics, territory and
Security at King's College London. Contact :
a MA candidate of the George
Washington University, Elliott School of International Affairs. Her
research focus is on cross-Pacific security and Asian studies,
particularly on the Sino-U.S. relations and on the foreign policy
and politics of these two.
Born in Chile and raised in Rome, Alessandro
Cipri has just finished his postgraduate studies at the department
of War Studies of King's College London, graduating with distinction
from the Master's Degree in "Intelligence and International
Security". Having served in the Italian Army's "Alpini" mountain
troops, he has a keen interest in national security, military
strategy, insurgency theory, and terrorism studies. His Master's
dissertation was on the impact of drug trafficking on the evolution
of the Colombian FARC.
Ms. Lingbo ZHAO
is a candidate of the Hong Kong Baptist
University, Department of Government and International Studies. Her
research interest includes Sino-world, Asia and cross-Pacific.
Hannes Grassegger and Mikael Krogerus are investigative
journalists attached to the Swiss-based Das Magazin specialized
Hannes Grassegger and Mikael Krogerus are investigative journalists attached to the Swiss-based Das Magazin
Ms. Elodie Pichon, Research Fellow of the IFIMES Institute, DeSSA Department. This native Parisian is a Master in Geopolitics,
Territory and Security from the King’s College, London, UK.
Ambassador Muhamed Sacirbey currently lectures on Digital-Diplomacy. "Mo"
has benefited from a diverse career in investment banking & diplomacy, but
his passion has been the new avenues of communication. He was Bosnia &
Herzegovina's first Ambassador to the United Nations, Agent to the
International Court of Justice, Foreign Minister & Signatory of the Rome
Statute establishing the International Criminal Court. He also played
American football opting for a scholarship to Tulane University in New
Orleans after being admitted to Harvard, oh well!!
Amanda Janoo is an Alternative
Economic Policy Adviser to governments and development
organizations. Graduate from Cambridge University with an MPhil in
Development Studies, Amanda worked at the United Nations Industrial
Development Organization (UNIDO) supporting government's with
evidence-based industrial policy design for inclusive and
sustainable growth. Her research focus is on the relationship
between international trade and employment generation. She has
worked throughout Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa promoting greater
economic self-determination and empowerment.
Michael dr. Logies,
The writer, editor-in-chief of
The Jakarta Post, took part
in the Bali Civil Society and Media Forum, organized by the
Institute for Peace and Democracy and the Press Council, on Dec.5-6.
Dutch - Nederlands
French - Français
German - Deutsch
The European Commission's Strategy for the Western
By Zlatko Hadžidedić
The European Commission set a target date of 2025 for
some of the Balkan countries to join. However, Brussels sees only
Serbia and Montenegro as actual candidates. The door formally
remains open to Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia,
but these countries have been put into a grey zone with no time
frames and road maps. They have been put on hold with no tangible
prospects for membership, left without any explanation of what makes
them less valid candidates than Serbia and Montenegro, with these
two being as poor, illiberal and undemocratic as the remaining four.
With a dose of instant cynicism, one might conclude
that Serbia and Montenegro have been rewarded for their military
aggressions on Bosnia and Kosovo, and Serbia's permanent pressures
on Macedonia, whereas the latter ones have been punished for being
the former's victims. However, a more careful look at the population
structure of the four non-rewarded countries reveals that these,
unlike Serbia and Montenegro, have a relative excess of Muslim
population. So far, there have been dilemmas whether the European
Union is to be regarded as an exclusive Christian club, bearing in
mind the prolonged discriminatory treatment of Turkey as an unwanted
candidate. After the European Commission's new strategy for the
Balkans, there can be no such dilemmas: the countries perceived by
Brussels bureaucrats as Muslim ones – regardless of the actual
percentage of their Muslim population – are not to be treated as
The resurrection of this logic, now embodied in the
actual strategy, takes Europe back to its pre-Westphalian roots, to
the faraway times of the Crusades or the times of the Siege of
Vienna. It also signals the ultimate triumph of the most reactionary
populist ideologies in the contemporary Europe, based on exclusion
of all who are perceived as „others“. It signals the ultimate
triumph of the European ineradicable xenophobia. Or – to put it in
terms more familiar to the likely author of the strategy, the
European Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and
Enlargement Negotiations, Johannes Hahn – the triumph of
Now, what options are left to the practically
excluded Balkan countries, after so many efforts to present
themselves as valid candidates for EU membership? There is a point
in claims that some of their oligarchies, particularly the
tripartite one in Bosnia-Herzegovina, have never actually wanted to
join the EU, because their arbitrary rule would be significantly
undermined by the EU's rule of law. It is logical, then, that the
tripartite oligarchy welcomes the strategy that keeps the country
away from the EU membership, while at the same time deceiving the
population that the strategy is a certain path to the EU. Yet, what
about these people, separated into three ethnic quarantines, who
believe that joining the EU would simply solve all their political
and economic problems, and who refuse to accept the idea that the EU
might be an exclusive club, not open to them? What are the remaining
options for them?
