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Ing. Salih CAVKIC

No more Paris nor Brussels!
Stop terrorism!
We want to live in peace with all our neighbors.
  regardless of their religion, color and origin.
Therefore, we condemn any kind of terrorism!

Ne više Pariz ni Brisel!
Stop terorizam!
Mi želimo živjeti u miru sa svim našim komšijama,
bez obzira koje su vjere, boje kože i porijekla.
Zato mi osuđujemo svaku vrstu terorizma!

Belang van Limburg
De Morgen
De Standard
Het Laatste Nieuws
La Libre Belgique

VRT Nieuws

Deutsche Welle
West-D. Zeitung

The man of the year 2009
Guy Verhofstadt
Mr. Guy Verhofstadt

The man of the year
L'homme de l'ane
De man van het jaar

A proven Democrat, protector and fighter for justice and human rights in the World.

Een bewezen Democraat, beschermer en strijder voor rechtvaardigheid en mensenrechten in de Wereld.

Un prouvé démocrate, protecteur et combattant pour la justice et des droits de l'homme dans le Mond.

Eine bewährte Demokrat, Beschützer und Kämpfer für Gerechtigkeit und Menschenrechte in der Welt.

Dokazani demokrat,
 zaštitnik i borac za pravdu i ljudska prava u Svijetu.

Maasmechelen Village

The man of the year 2012

Mr. Barak Hossein Obama

The man of the year
L'homme de l'an
De man van het jaar

peace in the world

vrede in de wereld

la paix dans le monde

Garantie des Friedens in der Welt

mieru vo svete

mira u svijetu

Prof. dr. Murray Hunter
University Malaysia Perlis

20 Years to Trade Economic Independence for Political Sovereignty - Eva MAURINA

Aleš Debeljak +
In Defense of Cross-Fertilization: Europe and Its Identity Contradictions - Aleš Debeljak



Rattana Lao
Rattana Lao holds a doctorate in Comparative and International Education from Teachers College, Columbia University and is currently teaching in Bangkok.

Bakhtyar Aljaf
Director of Middle-East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) in Ljubljana, Slovenia

Rakesh Krishnan Simha
Géométrie variable of a love triangle – India, Russia and the US

Amna Whiston
Amna Whiston is a London-based writer specialising in moral philosophy. As a PhD candidate at Reading University, UK, her main research interests are in ethics, rationality, and moral psychology.

Eirini Patsea 
Eirini Patsea is a Guest Editor in Modern Diplomacy, and specialist in Cultural Diplomacy and Faith-based Mediation

Belmir Selimovic
Can we trust the government to do the right thing, are they really care about essential things such as environmental conditions and education in our life?

Dubravko Lovrenović +
Univ. prof. Dubravko Lovrenović is one of the leading European Medievalist specialized in the Balkans, pre-modern and modern political history.

Manal Saadi
Postgraduate researcher in International Relations and Diplomacy at the Geneva-based UMEF University

doc.dr.Jasna Cosabic
professor of IT law and EU law at Banja Luka College,
Bosnia and Herzegovina

Aleksandra Krstic
Studied in Belgrade (Political Science) and in Moscow (Plekhanov’s IBS). Currently, a post-doctoral researcher at the Kent University in Brussels (Intl. Relations). Specialist for the MENA-Balkans frozen and controlled conflicts.


Dr. Swaleha Sindhi is Assistant Professor in the Department of Educational Administration, the Maharaja Sayajirao University of Baroda, India. Decorated educational practitioner Dr. Sindhi is a frequent columnist on related topics, too. She is the Vice President of Indian Ocean Comparative Education Society (IOCES). Contact:

Barçın Yinanç
 It is an Ankara-based journalist and notable author. She is engaged with the leading Turkish dailies and weeklies for nearly three decades as a columnist, intervieweer and editor. Her words are prolifically published and quoted in Turkish, French an English.

Modified from the original: They killed 1 Saddam and created 1,000 others (Daily Sabah)

Aine O’Mahony
Aine O'Mahony has a bachelor in Law and Political Science at the Catholic Institute of Paris and is currently a master's student of Leiden University in the International Studies programme.Contact:

Elodie Pichon

  Elodie Pichon has a  bachelor in Law and Political Science at the Catholic Institute of Paris and is currently doing a MA in Geopolitics, territory and Security at King's College London. Contact :

Qi Lin

Qi Lin, a MA candidate of the George Washington University, Elliott School of International Affairs. Her research focus is on cross-Pacific security and Asian studies, particularly on the Sino-U.S. relations and on the foreign policy and politics of these two.

Born in Chile and raised in Rome, Alessandro Cipri has just finished his postgraduate studies at the department of War Studies of King's College London, graduating with distinction from the Master's Degree in "Intelligence and International Security". Having served in the Italian Army's "Alpini" mountain troops, he has a keen interest in national security, military strategy, insurgency theory, and terrorism studies. His Master's dissertation was on the impact of drug trafficking on the evolution of the Colombian FARC.

Ms. Lingbo ZHAO
is a candidate of the Hong Kong Baptist University, Department of Government and International Studies. Her research interest includes Sino-world, Asia and cross-Pacific.



Hannes Grassegger
Hannes Grassegger and Mikael Krogerus are investigative journalists attached to the Swiss-based Das Magazin specialized journal.


Mikael Krogerus

Hannes Grassegger and Mikael Krogerus are investigative journalists attached to the Swiss-based Das Magazin specialized journal.


Michal Kosinski

Scientific analysis


Elodie Pichon,
Ms. Elodie Pichon, Research Fellow of the IFIMES Institute, DeSSA Department. This native Parisian is a Master in Geopolitics, Territory and Security from the King’s College, London, UK.

Djoeke Altena

Muhamed Sacirbey
Muhamed Sacirbey

Ambassador Muhamed Sacirbey currently lectures on Digital-Diplomacy. "Mo" has benefited from a diverse career in investment banking & diplomacy, but his passion has been the new avenues of communication. He was Bosnia & Herzegovina's first Ambassador to the United Nations, Agent to the International Court of Justice, Foreign Minister & Signatory of the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court. He also played American football opting for a scholarship to Tulane University in New Orleans after being admitted to Harvard, oh well!!

Amanda Janoo

Amanda Janoo is an Alternative Economic Policy Adviser to governments and development organizations. Graduate from Cambridge University with an MPhil in Development Studies, Amanda worked at the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) supporting government's with evidence-based industrial policy design for inclusive and sustainable growth. Her research focus is on the relationship between international trade and employment generation. She has worked throughout Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa promoting greater economic self-determination and empowerment.

Michael dr. Logies,


INDEX 2017

INDEX 2016

Important News

Dutch - Nederlands
Belangrijke nieuws

French - Français
Nouvelles importantes

German - Deutsch
Wichtige News

Važne vijesti



The International Institute for Middle-East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) in Ljubljana, Slovenia, regularly analyses events in the Middle East and the Balkans. Following ICTY judgments against Ratko Mladić and Jadranko Prlić IFIMES has prepared an analysis of the situation and circumstances in which those judgments were (not) accepted. The most interesting sections from the analysis entitled Croatia-BiH-Serbia: Non-acceptance of ICTY judgments and 'humanisation' of crimes and criminals” are presented below.


Non-acceptance of ICTY judgments and “humanisation”of crimes and criminals

The verdicts against Ratko Mladić (IT-09-92) and Jadranko Prlić et al. (IT-04-74) represent the final judgments of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) which will formally cease to operate on 31 December 2017.

The Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals (MICT) established by the UN Security Council resolution CS/RES/1966 (2010) will continue the work of ICTY as its legal successor at least until 2023. MICT is formally ICTY's replacement body and as such will work with the same capacity and mandate as ICTY. Analysts believe that all the appeals and trial judgments before MICT
1 should be concluded before a comprehensive analysis and evaluation can be made of ICTY's 24 years of work.

