Ing. Salih CAVKIC
Paris nor Brussels!
We want to live in peace with all
regardless of their religion, color and origin.
Therefore, we condemn any
kind of terrorism!
Ne više Pariz ni Brisel!
Mi želimo živjeti u miru sa svim našim
bez obzira koje su vjere, boje kože i porijekla.
Zato mi osuđujemo svaku vrstu terorizma!
Prof. dr. Murray Hunter
University Malaysia Perlis
Years to Trade Economic Independence for Political Sovereignty -
Aleš Debeljak +
Defense of Cross-Fertilization: Europe and Its Identity
Contradictions - Aleš Debeljak
ALEŠ DEBELJAK - ABECEDA DJETINJSTVA
ALEŠ DEBEJAK - INTERVJU; PROSVJEDI, POEZIJA, DRŽAVA
Rattana Lao holds a doctorate in Comparative and International
Education from Teachers College, Columbia University and is currently teaching in Bangkok.
Director of Middle-East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) in Ljubljana, Slovenia
Rakesh Krishnan Simha
Géométrie variable of a love triangle – India, Russia and the US
Amna Whiston is a London-based writer specialising in moral philosophy. As a
PhD candidate at Reading University, UK, her main research interests are in ethics, rationality, and moral psychology.
Eirini Patsea is a Guest Editor in Modern Diplomacy, and
specialist in Cultural Diplomacy and Faith-based Mediation.
Can we trust the government to do the right thing, are they really
care about essential things such as environmental conditions and
education in our life?
Univ. prof. Dubravko Lovrenović is one of the leading European Medievalist specialized in the Balkans, pre-modern and modern political history.
Postgraduate researcher in International Relations and Diplomacy at the Geneva-based UMEF University
professor of IT law and EU law at Banja Luka College,
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Studied in Belgrade (Political Science) and in Moscow (Plekhanov’s IBS). Currently, a post-doctoral researcher at the Kent University in Brussels (Intl. Relations). Specialist for the
MENA-Balkans frozen and controlled conflicts.
Dr. Swaleha Sindhi is
Assistant Professor in the Department of Educational Administration, the Maharaja Sayajirao University of
Baroda, India. Decorated educational practitioner Dr. Sindhi is a frequent columnist on related topics, too. She is the Vice President
of Indian Ocean Comparative Education Society (IOCES). Contact:
It is an Ankara-based
journalist and notable author.
She is engaged with the leading Turkish dailies and weeklies for
nearly three decades as a columnist, intervieweer and editor.
Her words are prolifically published and quoted in Turkish,
French an English.
By İLNUR ÇEVIK
Modified from the original: They killed 1 Saddam and created 1,000 others (Daily Sabah)
Aine O'Mahony has a bachelor in Law and Political Science at
the Catholic Institute of Paris and is currently a master's student
of Leiden University in the International Studies programme.Contact:
Elodie Pichon has a
bachelor in Law and Political Science at the Catholic Institute of
Paris and is currently doing a MA in Geopolitics, territory and
Security at King's College London. Contact :
a MA candidate of the George
Washington University, Elliott School of International Affairs. Her
research focus is on cross-Pacific security and Asian studies,
particularly on the Sino-U.S. relations and on the foreign policy
and politics of these two.
Born in Chile and raised in Rome, Alessandro
Cipri has just finished his postgraduate studies at the department
of War Studies of King's College London, graduating with distinction
from the Master's Degree in "Intelligence and International
Security". Having served in the Italian Army's "Alpini" mountain
troops, he has a keen interest in national security, military
strategy, insurgency theory, and terrorism studies. His Master's
dissertation was on the impact of drug trafficking on the evolution
of the Colombian FARC.
Ms. Lingbo ZHAO
is a candidate of the Hong Kong Baptist
University, Department of Government and International Studies. Her
research interest includes Sino-world, Asia and cross-Pacific.
Hannes Grassegger and Mikael Krogerus are investigative
journalists attached to the Swiss-based Das Magazin specialized
Hannes Grassegger and Mikael Krogerus are investigative journalists attached to the Swiss-based Das Magazin
Ms. Elodie Pichon, Research Fellow of the IFIMES Institute, DeSSA Department. This native Parisian is a Master in Geopolitics,
Territory and Security from the King’s College, London, UK.
Ambassador Muhamed Sacirbey currently lectures on Digital-Diplomacy. "Mo"
has benefited from a diverse career in investment banking & diplomacy, but
his passion has been the new avenues of communication. He was Bosnia &
Herzegovina's first Ambassador to the United Nations, Agent to the
International Court of Justice, Foreign Minister & Signatory of the Rome
Statute establishing the International Criminal Court. He also played
American football opting for a scholarship to Tulane University in New
Orleans after being admitted to Harvard, oh well!!
Amanda Janoo is an Alternative
Economic Policy Adviser to governments and development
organizations. Graduate from Cambridge University with an MPhil in
Development Studies, Amanda worked at the United Nations Industrial
Development Organization (UNIDO) supporting government's with
evidence-based industrial policy design for inclusive and
sustainable growth. Her research focus is on the relationship
between international trade and employment generation. She has
worked throughout Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa promoting greater
economic self-determination and empowerment.
Michael dr. Logies,
Dutch - Nederlands
French - Français
German - Deutsch
Revisiting Dictatorship: Democracy is Worst Form
of Government, Indeed
By Endy Bayuni
Democracy is both: the procedure and the
content. It is a periodically revisited, fine-calibrated
social contract that ties all horizontal and vertical segments
of society. Although sometimes slow, tedious and consuming, this is
still a truly comprehensive, just and sustainable way to build on
its past, live the presence and pursuit the future of a nation.”
Following the known lines of professor Anis H. Bajrektarevic on ties
that bind, hereby is the fresh take from one of the largest
democracies of the world – that of Republic of Indonesia.
The late Soeharto has become something of a poster
boy for leadership as the nation searches for a president who can
effectively deliver the goods.
Photos of the smiling president, who ruled Indonesia
between 1966-1998, appear everywhere, with the caption in Javanese “piye
kabare, isih penak jamanku, tho?” (How
are you, better in my era, wasn’t it?), a reminder that for some,
life was so much better then. The Soeharto posters and memes have
been going viral since the 2014 election and are still circulating
Soeharto was a dictator, there is no doubt about it,
though his supporters would claim that he was a noble one. But the
point of the poster is that Indonesia had a leader who delivered the
goods, something that no other president since then has been able to
match, so his supporters claim.
Soeharto, who ruled with an iron fist, did deliver
justice, security and welfare, but it is debatable whether his
successors have fared better or worse. Ruling the country for 32
years, he was bound to have delivered something, while his
successors have been subject to periodic democratic elections and
limited to ruling for no more than two five-year terms.
The bigger question, and this was one of the topics
discussed at the recent Bali Civil Society and Media Forum, is
whether democracy can deliver justice, security and welfare to the
people, all the people.
Indonesia, now a democracy for nearly 20 years,
albeit a struggling one, makes a good case study to answer this
question, by comparing the ability of the two political systems in
bringing greater prosperity to the people.