They cannot launch a comprehensive revolution and
completely replace the tripartite oligarchy by their democratic
representatives. Still, they can press it to adopt and conduct a
multi-optional foreign policy, oriented towards several geopolitical
centers: one of them may remain Brussels, but Washington, Moscow,
Beijing, Ankara, Tehran, and others, should also be taken into
account. For, a no-alternative policy, as the one which only repeats
its devotion to the EU integrations without any other geopolitical
options, is no policy at all. In this sense, the presented EU
strategy has clearly demonstrated the futility of such a
no-alternative approach: regardless of how many times you repeat
your devotion to the EU values, principles and integrations, the EU
bureaucrats can simply tell you that you will never play in the same
team with them. However, such an arbitrary but definite rejection
logically pushes the country to look for geopolitical alternatives.
And it is high time for Bosnia-Herzegovina's people and intellectual
and political elites to understand that Brussels is not the only
option on the table, and that there are other geopolitical centers
whose interests might be identified as convergent with the interests
of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Still, all of them should first demonstrate
the ability to identify the interests of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which
means that they should first recognize it as a sovereign state with
its own interests, rather than someone else's proxy.
FEBRUARY 14, 2018
ASEAN Shared - the EU twin from Asia: New memories, old wounds
Photograph by Zanyasan
Bangkok – Imagining peace is a noble concept but what does it take
to achieve it?
Where does peace begin?
In modern day Southeast Asia, this can trace back to the 8th
of August, 1967 where five foreign ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia,
the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand joined hands to create the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations or what became known as
Diverse in nature and disperse in geography, ASEAN has achieved much
within the course of fifty years. The Association has grown in size
of its membership and expanded to reach ambitious mandates. In 2015,
ASEAN Economic Community was created to promote free movement of
people, goods and ideas.
Economic integration was just the beginning.
Coated in a long and wordy text and signed on 17th
November 2011, the Declaration on ASEAN Unity in Cultural Diversity
strived toward achieving “people centred and socially responsible
integration,” a socio-cultural integration in short.
Inspired by the European Union, creating one market was not enough
for ASEAN. The Association is driven to “forging a common identity”.
It is hoped that through such effort, peace, mutual understanding
and harmony will be fostered in Southeast Asia.
A common identity for more than 600 million people?
A little lofty.
To achieve this aspiration, the Shared History Project in Southeast
Asia was launched by UNESCO-Bangkok Office with funding from the
Republic of Korea in 2013 to create a new history curricular to be
taught and learned across ASEAN by 2018.
The project brought together historians, educators and researchers
across the region to search for common grounds of what aspect of
history to teach and how to teach it.
It is all for a higher purpose and a better future.
As the late Secretary General of ASEAN, Dr. Surin Pitsuwan,
persuasively said: “it is a better history education that will
produce and provide a strong foundation for understanding where we
have come from and to guide us into the future where we are going,
as individuals, as local communities, as nation states, as a greater
Ideally speaking, a Shared History should be welcomed with an open
arm. A project so inspiring that it aims to mitigate nationalism and
bridge differences across the nations.
In an interview with Dr. William Brehm of Waseda
University, he offered insight into this new architecture to build
peace in ASEAN.
There are many challenges to translate a Shared
Firstly, who will write these new memories? How can a consensus be
built amongst people with diverse cultural heritage, background and
If history is written by the winners – who are the winners in ASEAN?
In ASEAN, disputes and conflicts amongst nations
are not memories of things past, rather they are confounding issues
aggravating daily hatred across countries within the region. Border
dispute amongst nations is the case in point. As professor Anis H.
Bajrektarevic already warned in his luminary policy paper ‘No Asian
absolute or relative shift in economic and demographic strength of
one subject of international relations will inevitably put
additional stress on the existing power equilibriums and
constellations that support this balance in the particular theater
of implicit or explicit structure.”
Therefore, funded by the Thailand Research Fund,
Akkaraphong Khamkhun of Thammasat University counted as many as 20
ongoing territorial disputes in ASEAN. These conflicts are between
Malaysia and Brunei, Laos and Cambodia, Indonesia and the
This is not to mention the infamous
dispute that cuts deep wounds between Thailand
While the wounds are still fresh, how would these stories be told?
Whose stories, precisely?
Secondly, how can a Shared ASEAN formed when countries are deeply
founded with nationalistic sentiment, where overt nationalism is
propagated in and outside of classrooms, where the sense of hatred
to “the other” is instilled for students.
The villain of one country, is the hero of the other. Myanmar – Thai
historical text books are the prime examples on this. Thai kings are
always the heroes for Thailand, while Myanmar kings are presented
often and always as the villains.
This is what a well-known Thai historian
Thongchai Winichakul called “negative
For centuries, each country in ASEAN, is guilty for inflicting
negative identification for others to elevate a sense of pride for
themselves. It is easier to teach who is “us”, when you know who is
ASEAN is not alone in striving to form a new memory of themselves.
In the case of Africa, Dr. Brehm argued that the Shared History
project took as long as 35 years to be successful.
back to UNESCO’s 1964 General History of Africa project. That
project created a set of eight volumes articulating a shared history
of Africa. Huge disagreements among the various national historians
prolonged the project; it took 35 years before all eight volumes
If a country is an imagined community, said Bennedict Anderson in
his polemic book the Imagined Community, by schools, common language
and mass media, is it possible, Dr. Brehm asked, for the UNESCO and
ASEAN enthusiastic idealists to dream of a new common identity for
600 million people who speak more than hundreds of languages and
Is it possible that a common understanding can be reached and
harmony can be fostered through a new kind of text book, new
knowledge and new understanding to promote something as elusive as a
Dr. Brehm is a little sceptical: “So
long as education is organized by nation-states, history and
historical memory will always promote nationalism and national
identity. Everything else will be secondary or retro-fitted for the
Difficult but does that mean impossible?