No one had believed that ICTY would perform its function

In order to perform a comprehensive analysis, account should be taken of the conditions under which ICTY worked, which were anything but promising. A very illustrative example are regular annual and semi-annual reports that have been submitted by ICTY's President and Chief Prosecutor to UN Security Council since 1994. In almost all reports they complained about the non-cooperation on the part of the countries in the region, especially Serbia, but also Croatia and the Republika Srpska entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and about constant lack of financial and human resources.

During her testimony before ICTY former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright admitted that no one had believed the Tribunal would perform its function, that the UN would appoint the judges and prosecutors and that there would be any defendants, apprehensions, trials, judgments and punishments. She was one of the few persons who claimed the opposite: that the Tribunal would not only perform its function but play the key role in establishing the responsibility. The late professor M. Cherif Bassiouni wrote in his memoirs that the fact that Western Forces knew that the then President of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SRJ) Slobodan Milosevic was responsible for many of the crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina made him all the more valuable as an interlocutor– “and that knowledge, in turn, was incompatible with an assertive policy of supporting justice

Although that was not ICTY's priority task, it defined the nature of the armed conflict in the territory of former Yugoslavia, and thus provided answers to two key questions: what were the war goals and what was the nature of the armed conflict in the territory of former Yugoslavia. It should be noted why ICTY decided to define the nature of those conflicts while its priority task was to determine the responsibility of individuals. Namely, the proving of charges under Article 2 of ICTY Statute (Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions) and the application of that Article 2 were conditional upon the existence of an armed conflict. Therefore, in numerous judgments the character of those conflicts had to be defined.

In its judgments ICTY established the existence of an armed conflict in former Yugoslavia

n ICTY final judgments it was established that the conflicts in the territory of former Yugoslavia were of an international nature: Serbia against Croatia on one hand and Serbia and Croatia against Bosnia and Herzegovina on the other hand. In more simple terms we can say that in a series of judgment ICTY established the aggression of SRJ (Serbia) and the Republic of Croatia against Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as the aggression of Serbia against Croatia based on their plans to create the Greater Serbia and the Greater Croatia.
2 The conclusions of ICTY judgments are based on evidence showing direct and indirect interference of SRJ (Serbia) and the Republic of Croatia in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as the interference of SRJ (Serbia) in Croatia. In the judgments it was proven that the Greater Serbia and Greater Croatia plans represented the bases for the politics of committing crimes. The final judgment against Duško Tadić (IT-94-1) states in paragraph 660: As discussed, this Trial Chamber has found that an armed conflict existed in the territory of Opstina Prijedor at the relevant time and that an aspect of this conflict was a policy to commit inhumane acts against the civilian population of the territory, in particular the non-Serb population, in the attempt to achieve the creation of a Greater Serbia.”

The relevance of the Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE) legal doctrine

At the last meetings on the work of ICTY held in December 2017 in the UN, ICTY and MICT Chief Prosecutor Baron Serge Brammertz stressed the importance of Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE) as a legal doctrine:
Thanks to this theory, we determined that the war in Bosnia was not only a civil war, but that Belgrade, and also Zagreb, had a role in crimes in BiH, which was an international armed conflict.”

The first-instance judgments against Ratko Mladić and Radovan Karadžić taken by ICTY definitely represent the condemnation of political, military and police leadership of Republika Srpska and the confirmation of four JCEs. Analysts believe that both judgments contain the correctly established facts based on four JCEs, including the Srebrenica genocide. However, they failed to establish the genocide in six BiH municipalities, although the majority of judges except judge Orie established the genocidal intent in five municipalities.

The trial chambers again withdrew from the previously established facts in ICTY judgments regarding the JCE involving Slobodan Milošević and other officials from Serbia. Namely, in the 2008 judgment against Milan Martić (IT-95-11) it was concluded that:
In this respect, the Trial Chamber recalls the evidence that the SVK and the VJ were in reality one and the same organisation, only located at two separate locations. Moreover, the evidence of Milan Martić’s arrest in 1991 gives a clear example of joint cooperation between political leaders in the SAO Krajina, in the RS in BiH and in Serbia.

The Trial Chamber has been furnished with evidence that this type of cooperation continued until 1995. “The Trial Chamber therefore finds that at least Blagoje Adžić, Milan Babić, Radmilo Bogdanović, Veljko Kadijević, Radovan Karadžić, Slobodan Milošević, Ratko Mladić, Vojislav Šešelj, Franko “Frenki” Simatović, Jovica Stanišić, and Captain Dragan Vasiljković participated in the furtherance of the above-mentioned common criminal purpose.”

A dishonourable role of the Dutch judge Orie

It should be noted that judge Bakone Justice Moloto from South Africa was presiding the Trial Chamber in the Martić case and he was also member of the Appeals Chamber in the case of Prlić et al. in which it was established that JCE existed and also that former President of the Republic of Croatia Franjo Tuđman took part in JCE. Analysts believe that the main reason why in the cases of Karadžić and Mladić ICTY chambers withdrew in some parts from the earlier final judgements lies in the fact that in those cases the chambers were presided by Alphons Orie from the Netherlands and O-Gon Kwon from South Korea, who had already taken certain positions in earlier cases and did not change them in the Karadžić and Mladić cases. Judge Orie presided the Trial Chamber also in the judgement against Momćilo Krajišnik (IT-00-39) when he denied the existence of genocide in other BiH municipalities and excluded Serbian leaders from JCE, so it was expected that he would do the same in the case of Ratko Mladić (IT-09-92), and so he did. Judge Orie's separate opinion in the trial judgement against Ratko Mladić shows just how persistent he was in his position that no genocide was committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He opposed the majority of judges who found that the genocidal intent existed in five BiH municipalities. This finding represented a revolutionary position of ICTY judges after 24 years of work of the Tribunal and it now provides additional basis to MICT prosecution in trying to prove through appeals proceedings that genocide existed in other municipalities outside Srebrenica where all kinds of crimes that fall within the competence of ICTY, including ethnic cleansing, were established.

Judge Orie was also the presiding judge of the Trial Chamber in the case of Jovica Stanišić and Franko Simatović in which he scandalously concluded that the defendants were not responsible and abolished the JCE in which they were together with Slobodan Milošević, and then acquitted them. It was therefore expected that as the presiding judge in the Mladić case judge Orie would do everything to exclude from JCE Jovica Stanišić and Franko Simatović and logically also Slobodan Milošević as their superior.

 Nevertheless, his shameful judgement and the legal (non)standards that he applied in the Stanišić-Simatović case are now reversed and a new first instance trial is taking place.

The way in which presiding judge Orie together with another two members of the Trial Chamber defined JCE in the judgment against Ratko Mladić and the relationship between the Yugoslav Army (VJ) and the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS) is in direct contradiction with ICTY established case law. Thus in the final judgment against Duško Tadić it is explicitly stated in paragraph 156:
As the Appeals Chamber has already pointed out, international law does not require that the particular acts in question should be the subject of specific instructions or directives by a foreign State to certain armed forces in order for these armed forces to be held to be acting as de facto organs of that State. It follows that in the circumstances of the case it was not necessary to show that those specific operations carried out by the Bosnian Serb forces which were the object of the trial (the attacks on Kozarac and more generally within opština Prijedor) had been specifically ordered or planned by the Yugoslav Army. It is sufficient to show that this Army exercised overall control over the Bosnian Serb Forces. This showing has been made by the Prosecution before the Trial Chamber. Such control manifested itself not only in financial, logistical and other assistance and support, but also, and more importantly, in terms of participation in the general direction, coordination and supervision of the activities and operations of the VRS. This sort of control is sufficient for the purposes of the legal criteria required by international law.”