The track record of Indonesia since 1998 has not been
bad, although perhaps underappreciated.
The economy has improved significantly, in terms of
overall GDP and per-capita-income growth, and the government today
provides many services such as free health care, 12-year compulsory
free education and cash assistance for the poor. Indonesia is today
the 16th-largest economy in the world, and many predict that it will
be in the top 10 by 2025 and top five by 2040.
We have a growing middle class, reflected by the
number cellphones, cars and motorcycles, and a growing appetite for
holidays, both at home or abroad.
And there is freedom, all kinds of freedom, something
that distinguishes today’s era from that of Soeharto’s. Why then, do
some people still feel that they miss Soeharto?
Perhaps they don’t really miss him, but they miss the
certainty, the swift way decisions were made and the security he
provided. They miss the effectiveness and efficiency that an
authoritarian regime can deliver.
Democracy, unfortunately, is almost anything but.
Decisions are made through an arduous and cumbersome
process, and the government is often mired in stagnation. Every
single major decision has to undergo the democratic processes,
meaning noisy public debates and endless deliberation by
We also have legislators who are good at
grandstanding but ineffective in producing laws that reflect the
aspirations of the people. In many ways, Soeharto’s regime produced
some better laws because they did not go through the lengthy debates
we see today.
On security, Indonesia faces challenges in ensuring
protection for people who are attacked or persecuted because of
their faith, race, sexual orientation or even ideological leanings.
The attacks on the Shia and Ahmadiyya followers, the
forced closures of places of worship, the recent attacks against
people because of their leftist ideological leanings, and the return
of anti-Chinese sentiments, reflect that freedom and the protection
of freedom have been denied to some.
Soeharto would not have tolerated any of this, but
then, he would not have tolerated a lot of other things, including
dissent and differences of opinion.
Populism, the hallmark of democracy and one way of
getting elected, also means leaders addressing only popular issues
but avoiding more fundamental problems.
These failings of democracy in Indonesia may have
revived our memory of the “good old days” of Soeharto (while
forgetting the worse aspects of his regime), but they should not be
used as a pretext for a return to authoritarianism.
Democracy in Indonesia is still a work in progress.
We have been in this game for only 20 years, and it still has not
been able to ensure justice, security and welfare for all.
Democracy, as the popular saying goes, is the worst
form of government, except for all the others. The alternative, an
authoritarian regime, may be swift and efficient. But if
authoritarianism comes at the cost of our freedom, an absence of
checks and balances and endemic corruption, then yes, give us
democracy any time.
We just have to work harder, through the democratic
process, to fix these problems. We have to have faith in democracy.
By Endy Bayuni
The writer, editor-in-chief of
The Jakarta Post, took part
in the Bali Civil Society and Media Forum, organized by the
Institute for Peace and Democracy and the Press Council, on Dec.5-6.
DECEMBER 12, 2017
National Congress of The Republic of
ONLINE NEWSLETTER International, No. 959
December 3, 2017
Miscarriage of Justice at the ICTY: Bosnians
consider guilty genocide verdict for Mladić incomplete
Miscarriage of Justice at the ICTY: Bosnians consider guilty
genocide verdict for Mladić incomplete
1.1 The definition of the genocide is clear, simple and well
1.2 Genocide is very well documented in the Mladić judgment
1.3 The court setting its own definition of the genocide
1.4 The consequences of the new definition of genocide
2. Skraćeni opis metodologije suda i konzekvence takve metodologije
kojom se praktično mijenja defincija genocida
3. Success of the book "The War in Bosnia: How to Succeed at
5. Veliki uspjeh knjige “The War in Bosnia: How to Succeed at
The Flag of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina with lilies on East River
This issue of the newsletter goes on 2,989 e-mail addresses on our
"International" mailing list and on 63,731 addresses in our "Bosnian"
If you do not want to receive this Online Newsletter just reply with "UNSUBSCRIBE"
in the subject line.
1. Miscarriage of Justice at the ICTY: Bosnians consider
guilty genocide verdict for Mladić incomplete
By Tarik Borogovac, Bosnian Congress USA
1.1 The definition of the genocide is clear, simple and
In Bosnia and Herzegovina the Mladić decision, as the previous decisions at
the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY), is seen as
incomplete and a major miscarriage of justice. That may sound odd: Mladić
was proclaimed guilty of genocide carried out by the army that he commanded,
and he was sentenced to life in prison. How can it be miscarriage of justice?
First, Mladić's mission to establish an ethnically clean "Republic of the
Serbs" (RS) is alive and well. The establishment of the RS was the
successful main goal of the Joint criminal enterprise, (JCE). Today it is
both a symbol of genocide while also continuing its humiliation of the
victims through governing their hometowns, setting school curricula that
denies students' identity and history, flying its flag on sacred ground of
Srebrenica and other massacred Bosnian towns. While the RS exists, the ICTY
trials of a few ring-leaders and ideologues is fake justice because the
punishment is their own, and it exempts and protects the RS government that
committed these acts.
The second reason, on which we will spend the rest of this column, is the
verdict regarding Claim (I) of the indictment, relating to six towns other
than Srebrenica. The decision (and previous ones on Bosnia specifically)
uses very odd twists of logic in a strange effort to find reasons why these
towns might be different from Srebrenica. And their logic does not stand up
to basic scrutiny because there is no fundamental difference. It completely
weakens the definition of genocide, to an extent that many future genocides
will not be punished as such.
Let us remind ourselves how genocide is defined (from the convention on
Article II: In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following
acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Note this definition clearly is meant to prevent hairsplitting about what is
genocide. The word "intent" is used to make clear that you do not have to be
very successful in carrying it out to make it genocide, and "in part" means
that you do not have to even desire to kill every single group member, as
killing some of them for mere reason of being members of the group is
genocide. Even non-murderous acts qualify -- e.g. part (d) makes clear that
forcing sterilization or abortions of folks for the reason of being members
of the group qualifies. There is also no mention of victims being very
special or emblematic members of the targeted group -- it is genocide even
with (especially with) regular people because the motive is merely based on
the ethnic, religious, or racial membership of the victim.
1.2 The genocide is pretty well documented in the judgment
Everyone should read the decision or at least any random part of it, as it
is very long. Everyone, from schoolchildren to genocide deniers should read
it for the power of the evidence. In page after page, for thousands of pages,
it shows us what genocide looks like when carried out. Dispassionately, just
stating the facts, it documents statements by the JCE leaders, including
Mladić, that threaten to exterminate Bosniaks. It documents killings and
brutal violence against large numbers of Bosniak civilians -- giving times
and locations of the acts, names of victims and their killers, the methods
used to commit the murders. It is not exhaustive, it does not include every
killing in every town, as that would not be feasible to do. But there are
very many examples from different towns -- more than enough to show the
Just as a sampling of this, let us review a chilling section of summaries of
mass murder (omitting mass rapes, beatings detentions, etc.) of Bosniaks
carried out by people identified as Serbian military and paramilitary
members, motivated by ethnicity.