Surely a Shared textbook is useful and much
needed intervention to cement a mutual understanding amongst ASEAN
students. For political, historical and educational reasons,
however, this project requires careful consideration, time and
resources to ensure that a new generation of ASEAN will be peace
loving rather than nationalistic hawkish.
Having a multilateral organization like UNESCO to
promote history lesson offers a humble step toward regional peace.
Where does peace begin?
It begins with mutual understanding.
More importantly, it has to begin now.
FEBRUARY 1, 2018
The International Institute for Middle-East
and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) in Ljubljana, Slovenia, regularly
analyses events in the Middle East and the Balkans. Following ICTY
judgments against Ratko Mladić and Jadranko Prlić IFIMES has
prepared an analysis of the situation and circumstances in which
those judgments were (not) accepted. The most interesting sections
from the analysis entitled “Croatia-BiH-Serbia:
Non-acceptance of ICTY judgments and 'humanisation' of crimes and
criminals” are presented below.
Non-acceptance of ICTY judgments and
“humanisation”of crimes and criminals
The verdicts against Ratko Mladić (IT-09-92)
and Jadranko Prlić et al. (IT-04-74) represent the
final judgments of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) which will formally cease to operate on 31
The Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals (MICT)
established by the UN Security Council resolution CS/RES/1966
(2010) will continue the work of ICTY as its legal successor at
least until 2023. MICT is formally ICTY's replacement body and as
such will work with the same capacity and mandate as ICTY. Analysts
believe that all the appeals and trial judgments before MICT1
should be concluded before a comprehensive
analysis and evaluation can be made of ICTY's 24 years of work.
No one had believed that ICTY would perform
In order to perform a comprehensive analysis, account should
be taken of the conditions under which ICTY worked, which were
anything but promising. A very illustrative example are regular
annual and semi-annual reports that have been submitted by ICTY's
President and Chief Prosecutor to UN Security Council since 1994. In
almost all reports they complained about the non-cooperation on the
part of the countries in the region, especially Serbia, but also
Croatia and the Republika Srpska entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
and about constant lack of financial and human resources.
During her testimony before ICTY former US Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright admitted that no one had believed the
Tribunal would perform its function, that the UN would appoint the
judges and prosecutors and that there would be any defendants,
apprehensions, trials, judgments and punishments. She was one of the
few persons who claimed the opposite: that the Tribunal would not
only perform its function but play the key role in establishing the
responsibility. The late professor M. Cherif Bassiouni wrote
in his memoirs that the fact that Western Forces knew that the then
President of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SRJ) Slobodan
Milosevic was responsible for many of the crimes in Bosnia and
Herzegovina made him all the more valuable as an interlocutor– “and
that knowledge, in turn, was incompatible with an assertive policy
of supporting justice”.
Although that was not ICTY's priority task, it defined the nature of
the armed conflict in the territory of former Yugoslavia, and thus
provided answers to two key questions: what were the war goals and
what was the nature of the armed conflict in the territory of former
Yugoslavia. It should be noted why ICTY decided to define the nature
of those conflicts while its priority task was to determine the
responsibility of individuals. Namely, the proving of charges under
Article 2 of ICTY Statute (Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions)
and the application of that Article 2 were conditional upon the
existence of an armed conflict. Therefore, in numerous judgments the
character of those conflicts had to be defined.
In its judgments ICTY established the
existence of an armed conflict in former Yugoslavia
In ICTY final judgments it was established that the conflicts in
the territory of former Yugoslavia were of an international nature:
Serbia against Croatia on one hand and Serbia and Croatia against
Bosnia and Herzegovina on the other hand. In more simple terms we
can say that in a series of judgment ICTY established the aggression
of SRJ (Serbia) and the Republic of Croatia against Bosnia and
Herzegovina as well as the aggression of Serbia against Croatia
based on their plans to create the Greater Serbia and the Greater
conclusions of ICTY judgments are based on evidence showing direct
and indirect interference of SRJ (Serbia) and the Republic of
Croatia in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as the interference of SRJ
(Serbia) in Croatia. In the judgments it was proven that the Greater
Serbia and Greater Croatia plans represented the bases for the
politics of committing crimes. The final judgment against Duško
Tadić (IT-94-1) states in paragraph 660: “As
discussed, this Trial Chamber has found that an armed conflict
existed in the territory of Opstina Prijedor at the relevant time
and that an aspect of this conflict was a policy to commit inhumane
acts against the civilian population of the territory, in particular
the non-Serb population, in the attempt to achieve the creation of a
The relevance of the Joint Criminal
Enterprise (JCE) legal doctrine
At the last meetings on the work of ICTY held in December
2017 in the UN, ICTY and MICT Chief Prosecutor Baron Serge
Brammertz stressed the importance of Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE)
as a legal doctrine: “Thanks to this
theory, we determined that the war in Bosnia was not only a civil
war, but that Belgrade, and also Zagreb, had a role in crimes in BiH,
which was an international armed conflict.”
