OCTOBER 2020

 

Where is a Will – there is Brazil

Society 2020, despite the Pandemics

Photo by E. Dos Santos-Duisenberg : Labirinto de David, Búzios, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

After a century, the world population faced a new pandemic that fast spread globally, affecting individuals both physically and mentally. Covid-19 started in late 2019 in Asia, spreading so fast that despite the global connectivity and highly sophisticated information technology and communication systems, the interconnected society of the 21^st century was incapable to fast react in order to avoid contagion and prevent the worst. Gradually, the pandemic is making a tour around the globe contaminating citizens even in rural communities from all continents. Worldwide, there have been 32 million confirmed cases with over 1 million deaths during the first 9 months of this year^[1].

From this universal pandemic we learned that the interdependent globalized world of 2020 is connected but not synchronized – or as earlier in crisis, prof. Anis H. Bajrektarevic well-noted ‘world on autopilot’^[2]. All scientific, technological and digital knowledge accumulated over centuries remains inept to protect our civilization from an invisible virus that, ironically, can be eliminated with just soap and water. Obviously, the magnitude and the economic, social and cultural impact of this pandemic took humanity by surprise.

Society was already undergoing a deep process of transformation on all fronts. Debates were focused on the fragility of democracy, climate change and sustainability, inequality and inclusion, gender and race, social media and fake news, virtual payments and crypto currencies, artificial intelligence and blockchain. Science, knowledge and technology were advancing at a fast rate in all fields including genetics, neuroscience and biotechnology. Nevertheless, health-care was not a top priority for public investments or national budgets. Yet, with the eruption of the pandemic, priorities had to be immediately revisited.  A human-centred and inclusive approach became imperative in every corner of the planet. Incontestably, the 2020s is bringing irreversible disruptions.

Lockdown measures and social isolation deprived individuals of free movements, restricting social gatherings and citizen’s mobility. The home-office dismantled solid organizational structures of daily work conviviality. Closure of schools prevented children from accessing formal in-person education, creating a childcare crisis for working parents.  Crowded metropolis became empty urban centres, no shopping, no restaurants and no city life. Cultural festivities and spaces such as theatres, cinemas, and museums had their activities suspended leaving artists, cultural and creative professionals as well as street-vendors out of jobs. Parks and sportive centres became inactive and international tourism ceased.

Conversely, family life became the heart of social order. Parents that were extremely busy with their jobs had to juggle between work and the education of their children. People became less egocentric and started showing more empathy with the needed ones. Solidarity has been manifested in donations and collective assistance by civil society. Companies engaged with social responsibility.  Artists, cultural and creative workers were defied to work even harder at home to find new niches in the virtual domain. The confined society had to rediscover its ethical values, principles and priorities.


 Free-time and leisure at present

Paradoxically, this shift in human behaviour brought us back to a theory of economics that emerged a century ago (Ruskin, 1900) “There is no wealth but life”. In this new-old context, free-time, leisure, well-being and culture are closely associated. Usually, we use our free-time to carry out activities that are not directly related to work, duties or domestic occupations. May be free-time is an illusion because only in exceptional occasions our time is completely free. Leisure, however, is a subjective concept which varies depending on the society which we belong. It is connected with our participation in cultural life, reflecting the values and characteristics of a nation. Thus, it can be considered a human right according to the UN Declaration of Human Rights (1948), and in particular the International Convention on the Economic, Social and Cultural rights (1967).

Despite some divergent definitions of leisure there is convergence around three distinctions: (i) leisure as time; (ii) leisure as activity; and (iii) leisure as a state of mind. Firstly, it is defined as the constructive use of available time. Leisure as a variety of activities includes the practice of sports or actions related to intellectual and human development like reading, painting, gardening etc. and those can be leisure for ones and work for others. Understanding leisure as a state of mind is complex since it depends on individual perceptions about concepts such as freedom, motivation, competency etc. Certain skills can be considered leisure depending on the degree of satisfaction, emotion or happiness it causes. Yet, the most important is the possibility of free will.