Foca: 46 Bosnian Muslims as well as hundreds of predominantly Bosnian-Muslim
detainees at KP Dom Foca (prison) were killed
Kljuc: at least 266 Bosnian Muslims were killed and that those killings
Kotor Varoš: at least 185 Bosnian Muslims were killed and that those
killings constituted murder.
Prijedor: at least 993 Bosnian Muslims as well as at least 536 Bosnian
Muslims or Bosnian Croats were killed and that those killings constituted
Sanski Most: at least 94 Bosnian Muslims and 9 Bosnian Croats were killed
and that those killings constituted murder.
Vlasenica: at least 169 Bosnian Muslims were killed and that those killings
A technical note: ICTY refers to Bosniaks as "Bosnian Muslims" because
Yugoslavia officially used the name "Muslims by Nationality" to deny their
Bosniak identity. Bosniaks were called Turks by Serb nationalist leadership,
inciting Serb people toward historic score-settling.
Notice the words "at least" attached to the figures above. These figures
represent only the confirmed victims known to be tied to specific physical
perpetrators as part of the specific massacres, just as we know there were
many, many more dead in these areas. For example, estimates of numbers
murdered in Prijedor during the war, a town taken over without resistance
early in the war, are more than double what is listed above. Note also, that
these are not all of the towns where such ethnically based mass murders
occurred. For example, Visegrad, Zvornik, Bijeljina, Brcko, etc. are well
known sites of such massacres that fit this pattern but were excluded from
Claim 1 by the
prosecution, for all kinds of technical or practical reasons. Srebrenica was
included, but kept as a separate charge of genocide with a "guilty" verdict.
1.3 The court sets their own definition of the genocide
Clearly, after seeing just these massacres that are included, for which it
is shown in the judgment that the physical perpetrators were uniformed
members of Serb forces and of organized Serb paramilitaries operating in
view and in cooperation with Serb forces, and establishing that those
perpetrators were motivated by the ethnicity of the victims, the ICTY still
declines to call it genocide for these towns. That is baffling. The text of
the decision for Claim 1 gives the reason, quote from the judgement:
...the Trial Chamber finds that the Bosnian Muslims in Sanski Most,
Vlasenica, Foca, Kotor Varoš, and Prijedor Municipalities were targeted by
the physical perpetrators of prohibited acts largely in their own respective
municipalities. The Trial Chamber notes that the physical perpetrators had
limited geographical control or authority to carry out activities. The
Bosnian Muslims targeted in each individual municipality formed a relatively
small part of the Bosnian-Muslim population in the Bosnian-Serb claimed
territory or in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole. The Trial Chamber received
insufficient evidence in dictating why the Bosnian Muslims in each of the
above municipalities or the municipalities themselves had a special
significance or were emblematic in relation to the protected group as a
whole. The Trial Chamber is, therefore, not satisfied, beyond reasonable
doubt, that the only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the
surrounding facts and circumstances is that the physical perpetrators
possessed the intent to destroy the Bosnian Muslims in Sanski Most, Foca,
Kotor Varoš, Prijedor, and Vlasenica Municipalities as a substantial part of
the protected group. In conclusion, the Trial Chamber does not find, beyond
reasonable doubt, that the physical perpetrators of prohibited acts against
the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in the Count 1 municipalities
committed those prohibited acts, with the intent to destroy the Bosnian
Muslims and Bosnian Croats as a substantial part of the protected groups in
- the end of the quote
Therefore, the following illogical tests are imposed:
(A) Do the physical perpetrators stay in one town or go to other towns? That
is possibly a practical decision on the part of the Serb military leadership.
If you intend to commit genocide, and your victims are many and live over a
large territory, you have to divide and delegate the task anyway. So, you
may decide to keep groups of killers in smaller locations, preferably locals
who know who is a member of the group you are targeting (in Bosnia,
ethnicity is not apparent from seeing or speaking with someone). As for the
physical perpetrators themselves, even if their intent is to kill all
Bosniaks everywhere, they would not be tempted to leave their town at all,
as long as they believe that other perpetrators will massacre those other
towns. Given that the killing was so widespread, that would be a logical
assumption for them. Beyond that, the fact that so many different groups of
low-level butchers went on similar rampage in so many different locations
makes it implausible that they were not either encouraged, incited or
ordered by their higher level leadership. Else, how do they all get the same
ideas and work in similar ways independently? And why did they all conclude
they can carry out these acts with impunity? Apparently they could because
they were not stopped or punished by the RS leadership, as the massacres
lasted over long periods of time in those towns and recurred in other towns
all throughout the war. Going forward, does this not provide a recipe of how
to do genocide properly: just keep your low-level killers in smaller groups,
and assign to each a single location to terrorize. In that way the practical
organizational strategy has the benefit of protecting you legally.
(B) Are the people murdered (rather than intended) within each town
ofspecial significance (or emblematic) of Bosniaks? This rule was
established only in the case of Bosnia, to separate Srebrenica from other
towns. In the eyes of the perpetrators the victims in Srebrenica were the
same people as the victims in Prijedor and other towns, and killed for the
same reason -- they were Bosniaks ("Turks"). That was their significance.
Denoting Srebrenicans as especially significant or emblematic beyond others
is circular logic, as they only became emblematic of the Bosniak plight
because their fate and genocide was so visible, as they were in a UN
safe-zone and had been under siege
for a long time, and because their massacre was expected and anticipated,
due to the earlier massacres in the other towns. The victims in the other
towns are not special because they were first, they were taken from their
homes in the middle of the night, and their fates were not known until
sometime after the fact.
One can define significance in better ways than the ICTY did. Many of the
Bosniaks targeted first in many towns occupied by Serb forces were prominent
in their communities for being political leaders, intellectuals, religious
clerics (Imams), businessmen, lawyers and teachers. This was decapitation of
Bosniak communities in those towns, and in all of Bosnia. For example, Serb
forces executed Deputy Prime Minister Hakija Turajlic at a checkpoint
outside of Sarajevo when he was in a UN vehicle. Such people are most
emblematic of an ethnic group. The particular fake contrast chosen makes it
seem the court is desperately searching for any argument to separate
Srebrenica from other massacres.
(C) Are the people actually murdered (rather than intended) within each town
a large enough part of the protected group within that town? Clearly, the
numbers listed above are large, but the ICTY simply chooses to set a
threshold (an arbitrary and unclear one) at some higher number. Recall, the
definition of genocide implies there is no such threshold by using the words
"in part" and "intent". With this threshold, the ICTY is also setting an
implicit guideline for carrying out genocide in the future: they should
murder about 1500 in each town the size of Prijedor and make sure they do
not get near 8000 in a town the size of Srebrenica.