The first-instance judgments against Ratko Mladić and Radovan
Karadžić taken by ICTY definitely represent the condemnation of
political, military and police leadership of Republika Srpska and
the confirmation of four JCEs. Analysts believe that both judgments
contain the correctly established facts based on four JCEs,
including the Srebrenica genocide. However, they failed to establish
the genocide in six BiH municipalities, although the majority of
judges except judge Orie established the genocidal intent in five
The trial chambers again withdrew from the previously established
facts in ICTY judgments regarding the JCE involving Slobodan
Milošević and other officials from Serbia. Namely, in the 2008
judgment against Milan Martić (IT-95-11) it was
concluded that: “In this respect, the Trial
Chamber recalls the evidence that the SVK and the VJ were in reality
one and the same organisation, only located at two separate
locations. Moreover, the evidence of Milan Martić’s arrest in 1991
gives a clear example of joint cooperation between political leaders
in the SAO Krajina, in the RS in BiH and in Serbia.
The Trial Chamber has been furnished with evidence that this type
of cooperation continued until 1995. “The Trial Chamber therefore
finds that at least Blagoje Adžić, Milan Babić, Radmilo
Bogdanović, Veljko Kadijević, Radovan Karadžić, Slobodan
Milošević, Ratko Mladić, Vojislav Šešelj, Franko “Frenki”
Simatović, Jovica Stanišić, and Captain Dragan Vasiljković
participated in the furtherance of the above-mentioned common
criminal purpose.” 3
A dishonourable role of the Dutch judge
It should be noted that judge Bakone Justice Moloto
from South Africa was presiding the Trial Chamber in the Martić case
and he was also member of the Appeals Chamber in the case of Prlić
et al. in which it was established that JCE existed and also that
former President of the Republic of Croatia Franjo Tuđman
took part in JCE. Analysts believe that the main reason why in the
cases of Karadžić and Mladić ICTY chambers withdrew in some parts
from the earlier final judgements lies in the fact that in those
cases the chambers were presided by Alphons Orie from the
Netherlands and O-Gon Kwon from South Korea, who had already
taken certain positions in earlier cases and did not change them in
the Karadžić and Mladić cases. Judge Orie presided the Trial Chamber
also in the judgement against Momćilo Krajišnik (IT-00-39)
when he denied the existence of genocide in other BiH municipalities
and excluded Serbian leaders from JCE, so it was expected that he
would do the same in the case of Ratko Mladić (IT-09-92), and
so he did. Judge Orie's separate opinion in the trial judgement
against Ratko Mladić shows just how persistent he was in his
position that no genocide was committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
He opposed the majority of judges who found that the genocidal
intent existed in five BiH municipalities. This finding represented
a revolutionary position of ICTY judges after 24 years of work of
the Tribunal and it now provides additional basis to MICT
prosecution in trying to prove through appeals proceedings that
genocide existed in other municipalities outside Srebrenica where
all kinds of crimes that fall within the competence of ICTY,
including ethnic cleansing, were established.
Judge Orie was also the presiding judge of the Trial Chamber in the
case of Jovica Stanišić and Franko Simatović in which he
scandalously concluded that the defendants were not responsible and
abolished the JCE in which they were together with Slobodan
Milošević, and then acquitted them. It was therefore expected that
as the presiding judge in the Mladić case judge Orie would do
everything to exclude from JCE Jovica Stanišić and Franko Simatović
and logically also Slobodan Milošević as their superior.
Nevertheless, his shameful judgement and the legal (non)standards
that he applied in the Stanišić-Simatović case are now reversed and
a new first instance trial is taking place.
The way in which presiding judge Orie together with another two
members of the Trial Chamber defined JCE in the judgment against
Ratko Mladić and the relationship between the Yugoslav Army (VJ) and
the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS) is in direct contradiction with
ICTY established case law. Thus in the final judgment against Duško
Tadić it is explicitly stated in paragraph 156: “As
the Appeals Chamber has already pointed out, international law does
not require that the particular acts in question should be the
subject of specific instructions or directives by a foreign State to
certain armed forces in order for these armed forces to be held to
be acting as de facto organs of that State. It follows that in the
circumstances of the case it was not necessary to show that those
specific operations carried out by the Bosnian Serb forces which
were the object of the trial (the attacks on Kozarac and more
generally within opština Prijedor) had been specifically ordered or
planned by the Yugoslav Army. It is sufficient to show that this
Army exercised overall control over the Bosnian Serb Forces. This
showing has been made by the Prosecution before the Trial Chamber.
Such control manifested itself not only in financial, logistical and
other assistance and support, but also, and more importantly, in
terms of participation in the general direction, coordination and
supervision of the activities and operations of the VRS. This sort
of control is sufficient for the purposes of the legal criteria
required by international law.”
In the trial judgement against Ratko Mladić (IT-09-92, par.
3782, p. 1914, vol. 4) the Trial Chamber presided by judge Orie
found that the Yugoslav Army provided the VRS with weapons,
ammunition, and that the soldiers received their salaries and
benefits from the VJ while they were incorporated into the VRS,
however the Trial Chamber noted that it received no evidence to
suggest that the VJ issued instructions (or was able to issue
instructions) to these soldiers once they were incorporated into the
VRS.4 In other words,
the Trial Chamber presided by judge Orie not only changed the
standard from the Tadić case, but judge Orie and another two judges
once again wrongly applied the standard of "specific direction"
which was already annulled and abolished in 2015 in ICTY's appeal
judgment against Stanišić and Simatović. In its reversal of the
trial judgment against Stanišić and Simatović the ICTY Appeals
Chamber stated that the Trial Chamber erred in applying the law when
it required that the acts of the aider and abettor be specifically
directed to assist the commission of a crime. Thus the Appeals
Chamber stated that “if the new trial
chamber were to examine the responsibility of Stanišić and
Simatović for aiding and abetting the crimes, the Appeals Chamber
instructs it to apply the correct law on aiding and abetting
liability as set out above, which does not require that the acts of
the aider and abettor be specifically directed to assist the
commission of the crime.”