In the trial judgement against Ratko Mladić (IT-09-92, par. 3782, p. 1914, vol. 4) the Trial Chamber presided by judge Orie found that the Yugoslav Army provided the VRS with weapons, ammunition, and that the soldiers received their salaries and benefits from the VJ while they were incorporated into the VRS, however the Trial Chamber noted that it received no evidence to suggest that the VJ issued instructions (or was able to issue instructions) to these soldiers once they were incorporated into the VRS.
4 In other words, the Trial Chamber presided by judge Orie not only changed the standard from the Tadić case, but judge Orie and another two judges once again wrongly applied the standard of "specific direction" which was already annulled and abolished in 2015 in ICTY's appeal judgment against Stanišić and Simatović. In its reversal of the trial judgment against Stanišić and Simatović the ICTY Appeals Chamber stated that the Trial Chamber erred in applying the law when it required that the acts of the aider and abettor be specifically directed to assist the commission of a crime. Thus the Appeals Chamber stated that if the new trial chamber were to examine the responsibility of Stanišić and Simatović for aiding and abetting the crimes, the Appeals Chamber instructs it to apply the correct law on aiding and abetting liability as set out above, which does not require that the acts of the aider and abettor be specifically directed to assist the commission of the crime.”

It is worrying from the legal point of view that the Appeals Chamber in 2015 issued instructions on how and under what standards the retrial in the Stanišić-Simatović case it to take place. Judge Orie and the Trial Chamber which he presided in the Mladić case once again introduced the non-existent standards based on which Momćilo Perišić as well as Stanišić and Simatović had already been acquitted in earlier cases. To the satisfaction of the broad legal circles the Appeals Chamber eventually managed to abolish the standard of “specific direction” applied in the trial judgment against Stanišić and Simatović and to reverse the judgment. Consequently, a fierce legal “battle” is expected to take place in appeals proceedings against Mladić as well as against Karadžić with the aim to apply the conclusions of the final judgments and the correct international standards for determining criminal liability.

Judge O-Gon Kwon is best known from the trial against Slobodan Milošević in which he presented his separate opinion in the interim judgment in which Milošević was found liable under all charges in the indictment including JCE and the genocide in other BiH municipalities. Judge O-Gon Kwon was outvoted by the other two judges who decided that Milošević could already at the halfway stage be held liable under all charges in the indictment. As presiding judge in the Karadžić case, O-Gon Kwon once again excluded Milošević from JCE, which will be the subject of the appeals proceedings before MICT.

The key fact in evaluating the results of ICTY is that Slobodan Milošević was the only president from former Yugoslav republics who stood for trial before ICTY. It is therefore expected that in the appeals proceedings against Mladić and Karadžić MICT would respect the earlier conclusions from ICTY judgments and the fact that Milošević was charged with crimes committed in three countries in the framework of JCE.

Reactions to the judgment against Prlić: everyone accusing each other, but no one has accused the defence

CTY's final judgment against Prlić et al. pronounced on 29 November 2017 has triggered predictable reactions, especially in Croatia. ICTY has continually delivered judgments in which it confirmed that there was an international conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina and that Serbia and Croatia interfered in Bosnia and Herzegovina by controlling, respectively, the military forces of Bosnian Serbs and the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) in the so called Croatian republic of Herzeg-Bosnia with the aim to annex parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Croatian public has been deceived by hysterical statements made by the highest officials of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and the Republic of Croatia who claimed that the appeal proceeding was decided on the basis of Franjo Tuđman's presidential transcripts. They have intentionally concealed the fact that in the first three trials before ICTY the international conflict/aggression by the Republic of Croatia was established without the use of Tuđman's transcripts. In those three trials in the cases of Kordić and Čerkez (IT-95-14/2), Blaškić (IT- 95-14/1) and Aleksovski (IT- 95-14) the role of the Republic of Croatia was established in both trial and appeals proceedings in which 22 ICTY prosecutors took part and none of them applied Tuđman's transcripts.

Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE) as an element of proving criminal liability and international armed conflict represents two sides of the coin. Judgement against Prlić et al. was more or less expected, but after the acquittal of Ante Gotovina and others there was reasonable caution among all ICTY connoisseurs. Analysts believe that the prosecution outwitted the defence whose biggest mistake was that it demanded the trial chamber to provide for the fifth time evidence on Croatia's interference in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina although the prosecution had offered to reach an agreement on the established facts.

Thus the defence made it easier for the prosecution to prove grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions in parallel with the establishment of international armed conflict in BiH and joint criminal enterprise. Other mistakes noted by the analysts include the three demands of the Republic of Croatia to participate in the proceeding as the
friend of the court” and the statements made by incumbent Croatian President Kolinda Grabar Kitarović that she would not accept the sentencing judgment and the statement by the Croatian member of the BiH Presidency Dragan Čović who said that he knew in advance the Appeals Chamber's decision. The analysts have estimated the defence of Bruno Stojić as the worst one, since it focused on denying JCE and saving Croatia instead of contesting Stojić' concrete liability, although Stojić's position in the structure of the so called Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia was the most simple case for defence.

 In her final speech in the case of Prlić et al. defence counsel Senka Nožica used political rhetoric stressing that Bosnia and Herzegovina was a dysfunctional state and that most of the Croats living there felt that they were denied some of their rights. Noting that Croatian politicians also expressed concerns regarding that issue, Nožica stressed that
the third entity and Herzeg-Bosnia were no longer taboo topics”. Such statements provoked outrage in European and American highest professional, political and diplomatic circles. The defence presented Bruno Stojić as a temperate person who supports coexistence, while on the other hand it spent most of the time presenting evidence showing the Bosniak political leaders and the BiH Army as a criminal organisation which had planned and initiated the attacks at Croatian civilians and the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Those arguments were regarded as unsustainable by the trial chambers. The defence thus lost a lot of valuable time which it could have spent for protecting the interests of its clients.

It can be concluded that it is mainly thanks to the professional attitude of ICTY's staff and the willingness of mostly the Bosnian-Croatian side to cooperate that ICTY has fulfilled its mandate through apprehensions, trials and judgments of all 161 suspects. However, we should not forget that ICTY would have never determined the goal, scope, extent, nature and system of committed crimes were it not for the testimonies of over 4,000 victims. Instead of cooperating with ICTY, which was the obligation of all
the actors from the former Yugoslavia under their national laws, certain highest representatives of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia have rejected to accept the adopted judgments and even tried to humanisethe committed crimes and their perpetrators.

Ljubljana, 21 December 2017

International Institute for Middle-East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) - Ljubljana


Bakhtyar Aljaf


1 STANIŠIĆ Jovica and SIMATOVIĆ Franko (MICT-15-96), KARADŽIĆ Radovan (MICT-13-55), ŠEŠELJ Vojislav (MICT-16-99) MLADIĆ Ratko (MICT IT-09-92 ).

2 The list of judgments with the related paragraphs, including the interim judgement against Slobodan Milošević: ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, IT-94-1, par. 97,156,160,162,569,606,660.

ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalić, IT-96-21, par. 110,221,223,225,233 (‘Delalić)

ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, Trial Chamber, Decision on Motion for Judgement of Acquittal, 16 June 2004., IT-02-54, par. 254 (‘S. Milošević) (,

ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Milan Martić, IT-95-11, par. 329,442-446 (‘Martić)

ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brđanin, IT-99-36, par. 76,148.150,151,153,154

ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Miroslav Deronjić, Sentencing Judgement, 30 March 2004., IT-02-61, par. 52 (‘Deronjić) (

ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Jadranko Prlić et al., IT-04-74, par. 24 ,544,545,549,550,560,568 (‘Prlić et al.’)

ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Dario Kordić and Mario Čerkez, IT-95-14/2, par. 108,109,137,142,145 (‘Kordić and Čerkez)

ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreškić et al., IT-95-16, par. 40 (‘Kupreškić et al.)

ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Mladen Naletilić and Vinko Martinović, IT-98-34, par. 14 ,196,200 (‘Naletilić and Martinović)

ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, IT-95-14-T, par. 94, 122,123,744 (‘Blaškić’)

3 ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Milan Martić, Judgement, IT-95-11-T, par. 446 (‘Martić’) ic/tjug/bcs/070612.pdf

4 By adopting this conclusion, the Trial Chamber took the position that Slobodan Milošević, who is referred to in the judgement as VJ’s Supreme Commander and President of the Supreme Defence Council, is to be excluded from JCE. For MICT's prosecution in the appeal proceeding it will be of key importance to define the position of Slobodan Milošević in the trial judgement in relation to the conclusion of the trial chamber. Interestingly, the trial chamber held the opinion that Milošević received instructions from the Supreme Defence Council,

DECEMBER 26, 2017

Revisiting Dictatorship: Democracy is Worst Form of Government, Indeed

By Endy Bayuni


Democracy is both: the procedure and the content. It is a periodically revisited, fine-calibrated social contract that ties all horizontal and vertical segments of society. Although sometimes slow, tedious and consuming, this is still a truly comprehensive, just and sustainable way to build on its past, live the presence and pursuit the future of a nation.” Following the known lines of professor Anis H. Bajrektarevic on ties that bind, hereby is the fresh take from one of the largest democracies of the world – that of Republic of Indonesia.

The late Soeharto has become something of a poster boy for leadership as the nation searches for a president who can effectively deliver the goods.

Photos of the smiling president, who ruled Indonesia between 1966-1998, appear everywhere, with the caption in Javanese “piye kabare, isih penak jamanku, tho?” (How are you, better in my era, wasn’t it?), a reminder that for some, life was so much better then. The Soeharto posters and memes have been going viral since the 2014 election and are still circulating now.

Soeharto was a dictator, there is no doubt about it, though his supporters would claim that he was a noble one. But the point of the poster is that Indonesia had a leader who delivered the goods, something that no other president since then has been able to match, so his supporters claim.

Soeharto, who ruled with an iron fist, did deliver justice, security and welfare, but it is debatable whether his successors have fared better or worse. Ruling the country for 32 years, he was bound to have delivered something, while his successors have been subject to periodic democratic elections and limited to ruling for no more than two five-year terms.

The bigger question, and this was one of the topics discussed at the recent Bali Civil Society and Media Forum, is whether democracy can deliver justice, security and welfare to the people, all the people.

Indonesia, now a democracy for nearly 20 years, albeit a struggling one, makes a good case study to answer this question, by comparing the ability of the two political systems in bringing greater prosperity to the people.

The track record of Indonesia since 1998 has not been bad, although perhaps underappreciated.

The economy has improved significantly, in terms of overall GDP and per-capita-income growth, and the government today provides many services such as free health care, 12-year compulsory free education and cash assistance for the poor. Indonesia is today the 16th-largest economy in the world, and many predict that it will be in the top 10 by 2025 and top five by 2040.

We have a growing middle class, reflected by the number cellphones, cars and motorcycles, and a growing appetite for holidays, both at home or abroad.

And there is freedom, all kinds of freedom, something that distinguishes today’s era from that of Soeharto’s. Why then, do some people still feel that they miss Soeharto?

Perhaps they don’t really miss him, but they miss the certainty, the swift way decisions were made and the security he provided. They miss the effectiveness and efficiency that an authoritarian regime can deliver.

Democracy, unfortunately, is almost anything but.

Decisions are made through an arduous and cumbersome process, and the government is often mired in stagnation. Every single major decision has to undergo the democratic processes, meaning noisy public debates and endless deliberation by legislators.

We also have legislators who are good at grandstanding but ineffective in producing laws that reflect the aspirations of the people. In many ways, Soeharto’s regime produced some better laws because they did not go through the lengthy debates we see today.

On security, Indonesia faces challenges in ensuring protection for people who are attacked or persecuted because of their faith, race, sexual orientation or even ideological leanings.

The attacks on the Shia and Ahmadiyya followers, the forced closures of places of worship, the recent attacks against people because of their leftist ideological leanings, and the return of anti-Chinese sentiments, reflect that freedom and the protection of freedom have been denied to some.

Soeharto would not have tolerated any of this, but then, he would not have tolerated a lot of other things, including dissent and differences of opinion.

Populism, the hallmark of democracy and one way of getting elected, also means leaders addressing only popular issues but avoiding more fundamental problems.

These failings of democracy in Indonesia may have revived our memory of the “good old days” of Soeharto (while forgetting the worse aspects of his regime), but they should not be used as a pretext for a return to authoritarianism.

Democracy in Indonesia is still a work in progress. We have been in this game for only 20 years, and it still has not been able to ensure justice, security and welfare for all.

Democracy, as the popular saying goes, is the worst form of government, except for all the others. The alternative, an authoritarian regime, may be swift and efficient. But if authoritarianism comes at the cost of our freedom, an absence of checks and balances and endemic corruption, then yes, give us democracy any time.

We just have to work harder, through the democratic process, to fix these problems. We have to have faith in democracy.

By Endy Bayuni

The writer, editor-in-chief of The Jakarta Post, took part in the Bali Civil Society and Media Forum, organized by the Institute for Peace and Democracy and the Press Council, on Dec.5-6.

DECEMBER 12, 2017

National Congress of The Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina
ONLINE NEWSLETTER International, No. 959
December 3, 2017

Miscarriage of Justice at the ICTY: Bosnians consider guilty genocide verdict for Mladić incomplete


1. Miscarriage of Justice at the ICTY: Bosnians consider guilty genocide verdict for Mladić incomplete
1.1 The definition of the genocide is clear, simple and well intended
1.2 Genocide is very well documented in the Mladić judgment
1.3 The court setting its own definition of the genocide
1.4 The consequences of the new definition of genocide
2. Skraćeni opis metodologije suda i konzekvence takve metodologije kojom se praktično mijenja defincija genocida
3. Success of the book "The War in Bosnia: How to Succeed at Genocide"
5. Veliki uspjeh knjige “The War in Bosnia: How to Succeed at Genocide”


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1. Miscarriage of Justice at the ICTY: Bosnians consider guilty genocide verdict for Mladić incomplete

By Tarik Borogovac, Bosnian Congress USA

1.1 The definition of the genocide is clear, simple and well intended

In Bosnia and Herzegovina the Mladić decision, as the previous decisions at the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY), is seen as incomplete and a major miscarriage of justice. That may sound odd: Mladić was proclaimed guilty of genocide carried out by the army that he commanded, and he was sentenced to life in prison. How can it be miscarriage of justice? Two reasons:

First, Mladić's mission to establish an ethnically clean "Republic of the Serbs" (RS) is alive and well. The establishment of the RS was the successful main goal of the Joint criminal enterprise, (JCE). Today it is both a symbol of genocide while also continuing its humiliation of the victims through governing their hometowns, setting school curricula that denies students' identity and history, flying its flag on sacred ground of Srebrenica and other massacred Bosnian towns. While the RS exists, the ICTY trials of a few ring-leaders and ideologues is fake justice because the punishment is their own, and it exempts and protects the RS government that committed these acts.

The second reason, on which we will spend the rest of this column, is the verdict regarding Claim (I) of the indictment, relating to six towns other than Srebrenica. The decision (and previous ones on Bosnia specifically) uses very odd twists of logic in a strange effort to find reasons why these towns might be different from Srebrenica. And their logic does not stand up to basic scrutiny because there is no fundamental difference. It completely weakens the definition of genocide, to an extent that many future genocides will not be punished as such.

Let us remind ourselves how genocide is defined (from the convention on genocide -- 

Article II: In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Note this definition clearly is meant to prevent hairsplitting about what is genocide. The word "intent" is used to make clear that you do not have to be very successful in carrying it out to make it genocide, and "in part" means that you do not have to even desire to kill every single group member, as killing some of them for mere reason of being members of the group is genocide. Even non-murderous acts qualify -- e.g. part (d) makes clear that forcing sterilization or abortions of folks for the reason of being members of the group qualifies. There is also no mention of victims being very special or emblematic members of the targeted group -- it is genocide even with (especially with) regular people because the motive is merely based on the ethnic, religious, or racial membership of the victim.