(D) Are the people actually murdered (rather than intended) a significant
part or the protected group in the occupied territory and the country as a
whole? That is absurd, because it gives credit to the perpetrators for
inability to exterminate people who were simply out of their reach. It gives
them credit for those (majority) of Bosniaks from these towns who did not
wait around to be rounded up and slaughtered, the ones who took a look at
what was happening and decided to escape. Countless Bosniak refugees managed
to escape from these territories and ended up in free territories and in
other countries during the war. It gives the perpetrators credit even for
the large majority of Bosnia's 2 million Bosniaks who had lived in the
territories that the Serb forces never managed to occupy -- such as Tuzla,
Sarajevo, Bihac, Zenica, etc. The artificial segmentation to individual
towns and massacres also simply makes it impossible to mathematically ever
meet test (D). To guarantee that no piece is sufficient by itself, all you
have to do is to segment to small enough pieces.
1.4 The consequences of the new definition of genocide
In total, the ICTY managed to avoid making the obvious conclusion that all
of occupied Bosnia was subject to genocide by making a series of decisions
that individually defied logic, and built them upon each other like a house
of cards: It eliminated many of the deaths by not considering many towns and
locations where massacres occurred. Within the towns that it did consider,
it did not account for all the massacres as being part of the pattern, just
subsets where it could not find any uncertainty about any given aspect. It
focused on the numbers of actually murdered, rather than the stated and
demonstrated intent, giving the perpetrators credit for the difficulty of
their task and their ineffectiveness and inability to carry it out fully,
and credit for not murdering those they could not reach. It imposed an
arbitrary and opaque threshold for a number that would be a significant
enough part. It considered small towns separately, so that no town by itself
would be considered as a significant to all of Bosnia according to that
arbitrary threshold. And in the case of Srebrenica, which was known to
everybody as symbolic of the whole genocide, and could therefore not be
avoided, the court said that its symbolism made it a special case, and used
that assertion as a basis to differentiate and separate it from the others,
and in turn used that as a basis to dismiss the fundamental similarities in
facts that the others shared with Srebrenica.
Murder is an act against an individual, and even mass murder is an act
against a series of individuals. Each one has to be proven. But genocide as
defined above is different, it is a single collective crime, committed
against a group of people, by an organization, a movement adhering to an
ideology, or a state. All these massacres occurred in the same war, within a
short time span (three years) and in a small country about 300 km from end
to end. The perpetrators all followed the same ideology, all were part of
forces fighting on the same side, on territory occupied by the "Republic of
the Serbs". If genocide is so difficult to establish in a single location,
the fact that its pattern is co-occurring in so many other locations nearby
is evidence that strengthens the case for them all. The common patterns
between Prijedor, Sanski Most, Foca, Kljuc, etc. remove any basis for doubt
in the individual towns. Srebrenica also is not a separate event from the
other towns. Protection from genocide for members of a targeted group should
not stop at a town line, it should extend to all places within the reach of
the perpetrators. And the culpability of those perpetrators and their
supporters should not be subject to hairsplitting.
2. Skraćeni opis metodologije suda i konzekvence
takve metodologije kojom se praktično mijenja definicija genocida
U totalu, internacionalni kriminalni tribunal za bivšu Jugoslaviju
(ICTY) je uspio da izbjegne očigledan zaključak da je cijela
okupirana teritorija BiH bila izložena genocidu tako što je donio
niz odluka koje su svaka za sebe potpuno nelogične, pa je onda od
njih napravio kuću od karata. Prvo je isključio iz razmatranja mnoga
naselja i lokacije gdje su se masakri događali, i tako odmah na
početku izbacio iz razmatranja o genocida mnoga ubistva. Zatim, u
opštinama koje jeste razmatrao, sud nije razmatrao mnoge masakre
koji su počinjeni, ali nisu mogli biti apsolutno istraženi do
zadnjeg detalja. Zatim su se fokusirali samo na brojeve ubijenih, i
to brojeve koje su tom metodologijom veoma umanjili, umjesto da su
se fokusirali na dokazivanje genocidne namjere, koja je vidljiva sa
obzirom na tipičan “modus operandi”. Podsjećamo, po definiciji
genocida, dovoljno je bilo dokazati genocidnu namjeru i istrebljenje
jednog dijela ciljane grupe,
Takvom metodologijom je apsurdno Sud zločincima upisao u kredit i to
što su se neke od potencijalnih žrtava spasile bježanjem sa
okupirane teritorije, pa nisu ušli u saldo ubijenih. Time je uvedena
potpuno proizvoljna i nejasna granica do kojeg broja je dozvoljeno
ubijanje neke etničke grupe, a da to ne bude okarakterisano kao
genocid. I što je potpuno apsurdno, tom metodologijom je posmatrano
DA LI BI BROJ UBIJENIH U SVAKOM GRADU POJEDINAČNO BIO ZNAČAJAN U
ODNOSU NA CIJELU BiH, tj. da li je prešao tu proizvoljnu granicu
kada se može smatrati genocidom. A u slučaju Srebrenice, koja je
poznata po genocidu i za koju nisu mogli izbjeći donošenje presude
za genocid, sud je naveo da je narod Srebrenice poseban i
simbolizuje sve Bošnjake (valjda zato što je počinjen genocid) i
upravo ta posebnost izdvaja od ostalih opština, i tako je Sud
isključio iz razmatranja sličnost metodologije provođenja zločina u
Srebrenici sa drugim opštinama?! Znači kružna “logika” (circulus
Ubistvo je akt protiv individue i čak je masovno ubistvo akt protiv
niza individua. Zato svako ubistvo posebno mora biti dokazano. Ali
genocid, prema definiciji genocida, je jedinstven zločin počinjen
nad kolektivom, na pripadnicima jedne etničke ili religijske grupe,
zato što su pripadnici te grupe. I počinjen od strane kolektiva:
organizacije ili pokreta koji se napaja jednom ideologijom, ili ga
je počinila jedna država. Svi bosanski masakri su počinjeni u istom
ratu, u kratkom periodu od tri godine, u maloj državi, oko 300
kilometara dugačkoj s kraja na kraj. Svi izvršioci su slijedili istu
ideologiju, svi su pripadali vojnim jedinicama koje su se borile na
istoj strani, na teritoriju paradržave koju su formirali i nazvali
Republika srpska. Ako je genocid tako teško dokazati u jednoj
opštini, činjenica da se identična metodologija (Američki policajci
kažu “common pattern” ili “Modus Operandi”, MO) ponavlja u drugim
opštinama dokazuje da se radi o jednom zločinačkom poduhvatu u svim
opštinama. Zajednički “Modus Operandi” zločinačkog djelovanja u
Prijedoru, Sanskom Mostu, Foči, Ključu itd. uklanja svaku sumnju da
se radi o genocidu u svim tim gradovima. Postavlja se pitaje, zašto
su sudije odlučile da svaku opštinu gledaju kao poseban slučaj, te
su tako onemogućili da isti Modus Operandi iz različitih opština
bude iskorišten kao moćan dokaz udruženog poduhvata i genocidne
namjere? Genocid u Srebrenici također nije odvojen događaj od svih
drugih gradova. Zaštita po konvenciji o genocidu se ne može
atomizirati po pojedinim gradovima, ona se pruža gdje god bi
zločinačka ruka mogla dosegnuti. Odgovornost zločinaca i njihovih
simpatizera ne bi smjela biti žrtva ovakvog “cijepanja dlake”, tj.
cijepanja jednoga zločina genocida u više manjih zločina da bi se
umanjila odgovornost mentora cijelog zločinačkog poduhvata.