It is worrying from the legal point of view that the Appeals Chamber
in 2015 issued instructions on how and under what standards the
retrial in the Stanišić-Simatović case it to take place. Judge Orie
and the Trial Chamber which he presided in the Mladić case once
again introduced the non-existent standards based on which
Momćilo Perišić as well as Stanišić and Simatović had already
been acquitted in earlier cases. To the satisfaction of the broad
legal circles the Appeals Chamber eventually managed to abolish the
standard of “specific direction” applied in the trial judgment
against Stanišić and Simatović and to reverse the judgment.
Consequently, a fierce legal “battle” is expected to take place in
appeals proceedings against Mladić as well as against Karadžić with
the aim to apply the conclusions of the final judgments and the
correct international standards for determining criminal liability.
Judge O-Gon Kwon is best known from the trial against Slobodan
Milošević in which he presented his separate opinion in the interim
judgment in which Milošević was found liable under all charges in
the indictment including JCE and the genocide in other BiH
municipalities. Judge O-Gon Kwon was outvoted by the other two
judges who decided that Milošević could already at the halfway stage
be held liable under all charges in the indictment. As presiding
judge in the Karadžić case, O-Gon Kwon once again excluded Milošević
from JCE, which will be the subject of the appeals proceedings
The key fact in evaluating the results of ICTY is that Slobodan
Milošević was the only president from former Yugoslav republics who
stood for trial before ICTY. It is therefore expected that in the
appeals proceedings against Mladić and Karadžić MICT would respect
the earlier conclusions from ICTY judgments and the fact that
Milošević was charged with crimes committed in three countries in
the framework of JCE.
Reactions to the judgment against Prlić:
everyone accusing each other, but no one has accused the defence
ICTY's final judgment against Prlić et al. pronounced on 29
November 2017 has triggered predictable reactions, especially in
Croatia. ICTY has continually delivered judgments in which it
confirmed that there was an international conflict in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and that Serbia and Croatia interfered in Bosnia and
Herzegovina by controlling, respectively, the military forces of
Bosnian Serbs and the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) in the so
called Croatian republic of Herzeg-Bosnia with the aim to annex
parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Croatian public has been deceived
by hysterical statements made by the highest officials of the
Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and the Republic of Croatia who
claimed that the appeal proceeding was decided on the basis of
Franjo Tuđman's presidential transcripts. They have
intentionally concealed the fact that in the first three trials
before ICTY the international conflict/aggression by the Republic of
Croatia was established without the use of Tuđman's transcripts. In
those three trials in the cases of Kordić and Čerkez (IT-95-14/2),
Blaškić (IT- 95-14/1) and Aleksovski (IT- 95-14) the
role of the Republic of Croatia was established in both trial and
appeals proceedings in which 22 ICTY prosecutors took part and none
of them applied Tuđman's transcripts.
Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE) as an element of proving criminal
liability and international armed conflict represents two sides of
the coin. Judgement against Prlić et al. was more or less expected,
but after the acquittal of Ante Gotovina and others there was
reasonable caution among all ICTY connoisseurs. Analysts believe
that the prosecution outwitted the defence whose biggest mistake was
that it demanded the trial chamber to provide for the fifth time
evidence on Croatia's interference in the war in Bosnia and
Herzegovina although the prosecution had offered to reach an
agreement on the established facts.
Thus the defence made it easier for the prosecution to prove grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions in parallel with the
establishment of international armed conflict in BiH and joint
criminal enterprise. Other mistakes noted by the analysts include
the three demands of the Republic of Croatia to participate in the
proceeding as the “friend of the court”
and the statements made by incumbent Croatian President Kolinda
Grabar Kitarović that she would not accept the sentencing
judgment and the statement by the Croatian member of the BiH
Presidency Dragan Čović who said that he knew in advance the
Appeals Chamber's decision. The analysts have estimated the defence
of Bruno Stojić as the worst one, since it focused on denying JCE
and saving Croatia instead of contesting Stojić' concrete liability,
although Stojić's position in the structure of the so called
Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia was the most simple case for
In her final speech in the case of Prlić et al. defence counsel
Senka Nožica used political rhetoric stressing that Bosnia and
Herzegovina was a dysfunctional state and that most of the Croats
living there felt that they were denied some of their rights. Noting
that Croatian politicians also expressed concerns regarding that
issue, Nožica stressed that “the third
entity and Herzeg-Bosnia were no longer taboo topics”. Such
statements provoked outrage in European and American highest
professional, political and diplomatic circles. The defence
presented Bruno Stojić as a temperate person who supports
coexistence, while on the other hand it spent most of the time
presenting evidence showing the Bosniak political leaders and the
BiH Army as a criminal organisation which had planned and initiated
the attacks at Croatian civilians and the Croatian Defence Council (HVO)
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Those arguments were regarded as
unsustainable by the trial chambers. The defence thus lost a lot of
valuable time which it could have spent for protecting the interests
of its clients.