1.2 The genocide is pretty well documented in the judgment

Everyone should read the decision or at least any random part of it, as it is very long. Everyone, from schoolchildren to genocide deniers should read it for the power of the evidence. In page after page, for thousands of pages, it shows us what genocide looks like when carried out. Dispassionately, just stating the facts, it documents statements by the JCE leaders, including Mladić, that threaten to exterminate Bosniaks. It documents killings and brutal violence against large numbers of Bosniak civilians -- giving times and locations of the acts, names of victims and their killers, the methods used to commit the murders. It is not exhaustive, it does not include every killing in every town, as that would not be feasible to do. But there are very many examples from different towns -- more than enough to show the pattern.

Just as a sampling of this, let us review a chilling section of summaries of mass murder (omitting mass rapes, beatings detentions, etc.) of Bosniaks carried out by people identified as Serbian military and paramilitary members, motivated by ethnicity.

Foca: 46 Bosnian Muslims as well as hundreds of predominantly Bosnian-Muslim detainees at KP Dom Foca (prison) were killed
Kljuc: at least 266 Bosnian Muslims were killed and that those killings constituted murder.
Kotor Varoš: at least 185 Bosnian Muslims were killed and that those killings constituted murder.
Prijedor: at least 993 Bosnian Muslims as well as at least 536 Bosnian Muslims or Bosnian Croats were killed and that those killings constituted murder.
Sanski Most: at least 94 Bosnian Muslims and 9 Bosnian Croats were killed and that those killings constituted murder.
Vlasenica: at least 169 Bosnian Muslims were killed and that those killings constituted murder.

A technical note: ICTY refers to Bosniaks as "Bosnian Muslims" because Yugoslavia officially used the name "Muslims by Nationality" to deny their Bosniak identity. Bosniaks were called Turks by Serb nationalist leadership, inciting Serb people toward historic score-settling.

Notice the words "at least" attached to the figures above. These figures represent only the confirmed victims known to be tied to specific physical perpetrators as part of the specific massacres, just as we know there were many, many more dead in these areas. For example, estimates of numbers murdered in Prijedor during the war, a town taken over without resistance early in the war, are more than double what is listed above. Note also, that these are not all of the towns where such ethnically based mass murders occurred. For example, Visegrad, Zvornik, Bijeljina, Brcko, etc. are well known sites of such massacres that fit this pattern but were excluded from Claim 1 by the
prosecution, for all kinds of technical or practical reasons. Srebrenica was included, but kept as a separate charge of genocide with a "guilty" verdict.

1.3 The court sets their own definition of the genocide

 Clearly, after seeing just these massacres that are included, for which it is shown in the judgment that the physical perpetrators were uniformed members of Serb forces and of organized Serb paramilitaries operating in view and in cooperation with Serb forces, and establishing that those perpetrators were motivated by the ethnicity of the victims, the ICTY still declines to call it genocide for these towns. That is baffling. The text of the decision for Claim 1 gives the reason, quote from the judgement:

...the Trial Chamber finds that the Bosnian Muslims in Sanski Most, Vlasenica, Foca, Kotor Varoš, and Prijedor Municipalities were targeted by the physical perpetrators of prohibited acts largely in their own respective municipalities. The Trial Chamber notes that the physical perpetrators had limited geographical control or authority to carry out activities. The Bosnian Muslims targeted in each individual municipality formed a relatively small part of the Bosnian-Muslim population in the Bosnian-Serb claimed territory or in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole. The Trial Chamber received insufficient evidence in dictating why the Bosnian Muslims in each of the above municipalities or the municipalities themselves had a special significance or were emblematic in relation to the protected group as a whole. The Trial Chamber is, therefore, not satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that the only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the surrounding facts and circumstances is that the physical perpetrators possessed the intent to destroy the Bosnian Muslims in Sanski Most, Foca, Kotor Varoš, Prijedor, and Vlasenica Municipalities as a substantial part of the protected group. In conclusion, the Trial Chamber does not find, beyond reasonable doubt, that the physical perpetrators of prohibited acts against the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in the Count 1 municipalities committed those prohibited acts, with the intent to destroy the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats as a substantial part of the protected groups in Bosnian-Herzegovina.
- the end of the quote

Therefore, the following illogical tests are imposed:

(A) Do the physical perpetrators stay in one town or go to other towns? That is possibly a practical decision on the part of the Serb military leadership. If you intend to commit genocide, and your victims are many and live over a large territory, you have to divide and delegate the task anyway. So, you may decide to keep groups of killers in smaller locations, preferably locals who know who is a member of the group you are targeting (in Bosnia, ethnicity is not apparent from seeing or speaking with someone). As for the physical perpetrators themselves, even if their intent is to kill all Bosniaks everywhere, they would not be tempted to leave their town at all, as long as they believe that other perpetrators will massacre those other towns. Given that the killing was so widespread, that would be a logical assumption for them. Beyond that, the fact that so many different groups of low-level butchers went on similar rampage in so many different locations makes it implausible that they were not either encouraged, incited or ordered by their higher level leadership. Else, how do they all get the same ideas and work in similar ways independently? And why did they all conclude they can carry out these acts with impunity? Apparently they could because they were not stopped or punished by the RS leadership, as the massacres lasted over long periods of time in those towns and recurred in other towns all throughout the war. Going forward, does this not provide a recipe of how to do genocide properly: just keep your low-level killers in smaller groups, and assign to each a single location to terrorize. In that way the practical organizational strategy has the benefit of protecting you legally.

(B) Are the people murdered (rather than intended) within each town ofspecial significance (or emblematic) of Bosniaks? This rule was established only in the case of Bosnia, to separate Srebrenica from other towns. In the eyes of the perpetrators the victims in Srebrenica were the same people as the victims in Prijedor and other towns, and killed for the same reason -- they were Bosniaks ("Turks"). That was their significance. Denoting Srebrenicans as especially significant or emblematic beyond others is circular logic, as they only became emblematic of the Bosniak plight because their fate and genocide was so visible, as they were in a UN safe-zone and had been under siege
for a long time, and because their massacre was expected and anticipated, due to the earlier massacres in the other towns. The victims in the other towns are not special because they were first, they were taken from their homes in the middle of the night, and their fates were not known until sometime after the fact.

One can define significance in better ways than the ICTY did. Many of the Bosniaks targeted first in many towns occupied by Serb forces were prominent in their communities for being political leaders, intellectuals, religious clerics (Imams), businessmen, lawyers and teachers. This was decapitation of Bosniak communities in those towns, and in all of Bosnia. For example, Serb forces executed Deputy Prime Minister Hakija Turajlic at a checkpoint outside of Sarajevo when he was in a UN vehicle. Such people are most emblematic of an ethnic group. The particular fake contrast chosen makes it seem the court is desperately searching for any argument to separate Srebrenica from other massacres.

(C) Are the people actually murdered (rather than intended) within each town a large enough part of the protected group within that town? Clearly, the numbers listed above are large, but the ICTY simply chooses to set a threshold (an arbitrary and unclear one) at some higher number. Recall, the definition of genocide implies there is no such threshold by using the words "in part" and "intent". With this threshold, the ICTY is also setting an implicit guideline for carrying out genocide in the future: they should murder about 1500 in each town the size of Prijedor and make sure they do not get near 8000 in a town the size of Srebrenica.

(D) Are the people actually murdered (rather than intended) a significant part or the protected group in the occupied territory and the country as a whole? That is absurd, because it gives credit to the perpetrators for inability to exterminate people who were simply out of their reach. It gives them credit for those (majority) of Bosniaks from these towns who did not wait around to be rounded up and slaughtered, the ones who took a look at what was happening and decided to escape. Countless Bosniak refugees managed to escape from these territories and ended up in free territories and in other countries during the war. It gives the perpetrators credit even for the large majority of Bosnia's 2 million Bosniaks who had lived in the territories that the Serb forces never managed to occupy -- such as Tuzla, Sarajevo, Bihac, Zenica, etc. The artificial segmentation to individual towns and massacres also simply makes it impossible to mathematically ever meet test (D). To guarantee that no piece is sufficient by itself, all you have to do is to segment to small enough pieces.