3. Sud je profesionalno obavio posao u suđenju
Udruženom zločinačkom poduhvatu Herceg-Bosna
Kao što je poznato Sud je potvrdio sve kazne šestorki prvaka Herceg-Bosne,
implicirajući pri tome i pokojne Franju Tuđmana i Gojka Suška, i što
je najvažnije i Republiku Hrvatsku. Za razliku od suđenja Mladiću i
Karadžiću, ovaj put Sud potpuno ispravno nije jedan zločinački
poduhvat razbio na niz manjih opštinskih zločina. I ne samo to, Sud
je potpuno ispravno, baš kao i u Nirenbergu, na jednom suđenju sudio
cijeloj garnituri njihove tvorevine Herceg-Bosne, a ne pojedinačno
svakom zločincu na posebnom suđenju.
Vrhunac je dostignut kada je Tuđmanov "general" Slobodan Praljak
teatralno popio otrov u sudnici. To je višestruko povećalo interes
svjetskih medija za šestorku, i za šta su oni osuđeni. Istu noć sam
gledao dva američka "World News" programa, ABC od 6:30 i BBC od
7:00. To su nešto kao naši nekadašnji večernji TV dnevnici. Oba su
imala velike reportaže o zločinima HVO-a u Bosni, sa snimkama iz
Mostara, noćnim slikama protjerivanih civila preko starog mosta,
rušenje starog mosta, i svim mukama kojima su Mostarci bili izloženi.
Nastupao je i jedan svjedok sa suđenja šestorki, bivši dopisnik
BBC-a iz Mostara.
Ukratko, mnogo više prostora je dato ovoj presudi, nego presudi
Mladiću, vjerovatno upravo zato što je Praljak na suđenju popio
otrov, te je to značajno doprinjelo povećanom interesu svjetske
javnosti. Ova presuda nama daje moralnu snagu da nikada ne
pristanemo na treći entitet, tj. na vaskrsnuće Herceg-Bosne. Mislim
da se nikoji izdajnici više neće usuditi da dignu svoje prljave ruke
kojima će glasati za promjene ustava po volji HDZ-a, i da nam više
ne mogu lagati u oči i govoriti "Svijet hoće Herceg-Bosnu.", ako ju
je taj isti svijet osudio kao zločinački poduhvat.
Zato sada zaista imamo šansu da spasimo BiH i da spasimo Bošnjake od
sudbine Palestinaca, a ta sudbina bi nas snašla ako ikada bude
osnovan treći entitet u bilo kojoj formi. Pri tome se ne smijemo
okliznuti ni na drugoj strani, moramo zaustaviti naše izdajnike i u
njihovim dogovorima sa Srbijom, prije svega ne smijemo dozvoliti da
se pregovara o granicama BiH, jer jednom kada se otvore granice BiH
za pregovore, onda se to neće zaustaviti na "manjim korekcijama"
kako nam to sada prodaju.
Nikada nam se više ne smije dogoditi da povjerujemo glumi jednog
Bakira Izetbegovića. I on je kao i njegov otac izuzetno dobar glumac.
Na primjer, čak sam i ja bio sklon da povjerujem da on istinski želi
reviziju presude za genocid BiH protiv Srbije na Internacionalnom
sudu pravde (ICJ) kako je veoma dobro obrazlagao zahtjev za
revizijom u "svađama" sa Ivanićem. Tek kasnije smo od Nevenke Tromp
i Jefrey-a Nice-a saznali da je on javio agentu BiH, jedinom čovjeku
iz BiH sa ovlaštenom da komunicira sa Internacionalnim sudom pravde,
da preda Ivanićevo pismo Sudu. Time je Ivanićevom pismu data snaga
usaglašenog državnog dokumenta, te je to bio kraj procesa početog
1992 od strane Prof Boylea. Za novi proces je trebalo dobiti
saglasnost Ivanića i Čovića. Dakle, Izetbegović je propuštanjem
Ivanićevog pisma sahranio Reviziju presude za genocid na najvažnijem
sudu, a sjetimo se kako se izvanredno argumentovano tukao sa
Ivanićem (tj. glumio) za već mrtvu Reviziju, što mi tada nismo
4. Success of the book "The War
in Bosnia: How to Succeed at Genocide"
The book, "The War in Bosnia: How to Succeed at Genocide" by Muhamed
Borogovac is the only book in English written by Bosnians about political
scheming that enabled the war and genocide in Bosnia and produced the Dayton
agreement. In other words, that is the only book about the big picture of
the war as seen from the Bosnian perspective. It is a collection of
political analyses written during the war and right after the war, by
Bosnian intellectuals, insiders, dissidents from the Bosnian government who
took part in the division of the country along the ethnic lines.
The renewed interest for Bosnia, due to the November judgements at the ICTY
pushed the book on top of the Amazon charts of book about the War in Bosnia.
The book was issued in Bosnian, first time before the end of the war.
Because authors predicted the great deal of what will happen in the future,
the book became very popular among Bonsians, even though the book was very
critical of Bosnian leadership for negotiating with and collaborating with
the aggressors. The book owes its success to the fact that its predictions
were correct, which indicates that authors understand very well what was
really going on in Bosnia, which was very different form the picture
presented to the world.
5. Veliki uspjeh knjige “The War in Bosnia: How to
Succeed at Genocide”
Knjiga “The War in Bosnia: How to Succeed at Genocide”, autora
Muhameda Borogovca je u posljednjih nekoliko sedmica, zahvaljujući
povećanom interesu za BiH uzrokovanom novembarskim presudama Mladiću
i Udruženom zločinačkom poduhvatu Herceg-Bosna izbila na prvo mjesto
Amazonove liste knjiga o Ratu u BiH. Podsjećamo, tu smo knjigu
preveli na Engleski i objavili radi onih mladih Bošnjaka koji su
raseljeni prije 25 godina iz domovine i sada bolje govore Engleski
nego Bosanski. Želimo da i oni znaju istinu o tome ko je odgovoran
da su oni gotovo izgubili svoju domovinu. Gornji link do Amazonove
liste knjiga o ratu u BiH, i gornja kratka informacija o knjizi na
Engleskom namijenjena upravo onim mladim Bošnjacima kojima je
namijenjena i knjiga.
Čitaj 73 vrijeme:
« BUSULADZIC; KURSPAHIC; LAZOVIC; GAVRANKAPETANOVIC; br. 958
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DECEMBER 3, 2017
OSCE SUPPLEMENTARY HUMAN DIMENSION MEETING
Access to Justice as a Key Element of the Rule
ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR THE IDPs IN THE OSCE AREA
IMPACT ON CONFLICT RESOLUTION
Date and Time:
16 November 2017, 13:30-14:45
Room 532, Hofburg, Vienna (5th floor)
Snacks and refreshments
will be served in Ratsaal Foier at 13:00 before the event
Discussion moderated by:
Prof. Anis H. BAJREKTAREVIC
Prof. and Chair for Intl.