Time available for leisure also varies according to cultural, social and even climate considerations. The notion of time can be different in Africa, Asia, Latin America or Europe. Usually people who live in areas of hot climate enjoy outdoor activities and sports while Nordic people whose habitat is in cold weather prefer indoors socialization and hobbies like playing chess, classic music etc. Social leisure embraces communitarian happenings such as going to the beach, practicing sports in a club etc. Behavioural studies indicate the benefits of social leisure for the well-being of individuals, self-esteem and cultural identity^[3].

Moments of leisure are essential in all phases of our life. During childhood and adolescence most of our time is devoted to study and sports while at adulthood our time is mostly consumed with work and family. Indeed, it is at senior age that retired people generally have extra free-time to enjoy cultural events, leisure and tourism.  Globally people are living longer and a new age structure is taking shape: the young senior (65-74 years), the middle senior (75-84 years) and the older senior as from 85 years old. According to the United Nations,^[4] in 2018 for the first time in history, persons aged 65 years or over outnumbered children under age five. This partially explains the vast number of people in the group of risk requiring quarantine protection throughout the pandemic period.


Well-being and spirituality in pandemic times

Photo by E. Dos Santos-Duisenberg : Pirâmide Sinética, Búzios, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
 

During the pandemic, reflections about well-being and spirituality gained space in our minds. It is undeniable that the constraints brought about by lock-down measures and social distancing, offered us more free-time but very limited leisure options. We gained additional time to be closer to loved ones and to do things we like most at home. Enjoying family life, including eating and even cooking together became a shared pleasure and a new leisure style. Individuals had to optimize the quality of their temporarily sedentary lives.

Global pandemics affect our collective mental health. Given the prevailing health and economic insecurity, the focus of our attention has been on well-being, strengthening friendships, expanding social network, practicing solidarity, improving self-esteem as well as reflecting on spirituality and religion. Suddenly the exuberant society of 2020 is afraid of the unknown virus and its long-term harmful consequences on day-to-day life. Well-being and happiness became the essence of achievable goals.

People are emotionally fragile in this moment of anxiety. Individuals are suffering losses that will persist long after the pandemic will be over.  Some feel stressed or depressed while others react by searching for relief in exercising, relaxation, meditation, yoga or mindfulness training.  Individuals are finding new ways to overcome solitude and boost mental resilience. Current philosophical thinking (Harari, 2018) is reminding us that homo sapiens have bodies but technology is distancing us from our bodies^[5].

Inspirational talks in likeminded groups have been helpful for reconnecting people dealing with an uncertain future. Social engagement and advocacy for health causes are used for promoting social change. Thus, besides upgrading healthcare systems and putting in place special measures for accelerating economic and cultural recovery, targeted governmental support will be needed to improve mental well-being and raise the overall level of satisfaction and happiness of citizens in the post-crisis.


Culture and e-learning nowadays

In a short period of time, many went from an exciting social and cultural lifestyle to a simple life. People had to assume the role of protagonists of their actions. Due to open-air limitations, free-time activities had to be less physically-intensive (no bike, tennis, jogging etc.), and more creative-oriented such as designing, playing music, writing. Much time has also been spent watching TV series, surfing the internet, viewing live music concerts, video-gaming, attending video-conferences as well as socializing in virtual chats. Equally, there are growing concerns about the ethics of consumer technology and internet addiction “time well spent” (Tristan, 2015)[6].

 A recent study^[7] carried out in the UK to track digital cultural consumption during the pandemic, indicates that the median time spent daily watching TV are 4 hours, while listening to music, watching films and playing video games each day are 3 hours respectively. Understanding human behaviour, in particular youth habits can help to indicate new cultural trends and consolidate social cohesion in post-pandemic times. Moreover, policy-makers could consider engaging cultural institutions and employing artists and creatives to help facilitate a collective healing process and kick-start recovery.