It can be concluded that it is mainly thanks to the professional
attitude of ICTY's staff and the willingness of mostly the
Bosnian-Croatian side to cooperate that ICTY has fulfilled its
mandate through apprehensions, trials and judgments of all 161
suspects. However, we should not forget that ICTY would have never
determined the goal, scope, extent, nature and system of committed
crimes were it not for the testimonies of over 4,000 victims.
Instead of cooperating with ICTY, which was the obligation of all
the actors from the former Yugoslavia under
their national laws, certain highest representatives of Croatia,
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia have
rejected to accept the adopted judgments and even tried to “humanise”
the committed crimes and their perpetrators.
Ljubljana, 21 December 2017
International Institute for Middle-East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES)
1 STANIŠIĆ Jovica and SIMATOVIĆ
Franko (MICT-15-96), KARADŽIĆ Radovan (MICT-13-55), ŠEŠELJ Vojislav
(MICT-16-99) MLADIĆ Ratko (MICT IT-09-92 ).
The list of judgments with the related paragraphs,
including the interim judgement against Slobodan Milošević: ICTY,
The Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, IT-94-1, par.
ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalić,
IT-96-21, par. 110,221,223,225,233 (‘Delalić’)
ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević,
Trial Chamber, Decision on Motion for Judgement of Acquittal, 16
June 2004., IT-02-54, par. 254 (‘S. Milošević) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/d7fb46/,
ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Milan Martić,
IT-95-11, par. 329,442-446 (‘Martić’)
ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Radoslav
Brđanin, IT-99-36, par. 76,148.150,151,153,154 http://www.icty.org/bcs/case/brdanin/4
ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Miroslav Deronjić,
Sentencing Judgement, 30 March 2004., IT-02-61, par. 52 (‘Deronjić’)
ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Jadranko Prlić et
al., IT-04-74, par. 24 ,544,545,549,550,560,568 (‘Prlić et
ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Dario Kordić and
Mario Čerkez, IT-95-14/2, par. 108,109,137,142,145 (‘Kordić
and Čerkez’) http://www.icty.org/bcs/case/kordic_cerkez/4
ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreškić et
al., IT-95-16, par. 40 (‘Kupreškić et al.’)
ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Mladen Naletilić
and Vinko Martinović, IT-98-34, par. 14 ,196,200 (‘Naletilić
and Martinović’) http://www.icty.org/bcs/case/naletilic_martinovic/4
ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić,
IT-95-14-T, par. 94, 122,123,744 (‘Blaškić’) http://www.icty.org/bcs/case/blaskic/4
The Prosecutor v. Milan Martić, Judgement, IT-95-11-T, par. 446 (‘Martić’)
adopting this conclusion, the Trial Chamber took the position that
Slobodan Milošević, who is referred to in the judgement as VJ’s
Supreme Commander and President of the Supreme Defence Council, is
to be excluded from JCE. For MICT's prosecution in the appeal
proceeding it will be of key importance to define the position of
Slobodan Milošević in the trial judgement in relation to the
conclusion of the trial chamber. Interestingly, the trial chamber
held the opinion that Milošević received instructions from the
Supreme Defence Council,
DECEMBER 26, 2017
Revisiting Dictatorship: Democracy is Worst Form
of Government, Indeed
By Endy Bayuni
Democracy is both: the procedure and the
content. It is a periodically revisited, fine-calibrated
social contract that ties all horizontal and vertical segments
of society. Although sometimes slow, tedious and consuming, this is
still a truly comprehensive, just and sustainable way to build on
its past, live the presence and pursuit the future of a nation.”
Following the known lines of professor Anis H. Bajrektarevic on ties
that bind, hereby is the fresh take from one of the largest
democracies of the world – that of Republic of Indonesia.
The late Soeharto has become something of a poster
boy for leadership as the nation searches for a president who can
effectively deliver the goods.
Photos of the smiling president, who ruled Indonesia
between 1966-1998, appear everywhere, with the caption in Javanese “piye
kabare, isih penak jamanku, tho?” (How
are you, better in my era, wasn’t it?), a reminder that for some,
life was so much better then. The Soeharto posters and memes have
been going viral since the 2014 election and are still circulating
Soeharto was a dictator, there is no doubt about it,
though his supporters would claim that he was a noble one. But the
point of the poster is that Indonesia had a leader who delivered the
goods, something that no other president since then has been able to
match, so his supporters claim.
Soeharto, who ruled with an iron fist, did deliver
justice, security and welfare, but it is debatable whether his
successors have fared better or worse. Ruling the country for 32
years, he was bound to have delivered something, while his
successors have been subject to periodic democratic elections and
limited to ruling for no more than two five-year terms.
The bigger question, and this was one of the topics
discussed at the recent Bali Civil Society and Media Forum, is
whether democracy can deliver justice, security and welfare to the
people, all the people.
Indonesia, now a democracy for nearly 20 years,
albeit a struggling one, makes a good case study to answer this
question, by comparing the ability of the two political systems in
bringing greater prosperity to the people.
The track record of Indonesia since 1998 has not been
bad, although perhaps underappreciated.
The economy has improved significantly, in terms of
overall GDP and per-capita-income growth, and the government today
provides many services such as free health care, 12-year compulsory
free education and cash assistance for the poor. Indonesia is today
the 16th-largest economy in the world, and many predict that it will
be in the top 10 by 2025 and top five by 2040.