1.4 The consequences of the new definition of genocide

In total, the ICTY managed to avoid making the obvious conclusion that all of occupied Bosnia was subject to genocide by making a series of decisions that individually defied logic, and built them upon each other like a house of cards: It eliminated many of the deaths by not considering many towns and locations where massacres occurred. Within the towns that it did consider, it did not account for all the massacres as being part of the pattern, just subsets where it could not find any uncertainty about any given aspect. It focused on the numbers of actually murdered, rather than the stated and demonstrated intent, giving the perpetrators credit for the difficulty of their task and their ineffectiveness and inability to carry it out fully, and credit for not murdering those they could not reach. It imposed an arbitrary and opaque threshold for a number that would be a significant enough part. It considered small towns separately, so that no town by itself would be considered as a significant to all of Bosnia according to that arbitrary threshold. And in the case of Srebrenica, which was known to everybody as symbolic of the whole genocide, and could therefore not be avoided, the court said that its symbolism made it a special case, and used that assertion as a basis to differentiate and separate it from the others, and in turn used that as a basis to dismiss the fundamental similarities in facts that the others shared with Srebrenica.

Murder is an act against an individual, and even mass murder is an act against a series of individuals. Each one has to be proven. But genocide as defined above is different, it is a single collective crime, committed against a group of people, by an organization, a movement adhering to an ideology, or a state. All these massacres occurred in the same war, within a short time span (three years) and in a small country about 300 km from end to end. The perpetrators all followed the same ideology, all were part of forces fighting on the same side, on territory occupied by the "Republic of the Serbs". If genocide is so difficult to establish in a single location, the fact that its pattern is co-occurring in so many other locations nearby is evidence that strengthens the case for them all. The common patterns between Prijedor, Sanski Most, Foca, Kljuc, etc. remove any basis for doubt in the individual towns. Srebrenica also is not a separate event from the other towns. Protection from genocide for members of a targeted group should not stop at a town line, it should extend to all places within the reach of the perpetrators. And the culpability of those perpetrators and their supporters should not be subject to hairsplitting.

2. Skraćeni opis metodologije suda i konzekvence takve metodologije kojom se praktično mijenja definicija genocida

U totalu, internacionalni kriminalni tribunal za bivšu Jugoslaviju (ICTY) je uspio da izbjegne očigledan zaključak da je cijela okupirana teritorija BiH bila izložena genocidu tako što je donio niz odluka koje su svaka za sebe potpuno nelogične, pa je onda od njih napravio kuću od karata. Prvo je isključio iz razmatranja mnoga naselja i lokacije gdje su se masakri događali, i tako odmah na početku izbacio iz razmatranja o genocida mnoga ubistva. Zatim, u opštinama koje jeste razmatrao, sud nije razmatrao mnoge masakre koji su počinjeni, ali nisu mogli biti apsolutno istraženi do zadnjeg detalja. Zatim su se fokusirali samo na brojeve ubijenih, i to brojeve koje su tom metodologijom veoma umanjili, umjesto da su se fokusirali na dokazivanje genocidne namjere, koja je vidljiva sa obzirom na tipičan “modus operandi”. Podsjećamo, po definiciji genocida, dovoljno je bilo dokazati genocidnu namjeru i istrebljenje jednog dijela ciljane grupe,

Takvom metodologijom je apsurdno Sud zločincima upisao u kredit i to što su se neke od potencijalnih žrtava spasile bježanjem sa okupirane teritorije, pa nisu ušli u saldo ubijenih. Time je uvedena potpuno proizvoljna i nejasna granica do kojeg broja je dozvoljeno ubijanje neke etničke grupe, a da to ne bude okarakterisano kao genocid. I što je potpuno apsurdno, tom metodologijom je posmatrano DA LI BI BROJ UBIJENIH U SVAKOM GRADU POJEDINAČNO BIO ZNAČAJAN U ODNOSU NA CIJELU BiH, tj. da li je prešao tu proizvoljnu granicu kada se može smatrati genocidom. A u slučaju Srebrenice, koja je poznata po genocidu i za koju nisu mogli izbjeći donošenje presude za genocid, sud je naveo da je narod Srebrenice poseban i simbolizuje sve Bošnjake (valjda zato što je počinjen genocid) i upravo ta posebnost izdvaja od ostalih opština, i tako je Sud isključio iz razmatranja sličnost metodologije provođenja zločina u Srebrenici sa drugim opštinama?! Znači kružna “logika” (circulus viciozus).

Ubistvo je akt protiv individue i čak je masovno ubistvo akt protiv niza individua. Zato svako ubistvo posebno mora biti dokazano. Ali genocid, prema definiciji genocida, je jedinstven zločin počinjen nad kolektivom, na pripadnicima jedne etničke ili religijske grupe, zato što su pripadnici te grupe. I počinjen od strane kolektiva: organizacije ili pokreta koji se napaja jednom ideologijom, ili ga je počinila jedna država. Svi bosanski masakri su počinjeni u istom ratu, u kratkom periodu od tri godine, u maloj državi, oko 300 kilometara dugačkoj s kraja na kraj. Svi izvršioci su slijedili istu ideologiju, svi su pripadali vojnim jedinicama koje su se borile na istoj strani, na teritoriju paradržave koju su formirali i nazvali Republika srpska. Ako je genocid tako teško dokazati u jednoj opštini, činjenica da se identična metodologija (Američki policajci kažu “common pattern” ili “Modus Operandi”, MO) ponavlja u drugim opštinama dokazuje da se radi o jednom zločinačkom poduhvatu u svim opštinama. Zajednički “Modus Operandi” zločinačkog djelovanja u Prijedoru, Sanskom Mostu, Foči, Ključu itd. uklanja svaku sumnju da se radi o genocidu u svim tim gradovima. Postavlja se pitaje, zašto su sudije odlučile da svaku opštinu gledaju kao poseban slučaj, te su tako onemogućili da isti Modus Operandi iz različitih opština bude iskorišten kao moćan dokaz udruženog poduhvata i genocidne namjere? Genocid u Srebrenici također nije odvojen događaj od svih drugih gradova. Zaštita po konvenciji o genocidu se ne može atomizirati po pojedinim gradovima, ona se pruža gdje god bi zločinačka ruka mogla dosegnuti. Odgovornost zločinaca i njihovih simpatizera ne bi smjela biti žrtva ovakvog “cijepanja dlake”, tj. cijepanja jednoga zločina genocida u više manjih zločina da bi se umanjila odgovornost mentora cijelog zločinačkog poduhvata.

3. Sud je profesionalno obavio posao u suđenju Udruženom zločinačkom poduhvatu Herceg-Bosna

Muhamed Borogovac

Kao što je poznato Sud je potvrdio sve kazne šestorki prvaka Herceg-Bosne, implicirajući pri tome i pokojne Franju Tuđmana i Gojka Suška, i što je najvažnije i Republiku Hrvatsku. Za razliku od suđenja Mladiću i Karadžiću, ovaj put Sud potpuno ispravno nije jedan zločinački poduhvat razbio na niz manjih opštinskih zločina. I ne samo to, Sud je potpuno ispravno, baš kao i u Nirenbergu, na jednom suđenju sudio cijeloj garnituri njihove tvorevine Herceg-Bosne, a ne pojedinačno svakom zločincu na posebnom suđenju.

Vrhunac je dostignut kada je Tuđmanov "general" Slobodan Praljak teatralno popio otrov u sudnici. To je višestruko povećalo interes svjetskih medija za šestorku, i za šta su oni osuđeni. Istu noć sam gledao dva američka "World News" programa, ABC od 6:30 i BBC od 7:00. To su nešto kao naši nekadašnji večernji TV dnevnici. Oba su imala velike reportaže o zločinima HVO-a u Bosni, sa snimkama iz Mostara, noćnim slikama protjerivanih civila preko starog mosta, rušenje starog mosta, i svim mukama kojima su Mostarci bili izloženi. Nastupao je i jedan svjedok sa suđenja šestorki, bivši dopisnik BBC-a iz Mostara.