Law & Global Political Studies, Editor of the GHIR
New York Addleton Academic Publishers’ specialized Magazine for Geopolitics,
History and Intl. Relations)
Dr. Gabriel LANSKY
Attorney at Law, Partner at
Lansky, Ganzger and Partner
Special Agent at the European Court of Human Rights
on the next page:.........
October 31, 2017
Long story of Kurz:
‘Austria You will be Macronised’
is a claim constantly circulating the EU: ‘multiculturalism is
dead in Europe’. Dead or maybe d(r)ead?... That much comes from
a cluster of European nation-states that love to romanticize – in a
grand metanarrative of dogmatic universalism – their
appearance as of the coherent Union, as if they themselves lived a
long, cordial and credible history of multiculturalism. Hence, this
claim and its resonating debate is of course false. It is also
cynical because it is purposely deceiving. No wonder, as the
conglomerate of nation-states/EU has silently handed over one of its
most important debates – that of European anti-fascistic identity,
or otherness – to the wing-parties. This was repeatedly followed by
the selective and contra-productive foreign policy actions of the
Union in the MENA, Balkans and Ukraine.” – wrote prof. Anis H.
Bajrektarevic in his luminary and farsighted essay
Denazification – urgently needed in Europe .
Last two parliamentary elections in Central Europe are indicative
enough: Europe inevitably loses its grip over the grand narrative,
fatherly eroding its place in history. Hereby a few lines about the
latest of them.
Sebastian Kurz, 31, is likely to become Austria’s new Chancellor
following the 15 October election. He would be the youngest-ever
head of government in the European Union and to many of his
supporters will be seen as a bold new face ready to lead Europe
through and past the ongoing crises over migration, integration,
fiscal authority, and identity that have dominated European
politics, within and without the EU, in recent years. A new leader
of Europe’s populist right is likely on the horizon, yet he has
received little international attention compared with candidates
such as Marine Le Pen or Nigel Farage who were always long shots.
Kurz’s Rise – Aus Iuridicum
Rapidly rising through the youth wing of the Austrian People’s Party
(ÖVP), Kurz was elected its head in 2009 and then promoted directly
into the party’s upper echelon in 2011 when he was named to the
newly-created post of state secretary for integration at age 24.
From the earliest days, Kurz embraced a populist right-wing
worldview although he initially steadfastly avoided divisive
rhetoric that could have derailed his rise. Kurz used his post as
state secretary to publicize these ideas, while also astutely
employing the leeway afforded by his youth to take positions
deviating from the ÖVP platform.
In 2013 Kurz was elected to the national legislature, also winning
the most direct ‘preference votes’ of any candidate and a third more
than the ÖVP’s then-head Michael Spindelegger. The ÖVP received less
overall votes than the Social Democrats (SPÖ) and again went into
government as the junior coalition partner. Kurz was rewarded with
the second-highest post of any ÖVP leader when he was named foreign
Austrians see themselves both as core members of the ‘West’ but also
as traditionalists and the inheritors of a unique culture. The
historic heft of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, a separateness
from Germans and Germany that was cemented by the divides caused by
the Enlightenment and birth of Protestantism, and steady
decades-long growth in income and living standards all have served
to shape an image of Austria and Austrians as reasoned yet
traditional, sober yet dandy, and reserved yet welcoming. It is
precisely in this image that Kurz has tried to cast himself.
Even Kurz’s critics are quick to acknowledge that from the beginning
of his career he had a remarkable ability to gauge the prevailing
zeitgeist, all the while grounding himself in the core Austrian
conservatism that the ÖVP represents. In contrast to populist
politicians who have at best half-convicningly attempted to portray
themselves as outsiders, Kurz embraces the fact he has had his
sights set on a political career since his youth. Kurz recognized
the quickest route to ‘authenticity’ was to never speak the word.
Kurz, the Foreign Minister
As Foreign Minister, Kurz was able to play host and diplomat to
Austria’s wide variety of partners. He also judiciously avoided
controversy in mainstream international media. On issues where Kurz
would perhaps have been more vocal, he accepted his role as a
government minister and did not speak out overly loudly when he
disagreed with his party’s leaders, while tweaking those of the SPÖ,
the senior coalition partner, in a way that did not offend Austrian
Kurz’s four years in the foreign ministry saw a series of regional
and political crises, attesting to his political skill. Three months
after taking office, Ukrainian oligarch Dmytro Firtash was arrested
on a visit to Vienna on the request of US authorities. The arrest
came two day’s before Moscow’s controversial referendum in Crimea
and struck at the core of domestic politics in Ukraine, where
Firtash long played an outsize role. Yet Kurz did not shy from being
thrust in the spotlight, in fact he appeared to be hungering for it,
with the then-27-year old even offering to mediate Russia and
Ukraine’s disputes over Crimea.
Kurz ultimately backed sanctions, sensing the prevailing winds in
Europe. However, he was vocal in calling for European business’
interests to be considered even before Italian, Hungarian and
Cypriot politicians subsequently took up such positions. The move
played well domestically in Austria, where many criticize great
power games, perhaps with a slight, albeit unstated view towards the
rearview mirror given their fatal role in Austria’s own history.
Austria’s Raiffeisen bank also derives most of its profits from
Eastern Europe and is the largest foreign player in Russia’s banking
market. Russian President Vladimir Putin also travelled to Vienna in
June 2014, his first post-Crimea visit to a Western country, with
Kurz vocally defending the invite and signing of a controversial
pipeline deal at the same time EU and US officials were deliberating
sanctions on Russia’s energy sector.
Kurz’s time as foreign minister also coincided with Europe’s
migration crisis, which was nearly simultaneous with his push
towards the spotlight when he backed the stance of Austria’s eastern
and southeastern neighbors even while then-Chancellor Werner Faymann
waffled on the issue. By February 2016, Kurz was publicly embracing
not only the positions of Warsaw, Budapest, and Ljubljana, but their
rhetoric as well. In March 2016, Austria had closed its borders to
most asylum seekers. By the end of May of that year, Faymann
resigned. He was subsequently replaced by Christian Kern, the
current head of the SPÖ.
Kurz took advantage of the weakness of the senior leadership within
the SPÖ and his own ÖVP to push his personal agenda and reputation
to the fore. Kurz has even sought to use the largely-symbolic
rotating chairmanship of the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which Vienna holds for 2017, to
promote his political agenda. Kurz was bold enough to broadcast this
intention, declaring in an interview with Der Spiegel that he
would use the post to push for the lifting of sanctions against
Russia. He has also used the platform to again propose he mediate a
solution to the conflict in Donbas, even writing an English-language
op-ed for Politico on the subject this September.