It is widely recognized that the arts, culture and creative sectors were hit hard by the pandemic. Whist digital cultural and creative products for home consumption were in high demand, others tangible creative goods like arts, crafts, fashion and design products sharply contracted. Many artists and creatives had no option than to experiment on work in digital spaces, since they had to go global from home.

Despite the fact that 4.5 billion people (60% the global population) use internet^[8], the availability of affordable broadband access is a pre-condition to use and benefit from the opportunities provided by digital tools. This applies to both producers and consumers of cultural and creative digital content. Currently, videos account for 80-90% of global digital data circulation, but at the same time Latin America, the Middle East and Africa together represent only around 10% of world data traffic^[9]. This evidence points to digital asymmetries that are being aggravated. Creativity only is not enough to transform ideas into marketable creative goods or services if digital tools and infrastructure will not be available.

The pandemic also had a strong impact on education and learning.  Re-thinking education was already a topic on the agenda of many countries in order to respond to the realities of the jobs market in the 2020s.  Besides the need to adapt methodology and pedagogical practices, many believe it is necessary to bring an interdisciplinary and applied approach to curricula with focus on science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM)^[10], preferably also integrating arts (STEAM). In any case, the education system has been forced to quickly adjust to remote learning. Globally over 1.2 billion children are out of the classroom in 186 countries^[11]. In Latin America schools are closed and around 154 million children between the ages of 5 and 18 are at home instead of in class^[12]. Furthermore, access to school-related inputs is distributed in an unbalanced manner; wealthier students have access to internet and home-schooling while the poorer have not. Young people are losing months of learning and this will have long-lasting effects. The loss for human capital is enormous.

On the positive side, continuous e-learning became a trend and a necessity.  Innovation and digital adaption gave rise to a wide-range of on-line courses. Millions of learners are upgrading their knowledge and skills in different domains through distance learning, whether through language and music apps, video conferences or software learning.  Some are free others have to be paid for, but what is absolutely transformative is that access to knowledge became more democratic.  Independently of age or field of interest, learners from different parts of the world can have access to prestigious universities or practical training.  E-learning, where teaching is undertaken remotely and on digital platforms already existed, but demand has sharply increased during pandemic and this might be a point of no return.

Over these critical 9 months, there are growing signs that the 2020s will face a new set of challenges and life will not be back as usual. The future will be very different when compared to the recent past.  Hope and fear are likely to co-exist for a certain time. There are new values, new lifestyles, new social behaviour, new consumption standards, and new ways of working and studying.  The pandemic has imposed a deep ethical and moral re-assessment on society. This turning point is leading to a deep socio-economic renovation and hopefully to a more inclusive and sustainable society.


About the author:


*Edna dos Santos-Duisenberg is an economist renowned for her pioneering work in research and international policies on creative economy and its development dimension.  She set-up and leaded the UNCTAD Creative Economy Program launching the UN Creative Economy Reports (2008 and 2010). Advisor associated with the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR). Member of the International Council of the Creative Industries Policy and Evidence Centre (PEC, London) led by NESTA (UK National Endowment for Science, Technology and Arts).  She also serves as Vice President of the International Federation of Internet and Multimedia (FIAM, Montreal). Advises governments and international institutions and collaborates with universities in Europe, Latin America, Asia and the United States. 


OCTOBER 21, 2020

---

International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES)[1] from Ljubljana, Slovenia, regularly analyses developments in the Middle East and the Balkans. General (Rtd) Corneliu Pivariu is a member of IFIMES Advisory Board and founder and former CEO at Ingepo Consulting. In his comprehensive analysis entitled “Lebanon 2020: From “The Pearl of the Orient” to failed state?” he is analysing the economic and social situation in Lebanon – can Lebanon become again a democratic and modern country of the Middle East.

● General (Rtd) Corneliu Pivariu 
Member of IFIMES Advisory Board and 
Founder and the former CEO of the INGEPO Consulting

Lebanon 2020: From “The Pearl of the Orient” to failed state?