We have a growing middle class, reflected by the
number cellphones, cars and motorcycles, and a growing appetite for
holidays, both at home or abroad.
And there is freedom, all kinds of freedom, something
that distinguishes today’s era from that of Soeharto’s. Why then, do
some people still feel that they miss Soeharto?
Perhaps they don’t really miss him, but they miss the
certainty, the swift way decisions were made and the security he
provided. They miss the effectiveness and efficiency that an
authoritarian regime can deliver.
Democracy, unfortunately, is almost anything but.
Decisions are made through an arduous and cumbersome
process, and the government is often mired in stagnation. Every
single major decision has to undergo the democratic processes,
meaning noisy public debates and endless deliberation by
We also have legislators who are good at
grandstanding but ineffective in producing laws that reflect the
aspirations of the people. In many ways, Soeharto’s regime produced
some better laws because they did not go through the lengthy debates
we see today.
On security, Indonesia faces challenges in ensuring
protection for people who are attacked or persecuted because of
their faith, race, sexual orientation or even ideological leanings.
The attacks on the Shia and Ahmadiyya followers, the
forced closures of places of worship, the recent attacks against
people because of their leftist ideological leanings, and the return
of anti-Chinese sentiments, reflect that freedom and the protection
of freedom have been denied to some.
Soeharto would not have tolerated any of this, but
then, he would not have tolerated a lot of other things, including
dissent and differences of opinion.
Populism, the hallmark of democracy and one way of
getting elected, also means leaders addressing only popular issues
but avoiding more fundamental problems.
These failings of democracy in Indonesia may have
revived our memory of the “good old days” of Soeharto (while
forgetting the worse aspects of his regime), but they should not be
used as a pretext for a return to authoritarianism.
Democracy in Indonesia is still a work in progress.
We have been in this game for only 20 years, and it still has not
been able to ensure justice, security and welfare for all.
Democracy, as the popular saying goes, is the worst
form of government, except for all the others. The alternative, an
authoritarian regime, may be swift and efficient. But if
authoritarianism comes at the cost of our freedom, an absence of
checks and balances and endemic corruption, then yes, give us
democracy any time.
We just have to work harder, through the democratic
process, to fix these problems. We have to have faith in democracy.
By Endy Bayuni
The writer, editor-in-chief of
The Jakarta Post, took part
in the Bali Civil Society and Media Forum, organized by the
Institute for Peace and Democracy and the Press Council, on Dec.5-6.
DECEMBER 12, 2017
Shared - the EU twin from Asia: New memories, old wounds - Rattana
European Commission's Strategy for the Western Balkans - Bureaucrats
Crusade - By Zlatko Hadžidedić
PUBLICATIONS DECEMBRE 2017
Non-acceptance of ICTY judgments and “humanisation”of crimes and
criminals - Bakhtyar Aljaf - IFIMES
Revisiting Dictatorship: Democracy is Worst
Form of Government, Indeed - By Endy Bayuni
of Justice at the ICTY: Bosnians consider guilty genocide verdict
for Mladić incomplete - By Tarik Borogovac, Bosnian Congress USA
PUBLICATIONS OCTOBER, 2017:
OSCE SUPPLEMENTARY HUMAN DIMENSION MEETING - Clara Lorenz
story of Kurz: 'Austria You will be Macronised' - Max Hess
Germany that kills itself and Europe - Michael dr. Logies,
PUBLICATIONS SEPTEMBER, 2017:
Grabar-Kitarović and Vučić on a
joint mission to (de)stabilize the region
over troubled waters – Growing meritime dispute between Croatia and
Bosnia, neglected by the EU - Dr. Enis Omerović and Adil Kulenović
ARE WE DEALING WITH – TRUMP OR DEMOCRACY - By: Tomislav Jakić
and Africa – Similarities and difference in Security Structures -
Written by Anis Bajrektarevic and Giuliano Luongo
The Return of Good Policies for Bad Reasons - Populism and
Industrial Policy - Amanda Janoo
Serbia Delivered Srebrenica Refugees to Mladic: Report - Filip Rudic - BIRN-Belgrade
stuggle on the Balkans - Senadin Lavić
Bosnian Reporter Flees After Condemning Mladic Rally - BIRN - Banja
REGIONAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURES: COMPARING ASIA AND EUROPE -
Insights from Anis Bajrektarevic
“We win, they lose” – Wonderful world of Binary categorisations - (Refeudalisation
of Europe – III Part) - Anis H. Bajrektarevic
Sarajevo, Jerusalem of Europe
Memorandum of Understanding between IFIMES and GBAA
Paris and Pittsburgh, pesticides in Indonesia: When none is best
- Julia Suryakusuma
COMMON SENSE – A RELIC OF THE PAST? - By: Tomislav Jakic
post-Christian West and post-Western World - (Refeudalisation of
Europe – II Part) - Anis H. Bajrektarevic
Zbigniew Brzezinski & the Battle on Post Communism Fascism - By,
Ambassador Muhamed Sacirbey
Post-secular Europe and post-Soviet Russia - Anis H.
The story of a Bosnian woman who lost her entire family to the
terror of the 1990s:“I feel like a cut tree. I am neither alive nor
dead … There is no justice and there will never be,” - Robert
'Schindler List' for Southeast Europe - Pakistanisation as the Final Solution for the Balkans? - Prof.