Ukratko, mnogo više prostora je dato ovoj presudi, nego presudi Mladiću, vjerovatno upravo zato što je Praljak na suđenju popio otrov, te je to značajno doprinjelo povećanom interesu svjetske javnosti. Ova presuda nama daje moralnu snagu da nikada ne pristanemo na treći entitet, tj. na vaskrsnuće Herceg-Bosne. Mislim da se nikoji izdajnici više neće usuditi da dignu svoje prljave ruke kojima će glasati za promjene ustava po volji HDZ-a, i da nam više ne mogu lagati u oči i govoriti "Svijet hoće Herceg-Bosnu.", ako ju je taj isti svijet osudio kao zločinački poduhvat.

Zato sada zaista imamo šansu da spasimo BiH i da spasimo Bošnjake od sudbine Palestinaca, a ta sudbina bi nas snašla ako ikada bude osnovan treći entitet u bilo kojoj formi. Pri tome se ne smijemo okliznuti ni na drugoj strani, moramo zaustaviti naše izdajnike i u njihovim dogovorima sa Srbijom, prije svega ne smijemo dozvoliti da se pregovara o granicama BiH, jer jednom kada se otvore granice BiH za pregovore, onda se to neće zaustaviti na "manjim korekcijama" kako nam to sada prodaju.

Nikada nam se više ne smije dogoditi da povjerujemo glumi jednog Bakira Izetbegovića. I on je kao i njegov otac izuzetno dobar glumac. Na primjer, čak sam i ja bio sklon da povjerujem da on istinski želi reviziju presude za genocid BiH protiv Srbije na Internacionalnom sudu pravde (ICJ) kako je veoma dobro obrazlagao zahtjev za revizijom u "svađama" sa Ivanićem. Tek kasnije smo od Nevenke Tromp i Jefrey-a Nice-a saznali da je on javio agentu BiH, jedinom čovjeku iz BiH sa ovlaštenom da komunicira sa Internacionalnim sudom pravde, da preda Ivanićevo pismo Sudu. Time je Ivanićevom pismu data snaga usaglašenog državnog dokumenta, te je to bio kraj procesa početog 1992 od strane Prof Boylea. Za novi proces je trebalo dobiti saglasnost Ivanića i Čovića. Dakle, Izetbegović je propuštanjem Ivanićevog pisma sahranio Reviziju presude za genocid na najvažnijem sudu, a sjetimo se kako se izvanredno argumentovano tukao sa Ivanićem (tj. glumio) za već mrtvu Reviziju, što mi tada nismo znali.

 4. Success of the book "The War in Bosnia: How to Succeed at Genocide"

The book, "The War in Bosnia: How to Succeed at Genocide" by Muhamed Borogovac is the only book in English written by Bosnians about political scheming that enabled the war and genocide in Bosnia and produced the Dayton agreement. In other words, that is the only book about the big picture of the war as seen from the Bosnian perspective. It is a collection of political analyses written during the war and right after the war, by Bosnian intellectuals, insiders, dissidents from the Bosnian government who took part in the division of the country along the ethnic lines.

The renewed interest for Bosnia, due to the November judgements at the ICTY pushed the book on top of the Amazon charts of book about the War in Bosnia.

The book was issued in Bosnian, first time before the end of the war. Because authors predicted the great deal of what will happen in the future, the book became very popular among Bonsians, even though the book was very critical of Bosnian leadership for negotiating with and collaborating with the aggressors. The book owes its success to the fact that its predictions were correct, which indicates that authors understand very well what was really going on in Bosnia, which was very different form the picture presented to the world. index=aps&hvadid=198216555484&hvpos=1o1&hvnetw=g&hvrand=7796928925512672046& amp;hvpone&hvptwo&hvqmt=e&hvdev=c&hvdvcmdl&hvlocint&hvlocphy= 9001947&hvtargid=kwd-314767678500&ref=pd_sl_fglsbhjm9_e 

5. Veliki uspjeh knjige “The War in Bosnia: How to Succeed at Genocide”

Knjiga “The War in Bosnia: How to Succeed at Genocide”, autora Muhameda Borogovca je u posljednjih nekoliko sedmica, zahvaljujući povećanom interesu za BiH uzrokovanom novembarskim presudama Mladiću i Udruženom zločinačkom poduhvatu Herceg-Bosna izbila na prvo mjesto Amazonove liste knjiga o Ratu u BiH. Podsjećamo, tu smo knjigu preveli na Engleski i objavili radi onih mladih Bošnjaka koji su raseljeni prije 25 godina iz domovine i sada bolje govore Engleski nego Bosanski. Želimo da i oni znaju istinu o tome ko je odgovoran da su oni gotovo izgubili svoju domovinu. Gornji link do Amazonove liste knjiga o ratu u BiH, i gornja kratka informacija o knjizi na Engleskom namijenjena upravo onim mladim Bošnjacima kojima je namijenjena i knjiga.

Čitaj 73 vrijeme:

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DECEMBER 3, 2017


Access to Justice as a Key Element of the Rule of Law
Date and Time
: 16 November 2017, 13:30-14:45
: Room 532, Hofburg, Vienna (5th floor)
Permanent Mission
Working language:

Snacks and refreshments will be served in Ratsaal Foier at 13:00 before the event

Discussion moderated by:

Prof. and Chair for Intl. Law & Global Political Studies, Editor of the GHIR
(the New York Addleton Academic Publishers’ specialized Magazine for Geopolitics, History and Intl. Relations)

Dr. Gabriel LANSKY
Attorney at Law, Partner at Lansky, Ganzger and Partner
Special Agent at the European Court of Human Rights
(name tbc)
Regional Expert
(name tbc)

Read more on the next page:.........

October 31, 2017

Long story of Kurz: ‘Austria You will be Macronised’

Max Hess

“There is a claim constantly circulating the EU: ‘multiculturalism is dead in Europe’. Dead or maybe d(r)ead?... That much comes from a cluster of European nation-states that love to romanticize – in a grand metanarrative of dogmatic universalism – their appearance as of the coherent Union, as if they themselves lived a long, cordial and credible history of multiculturalism. Hence, this claim and its resonating debate is of course false. It is also cynical because it is purposely deceiving. No wonder, as the conglomerate of nation-states/EU has silently handed over one of its most important debates – that of European anti-fascistic identity, or otherness – to the wing-parties. This was repeatedly followed by the selective and contra-productive foreign policy actions of the Union in the MENA, Balkans and Ukraine.” – wrote prof. Anis H. Bajrektarevic in his luminary and farsighted essay Denazification – urgently needed in Europe .

Last two parliamentary elections in Central Europe are indicative enough: Europe inevitably loses its grip over the grand narrative, fatherly eroding its place in history. Hereby a few lines about the latest of them.

Sebastian Kurz, 31, is likely to become Austria’s new Chancellor following the 15 October election. He would be the youngest-ever head of government in the European Union and to many of his supporters will be seen as a bold new face ready to lead Europe through and past the ongoing crises over migration, integration, fiscal authority, and identity that have dominated European politics, within and without the EU, in recent years. A new leader of Europe’s populist right is likely on the horizon, yet he has received little international attention compared with candidates such as Marine Le Pen or Nigel Farage who were always long shots.

Kurz’s Rise – Aus Iuridicum

Rapidly rising through the youth wing of the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP), Kurz was elected its head in 2009 and then promoted directly into the party’s upper echelon in 2011 when he was named to the newly-created post of state secretary for integration at age 24.

From the earliest days, Kurz embraced a populist right-wing worldview although he initially steadfastly avoided divisive rhetoric that could have derailed his rise. Kurz used his post as state secretary to publicize these ideas, while also astutely employing the leeway afforded by his youth to take positions deviating from the ÖVP platform.