Demonstrating Kurz’s eye for the future, however, a number of senior
staff members have left Kurz’s Foreign Ministry since the start of
the year, promoted as Austria’s new ambassadors to some of its
leading partners. A further major reshuffle is expected after the
election, a possible indication that Kurz will continue to cut a
prominent figure on the international stage.
Kurz, the Candidate: Dressed to Impress
A year after Faymann’s resignation, the Kern government collapsed,
prompting the elections that will be held on 15 October. The interim
period saw the contested and contentious 2016 presidential run-off
election, in which the initial result was annulled and the far right
Freedom Party’s (FPÖ) Norbert Hofer was narrowly defeated by
independent candidate Alexander Van der Bellen. Kurz had refused to
endorse either candidate. Yet it was the fact that the run-off
featured neither a candidate of the SPÖ nor the ÖVP for the first
time that appears to have most shaped Kurz’s current candidacy.
Van der Bellen, an alumnus of Austria’s relatively minor Green
Party, was seen by many on the Austrian right as nearly as radical
as Hofer. The Austrian presidency is also largely symbolic –
although Hofer’s platform included steps that would have been
unprecedented by the Austrian executive. As a result, there was
little domestic political cost to Kurz remaining neutral.
The lack of an SPÖ or ÖVP candidate in the final round highlighted
the shifts underway at the heart of Austrian politics, and the
weakness of then-ÖVP leader Reinhold Mitterlehrner, who stepped back
in May, enabling Kurz’s ascent.
Kurz, however, attached a number of conditions to the proposal that
he lead the ÖVP. The decades-old party fell in line behind Kurz
quickly, even agreeing to campaign under the joint branding of ÖVP
and ‘Kurz List – the New People’s Party’. Kurz’s image, rhetoric,
and bold proclamations on the campaign trail have put the party
comfortably in the lead in the polls.
The lead Kurz maintains in the polls has come primarily at the
expense of the far-right FPÖ, although incumbent Chancellor
Christian Kern has done his party no favors following a series of
scandals. Kern’s SPÖ is polling behind the FPÖ in most polls and he
has declared that he would prefer to lead the opposition than
re-form a coalition with the ÖVP.
Kurz and Kern’s relationship was already poor but the latest scandal
around the SPÖ alleges a controversial former election advisor set
up social media pages aimed at besmirching Kurz, only dampening the
possibility for a renewed coalition. Yet Kurz also knows the
difficulties inherent to forming a government with the FPÖ, despite
having adopted much of its rhetoric in his own campaign. Such a
government could come under some degree of EU censure, as it did the
last time the ÖVP and FPÖ formed a government in 2000. The FPÖ then
was the larger of the two parties but would undergo a series of
splits while in government.
Although the FPÖ of today has long since coalesced under the
leadership of Heinz-Christian Strache, it too will be wary of a
coalition with the ÖVP, albeit less over concerns of an EU rebuttal
than over Kurz continuing to encroach on its political space.
- the Chancellor? the future EU
Kurz is likely to become Austria’s most prominent Chancellor on the
international stage in decades. His willingness to be outspoken and
take on issues far afield from Austria steadily grew during his
tenure in the foreign ministry. Beginning with his early proposal to
mediate between Moscow and Kyiv towards the end of his term, he was
sufficiently confident to publicly endorse incumbent Macedonian
Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski ahead of that country’s December 2016
Kurz’s alliances in the Balkans and Eastern Europe are extensive and
he was one of the few leading EU politicians outside the region to
defend Hungary’s crackdown on migrants and refugees. Kurz’s economic
policies are more traditionally liberal than those of the Visegrad
Group but are also tinged by his populist bent. Nevertheless, he
sees himself as a leading exponent of the same cultural conservatism
embraced by leaders such as Viktor Orban or Nigel Farage. He is
telegenic and well-spoken and has shown a knack for youth politics,
of particularly importance in Austria where the voting age is 16.
On 8 May, France elected Emmanuel Macron as president in a vote that
many hailed as a landmark victory for Europe’s centrist
establishment. On 15 October, Austria is likely to elect Kurz as its
next chancellor, in a vote that the populist right will hail as its
own landmark victory.
Max Hess is a senior political risk analyst
with the London-based AEK international, specializing in Europe and
October 19, 2017
PUBLICATIONS DECEMBRE 2017
Revisiting Dictatorship: Democracy is Worst
Form of Government, Indeed - By Endy Bayuni
of Justice at the ICTY: Bosnians consider guilty genocide verdict
for Mladić incomplete - By Tarik Borogovac, Bosnian Congress USA
PUBLICATIONS OCTOBER, 2017:
OSCE SUPPLEMENTARY HUMAN DIMENSION MEETING - Clara Lorenz
story of Kurz: 'Austria You will be Macronised' - Max Hess
Germany that kills itself and Europe - Michael dr. Logies,
PUBLICATIONS SEPTEMBER, 2017:
Grabar-Kitarović and Vučić on a
joint mission to (de)stabilize the region
over troubled waters – Growing meritime dispute between Croatia and
Bosnia, neglected by the EU - Dr. Enis Omerović and Adil Kulenović
ARE WE DEALING WITH – TRUMP OR DEMOCRACY - By: Tomislav Jakić
and Africa – Similarities and difference in Security Structures -
Written by Anis Bajrektarevic and Giuliano Luongo
The Return of Good Policies for Bad Reasons - Populism and
Industrial Policy - Amanda Janoo
Serbia Delivered Srebrenica Refugees to Mladic: Report - Filip Rudic - BIRN-Belgrade
stuggle on the Balkans - Senadin Lavić
Bosnian Reporter Flees After Condemning Mladic Rally - BIRN - Banja
REGIONAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURES: COMPARING ASIA AND EUROPE -
Insights from Anis Bajrektarevic
“We win, they lose” – Wonderful world of Binary categorisations - (Refeudalisation
of Europe – III Part) - Anis H. Bajrektarevic
Sarajevo, Jerusalem of Europe
Memorandum of Understanding between IFIMES and GBAA
Paris and Pittsburgh, pesticides in Indonesia: When none is best
- Julia Suryakusuma
COMMON SENSE – A RELIC OF THE PAST? - By: Tomislav Jakic
post-Christian West and post-Western World - (Refeudalisation of
Europe – II Part) - Anis H. Bajrektarevic
Zbigniew Brzezinski & the Battle on Post Communism Fascism - By,
Ambassador Muhamed Sacirbey
Post-secular Europe and post-Soviet Russia - Anis H.
The story of a Bosnian woman who lost her entire family to the
terror of the 1990s:“I feel like a cut tree. I am neither alive nor
dead … There is no justice and there will never be,” - Robert
'Schindler List' for Southeast Europe - Pakistanisation as the Final Solution for the Balkans? - Prof.
Brazil in the short Strikes – the ultimate price
of welfare - By Luísa Monteiro
Pimp my s/ride - Ms. Elodie Pichon
SPIRITUALITY AND THE ECONOMY OF CLIMATE CHANGE - Anis H.