Brazil in the short Strikes – the ultimate price
of welfare - By Luísa Monteiro
prof. dr. Anis Bajrektarevic
Editor - Geopolitics, History, International Relations (GHIR) Addleton Academic
Publishers - New YorK
Senior Advisory board member, geopolitics of energy Canadian energy research
institute - ceri, Ottawa/Calgary
Advisory Board Chairman Modern Diplomacy & the md Tomorrow's people platform
Head of mission and department head - strategic studies on Asia
Professor and Chairperson Intl. law & global pol. studies
Critical Similarities and Differences in SS of Asia and Europe - Prof.
Anis H. Bajrektarevic
MENA Saga and Lady Gaga - (Same dilemma from the MENA) - Anis H. Bajrektarevic
HE ONGOING PUBLIC DEBT CRISIS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: IMPACTS ON AND LESSONS
FOR VIETNAM - Dr. Nguyen Anh Tuan, Assos. Prof. Nguyen Linh
Change and Re Insurance: The Human Security Issue SC-SEA Prof. Anis
Bajrektarevic & Carla Baumer
(Researcher and Lecturer at the Faculty of Social and Politics,
University of Jayabaya)
the ‘crisis of secularism’ in Western Europe the result of multiculturalism?
Dr. Emanuel L. Paparella
A Modest “Australian” Proposal to Resolve our Geo-Political Problems
Were the Crusades Justified? A Revisiting - Dr. Emanuel L. Paparella
Earned an MA in International Relations from the University of East
Anglia in Norwich, United Kingdom in 2013. Her research interests include
foreign policy decision-making, realism and constructivism, and social
psychology and constructivism.
is an independent researcher specialized in International Politics and Peace
& Conflict Studies with a regional focus on the Balkans and the Middle East.
Founder of Internacionalista
Săo Paulo, Brazil
Brazil – New Age
political character of Social Media: How do Greek Internet users perceive and
use social networks?
SWISS UMEF UNIVERSITY
is a master`s degree student on the University for Criminal justice and Security
in Ljubljana. She obtained her bachelor`s degree in Political Science- Defense
George Mason University School of Policy, Government, and
Intl. Relations She focuses on Russia and Central Asia. Ms. Brletich is an
employee of the US Department of Defense.
Interview on HRT-Radio
Prof. dr. Anis Bajrektarević
Dr Filippo ROMEO,
is the outspoken Indonesian thinker,
social-cause fighter and trendsetter. She is the author of Julia’s Jihad.
Mads is an intern at PCRC. Mads Jacobsen is from Denmark and is currently
pursuing his Master's degree in 'Development and International Relations' at
University of Bihac, Faculty of Education,
Department of English Language and Literature - undergraduate
University of Banja Luka, Faculty of Philology, Department of English Language
and Literature - graduate study
Rakesh Krishnan Simha
New Zealand-based journalist and foreign affairs analyst. According to him, he
writes on stuff the media distorts, misses or ignores.
Rakesh started his career in 1995 with New Delhi-based Business World magazine,
and later worked in a string of positions at other leading media houses such as
India Today, Hindustan Times, Business Standard and the Financial Express, where
he was the news editor.
He is the Senior Advisory Board member of one of the fastest growing Europe’s
foreign policy platforms: Modern Diplomacy.
Daniele Scalea, geopolitical
analyst, is Director-general of IsAG (Rome Institute of Geopolitics) and Ph.D.
Candidate in Political studies at the Sapienza University, Rome. Author of three
books, is frequent contributor and columnist to various Tv-channels and
Research Associate at Institute of High
Studies in Geopolitics and Auxiliary Sciences (IsAG), Rome, Italy, and Ph.D.
researcher at University of Padova, is IMN Country Representative in Italy.
Foreign Policy Advisor to former Croatian
President Stjepan Mesić
Graduate of the London School of Economics,
prof. Zlatko Hadžidedić is a prominent thinker,
prolific author of numerous books, and indispensable political figure of the
former Yugoslav socio-political space in 1990s, 2000s and 2010s.
Mr. Nicola Bilotta
Nicola Bilotta has a BA and a MA
in History from Universitŕ degli Studi di Milano and a MSc in Economic History
from the London School of Economics. He works as a Global Finance Research
Assistant at The Banker (Financial Times) and collaborates as an external
researcher at ISAG (Istituto di Alti Studi di Geopolitica e Scienze Ausiliari)
Date and Place of Birth: April 22, 1943 – Amurang,
North Sulawesi, IndonesiaEducation: Bachelor in Public
Writer was a member of the House of Representatives
of Indonesia (DPR/MPR-RI) period of 1987-1999, and Chairman of
Committee X, cover Science and Technology, Environment and National
Development Planning (1988-1997).
Currently as Obsever of Nuclear for peace.
Attached to the US-based Berkeley University,
Sooyoung Hu is a scholar at its Political Science and Peace and Conflict
Studies Department. Miss Hu focuses on international relations, international
organizations and its instruments.
is a Ottawa-based free-lance writer from Zanzibar, Tanzania.
Recently retired Senior lecturer on Development studies, he extensively
publishes in over 50 countries on 4 continents. He can be reached at
Robert Leonard Rope
He studied at the University of
He lives in: San Francisco, California: San Francisco, California, USA
Dr. Enis OMEROVIĆ
Max Hess is a senior political risk analyst
with the London-based AEK international, specializing in Europe and Eurasia.