In 2013 Kurz was elected to the national legislature, also winning the most direct ‘preference votes’ of any candidate and a third more than the ÖVP’s then-head Michael Spindelegger. The ÖVP received less overall votes than the Social Democrats (SPÖ) and again went into government as the junior coalition partner. Kurz was rewarded with the second-highest post of any ÖVP leader when he was named foreign minister.

Austrians see themselves both as core members of the ‘West’ but also as traditionalists and the inheritors of a unique culture. The historic heft of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, a separateness from Germans and Germany that was cemented by the divides caused by the Enlightenment and birth of Protestantism, and steady decades-long growth in income and living standards all have served to shape an image of Austria and Austrians as reasoned yet traditional, sober yet dandy, and reserved yet welcoming. It is precisely in this image that Kurz has tried to cast himself.

Even Kurz’s critics are quick to acknowledge that from the beginning of his career he had a remarkable ability to gauge the prevailing zeitgeist, all the while grounding himself in the core Austrian conservatism that the ÖVP represents. In contrast to populist politicians who have at best half-convicningly attempted to portray themselves as outsiders, Kurz embraces the fact he has had his sights set on a political career since his youth. Kurz recognized the quickest route to ‘authenticity’ was to never speak the word.

Kurz, the Foreign Minister

As Foreign Minister, Kurz was able to play host and diplomat to Austria’s wide variety of partners. He also judiciously avoided controversy in mainstream international media. On issues where Kurz would perhaps have been more vocal, he accepted his role as a government minister and did not speak out overly loudly when he disagreed with his party’s leaders, while tweaking those of the SPÖ, the senior coalition partner, in a way that did not offend Austrian sensibilities.

Kurz’s four years in the foreign ministry saw a series of regional and political crises, attesting to his political skill. Three months after taking office, Ukrainian oligarch Dmytro Firtash was arrested on a visit to Vienna on the request of US authorities. The arrest came two day’s before Moscow’s controversial referendum in Crimea and struck at the core of domestic politics in Ukraine, where Firtash long played an outsize role. Yet Kurz did not shy from being thrust in the spotlight, in fact he appeared to be hungering for it, with the then-27-year old even offering to mediate Russia and Ukraine’s disputes over Crimea.

Kurz ultimately backed sanctions, sensing the prevailing winds in Europe. However, he was vocal in calling for European business’ interests to be considered even before Italian, Hungarian and Cypriot politicians subsequently took up such positions. The move played well domestically in Austria, where many criticize great power games, perhaps with a slight, albeit unstated view towards the rearview mirror given their fatal role in Austria’s own history. Austria’s Raiffeisen bank also derives most of its profits from Eastern Europe and is the largest foreign player in Russia’s banking market. Russian President Vladimir Putin also travelled to Vienna in June 2014, his first post-Crimea visit to a Western country, with Kurz vocally defending the invite and signing of a controversial pipeline deal at the same time EU and US officials were deliberating sanctions on Russia’s energy sector.

Kurz’s time as foreign minister also coincided with Europe’s migration crisis, which was nearly simultaneous with his push towards the spotlight when he backed the stance of Austria’s eastern and southeastern neighbors even while then-Chancellor Werner Faymann waffled on the issue. By February 2016, Kurz was publicly embracing not only the positions of Warsaw, Budapest, and Ljubljana, but their rhetoric as well. In March 2016, Austria had closed its borders to most asylum seekers. By the end of May of that year, Faymann resigned. He was subsequently replaced by Christian Kern, the current head of the SPÖ.

Kurz took advantage of the weakness of the senior leadership within the SPÖ and his own ÖVP to push his personal agenda and reputation to the fore. Kurz has even sought to use the largely-symbolic rotating chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which Vienna holds for 2017, to promote his political agenda. Kurz was bold enough to broadcast this intention, declaring in an interview with Der Spiegel that he would use the post to push for the lifting of sanctions against Russia. He has also used the platform to again propose he mediate a solution to the conflict in Donbas, even writing an English-language op-ed for Politico on the subject this September. Demonstrating Kurz’s eye for the future, however, a number of senior staff members have left Kurz’s Foreign Ministry since the start of the year, promoted as Austria’s new ambassadors to some of its leading partners. A further major reshuffle is expected after the election, a possible indication that Kurz will continue to cut a prominent figure on the international stage. 

Kurz, the Candidate: Dressed to Impress

A year after Faymann’s resignation, the Kern government collapsed, prompting the elections that will be held on 15 October. The interim period saw the contested and contentious 2016 presidential run-off election, in which the initial result was annulled and the far right Freedom Party’s (FPÖ) Norbert Hofer was narrowly defeated by independent candidate Alexander Van der Bellen. Kurz had refused to endorse either candidate. Yet it was the fact that the run-off featured neither a candidate of the SPÖ nor the ÖVP for the first time that appears to have most shaped Kurz’s current candidacy.

Van der Bellen, an alumnus of Austria’s relatively minor Green Party, was seen by many on the Austrian right as nearly as radical as Hofer. The Austrian presidency is also largely symbolic – although Hofer’s platform included steps that would have been unprecedented by the Austrian executive. As a result, there was little domestic political cost to Kurz remaining neutral.

The lack of an SPÖ or ÖVP candidate in the final round highlighted the shifts underway at the heart of Austrian politics, and the weakness of then-ÖVP leader Reinhold Mitterlehrner, who stepped back in May, enabling Kurz’s ascent.

Kurz, however, attached a number of conditions to the proposal that he lead the ÖVP. The decades-old party fell in line behind Kurz quickly, even agreeing to campaign under the joint branding of ÖVP and ‘Kurz List – the New People’s Party’. Kurz’s image, rhetoric, and bold proclamations on the campaign trail have put the party comfortably in the lead in the polls.

The lead Kurz maintains in the polls has come primarily at the expense of the far-right FPÖ, although incumbent Chancellor Christian Kern has done his party no favors following a series of scandals. Kern’s SPÖ is polling behind the FPÖ in most polls and he has declared that he would prefer to lead the opposition than re-form a coalition with the ÖVP.

Kurz and Kern’s relationship was already poor but the latest scandal around the SPÖ alleges a controversial former election advisor set up social media pages aimed at besmirching Kurz, only dampening the possibility for a renewed coalition. Yet Kurz also knows the difficulties inherent to forming a government with the FPÖ, despite having adopted much of its rhetoric in his own campaign. Such a government could come under some degree of EU censure, as it did the last time the ÖVP and FPÖ formed a government in 2000. The FPÖ then was the larger of the two parties but would undergo a series of splits while in government.

Although the FPÖ of today has long since coalesced under the leadership of Heinz-Christian Strache, it too will be wary of a coalition with the ÖVP, albeit less over concerns of an EU rebuttal than over Kurz continuing to encroach on its political space.

Get Shorty - the Chancellor? the future EU Commission President?

Kurz is likely to become Austria’s most prominent Chancellor on the international stage in decades. His willingness to be outspoken and take on issues far afield from Austria steadily grew during his tenure in the foreign ministry. Beginning with his early proposal to mediate between Moscow and Kyiv towards the end of his term, he was sufficiently confident to publicly endorse incumbent Macedonian Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski ahead of that country’s December 2016 election.

Kurz’s alliances in the Balkans and Eastern Europe are extensive and he was one of the few leading EU politicians outside the region to defend Hungary’s crackdown on migrants and refugees. Kurz’s economic policies are more traditionally liberal than those of the Visegrad Group but are also tinged by his populist bent. Nevertheless, he sees himself as a leading exponent of the same cultural conservatism embraced by leaders such as Viktor Orban or Nigel Farage. He is telegenic and well-spoken and has shown a knack for youth politics, of particularly importance in Austria where the voting age is 16.

On 8 May, France elected Emmanuel Macron as president in a vote that many hailed as a landmark victory for Europe’s centrist establishment. On 15 October, Austria is likely to elect Kurz as its next chancellor, in a vote that the populist right will hail as its own landmark victory.

Max Hess is a senior political risk analyst with the London-based AEK international, specializing in Europe and Eurasia.

October 19, 2017



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