Dysfunction in the Balkans? - Zlatko Hadžidedić
SPIRALE OF SENSLESNESS - By: Tomislav Jakic
of the post ideological Russia (Refeudalisation of Europe – I Part)
- Anis Bajrektarevic
king’s “Clash of Civilizations, convergence with Indonesia's
hypocrisy and opportunism - by Julia Suryakusuma
The World’s Last Colony: Morocco continues occupation of Western
Sahara, in defiance of UN - Nizar Visram
Culture as a binding factor in our society, interview with Camilla
Habsburg-Lothringen - By Djoeke Altena
ALL BREAKING BEDS OF OUR MOST FAVOURED AGGRESSOR - By Elodie Pichon
Congress of The Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina (NCR B&H) - March 2,
precariat, militaristic world images and media cynicism - Senadin
EMPIRE STRIKES BACK - By: Tomislav Jakić
Victims, please - Sooyoung Hu
data and the Future of Democracy - by Hannes Grassegger and Mikael
Malta Plan – a humane EU border and asylum policy is possible -
Diplomatic Insight JAN 2017.pdf
of Central Asia Kazakhstan and its “Astana Code of Conduct” - By
Trump, Nuclear Issue and Nuclear War -By: Markus Wauran
TURN - By Tomislav Jakić
the Trump Presidency – Will the Monroe doctrine finally die? -
Misery monetized - By Aleksandra Krstic
Gubernatorial Election 2017: Who Will Be Eliminated? - By: Igor
the Tiger: Combating corruption in the Sino-world - By Lingbo ZHAO
European swamp – corruption and human rights - Gerald Knaus
prof. dr. Anis Bajrektarevic
Editor - Geopolitics, History, International Relations (GHIR) Addleton Academic
Publishers - New YorK
Senior Advisory board member, geopolitics of energy Canadian energy research
institute - ceri, Ottawa/Calgary
Advisory Board Chairman Modern Diplomacy & the md Tomorrow's people platform
Head of mission and department head - strategic studies on Asia
Professor and Chairperson Intl. law & global pol. studies
Critical Similarities and Differences in SS of Asia and Europe - Prof.
Anis H. Bajrektarevic
MENA Saga and Lady Gaga - (Same dilemma from the MENA) - Anis H. Bajrektarevic
HE ONGOING PUBLIC DEBT CRISIS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: IMPACTS ON AND LESSONS
FOR VIETNAM - Dr. Nguyen Anh Tuan, Assos. Prof. Nguyen Linh
Change and Re Insurance: The Human Security Issue SC-SEA Prof. Anis
Bajrektarevic & Carla Baumer
(Researcher and Lecturer at the Faculty of Social and Politics,
University of Jayabaya)
the ‘crisis of secularism’ in Western Europe the result of multiculturalism?
Dr. Emanuel L. Paparella
A Modest “Australian” Proposal to Resolve our Geo-Political Problems
Were the Crusades Justified? A Revisiting - Dr. Emanuel L. Paparella
Earned an MA in International Relations from the University of East
Anglia in Norwich, United Kingdom in 2013. Her research interests include
foreign policy decision-making, realism and constructivism, and social
psychology and constructivism.
is an independent researcher specialized in International Politics and Peace
& Conflict Studies with a regional focus on the Balkans and the Middle East.
Founder of Internacionalista
Săo Paulo, Brazil
Brazil – New Age
political character of Social Media: How do Greek Internet users perceive and
use social networks?
SWISS UMEF UNIVERSITY
is a master`s degree student on the University for Criminal justice and Security
in Ljubljana. She obtained her bachelor`s degree in Political Science- Defense
George Mason University School of Policy, Government, and
Intl. Relations She focuses on Russia and Central Asia. Ms. Brletich is an
employee of the US Department of Defense.
Interview on HRT-Radio
Prof. dr. Anis Bajrektarević
Dr Filippo ROMEO,
is the outspoken Indonesian thinker,
social-cause fighter and trendsetter. She is the author of Julia’s Jihad.
Mads is an intern at PCRC. Mads Jacobsen is from Denmark and is currently
pursuing his Master's degree in 'Development and International Relations' at
University of Bihac, Faculty of Education,
Department of English Language and Literature - undergraduate
University of Banja Luka, Faculty of Philology, Department of English Language
and Literature - graduate study
Rakesh Krishnan Simha
New Zealand-based journalist and foreign affairs analyst. According to him, he
writes on stuff the media distorts, misses or ignores.
Rakesh started his career in 1995 with New Delhi-based Business World magazine,
and later worked in a string of positions at other leading media houses such as
India Today, Hindustan Times, Business Standard and the Financial Express, where
he was the news editor.
He is the Senior Advisory Board member of one of the fastest growing Europe’s
foreign policy platforms: Modern Diplomacy.
Daniele Scalea, geopolitical
analyst, is Director-general of IsAG (Rome Institute of Geopolitics) and Ph.D.
Candidate in Political studies at the Sapienza University, Rome. Author of three
books, is frequent contributor and columnist to various Tv-channels and
Research Associate at Institute of High
Studies in Geopolitics and Auxiliary Sciences (IsAG), Rome, Italy, and Ph.D.
researcher at University of Padova, is IMN Country Representative in Italy.
Foreign Policy Advisor to former Croatian
President Stjepan Mesić
Graduate of the London School of Economics,
prof. Zlatko Hadžidedić is a prominent thinker,
prolific author of numerous books, and indispensable political figure of the
former Yugoslav socio-political space in 1990s, 2000s and 2010s.
Mr. Nicola Bilotta
Nicola Bilotta has a BA and a MA
in History from Universitŕ degli Studi di Milano and a MSc in Economic History
from the London School of Economics. He works as a Global Finance Research
Assistant at The Banker (Financial Times) and collaborates as an external
researcher at ISAG (Istituto di Alti Studi di Geopolitica e Scienze Ausiliari)
Date and Place of Birth: April 22, 1943 – Amurang,
North Sulawesi, IndonesiaEducation: Bachelor in Public
Writer was a member of the House of Representatives
of Indonesia (DPR/MPR-RI) period of 1987-1999, and Chairman of
Committee X, cover Science and Technology, Environment and National
Development Planning (1988-1997).
Currently as Obsever of Nuclear for peace.
Attached to the US-based Berkeley University,
Sooyoung Hu is a scholar at its Political Science and Peace and Conflict
Studies Department. Miss Hu focuses on international relations, international
organizations and its instruments.
is a Ottawa-based free-lance writer from Zanzibar, Tanzania.
Recently retired Senior lecturer on Development studies, he extensively
publishes in over 50 countries on 4 continents. He can be reached at
Robert Leonard Rope
He studied at the University of
He lives in: San Francisco, California: San Francisco, California, USA
Dr. Enis OMEROVIĆ
Max Hess is a senior political risk analyst
with the London-based AEK international, specializing in Europe and Eurasia.
The writer, editor-in-chief of
The Jakarta Post, took part
in the Bali Civil Society and Media Forum, organized by the
Institute for Peace and Democracy and the Press Council, on Dec.5-6.