We will not allow for Lebanon to become a compromise 
card between nations that want to rebuild ties amongst themselves.
Patriarch Bechara Boutros Al-Rai – August 15, 2020
 

Before the explosion of the Port of Beirut (the biggest one in an urban area in the last decades), on August 4, 2020, the situation in Lebanon was circumscribed to the regional focus only while the disaster caused by the blast (around 200 dead, more than 6,000 wounded and damages estimated to 11/15 billion-dollar) brought again the small country of the cedars to the international focus as it happens in fact with any other country where an event of such proportions takes place. Yet Lebanon is in a peculiar situation since the developments in this country represent, as I presented on numerous occasions, a signal concerning possible future evolutions in the Middle East and even in a more extended area.

The present analysis is prepared at a time when the echoes and international emotions after the devastating blast of August, 4 have not gone out and tries to show not only the importance for the area of the developments in Lebanon but also in order to emphasize that what unfolded in Lebanon during the last decades and today is perfectly valid for another numerous countries everywhere in the world, countries which have no resources of their own, endure a multitude of foreign political influences, are confronted with a massive emigration as a result of a dire domestic situation and are worn out by corruption. 


Short chronology and considerations on the political evolution before August, 4

On September, 1st, 1920 France, through the voice of General Henri Gourand declared, in Beirut (surrounded by political and religious leaders), the emergence of Greater Lebanon, after centuries of Ottoman occupation and, on November, 22, 1943, Lebanon proclaimed its independence and the end of the French Mandate, a day that became since then the country’s National Day. After the independence, the Lebanese state was founded on the basis of an unwritten agreement between the two prominent leaders of the time: Béchara el-Khoury and Riad el-Solh, a Christian and a Muslim, called later on the National Pact[2] (al Mithaq al Watani), having a capital importance even today.

In the 1950s under the presidency of Camille Chamoun, the economy grew as the international tourism exploded and the banking sector developed as a result of the operations made by the Arab oil exporting countries and of their deposits with the Lebanese banks. However, the first civil war which lasts a few months breaks out in 1958 and the US send troops to assist president Chamoun. The 1960s and the beginning of 1970s witness the consolidation of Lebanon’s place as a regional center for the rich people of the Gulf and of the world who were coming to gamble at the Casino du Liban or to attend the famous Baalbek concerts and festivals.

The Palestinian presence in Lebanon and the attacks launched from the Lebanese territory on Israel led to dissensions on the domestic political scene and represent an important factor for triggering the civil war in 1975, a sectarian war which lasted 15 years and 6 months (more exactly between April 13, 1975 and October 13, 1990 – the forced departure in exile of general Michel Aoun). The war resulted in more than 150.000 dead, more than 300.000 wounded and in immeasurable destruction. Other sources consider the end of the war when the first parliamentary elections took place in the summer of 1992, after 20 years. During the same period Israel launched two invasions, in 1978 and 1982, and the latter resulted in the departure from Lebanon of Yasser Arafat, the president of the Palestine Liberation Organization and part of the Palestinian fighters. In 1982, too, two other important events took place, the massacres of civilians in Sabra and Chatilla refugee camps (450 and, respectively 3.600 dead) and the assassination of the newly elected president Bashir Gemayel.

In 1983 two bomb attacks resulted in the death of 241 US marines in their barracks on the Beirut shore and, in the same day, of 58 French paratroops, a few kilometers away; consequently, in the spring of next year the multinational forces withdrew from Lebanon. The 1982 Israeli invasion and the aforementioned bomb attacks marked the emergence and expansion of Hezbollah which begun to gradually play an ever-important role in the country’s political, economic and social life. 

In 1988, when the mandate of president Amine Gemayel expired and in the absence of an elected successor, he designated General Michel Aoun as a caretaker prime minister who, on March 14, declares war against the Syrian presence in Lebanon. After seven months of fighting a ceasefire was reached which was followed by international negotiations that secured the signing of The Taif Agreement on October 22, 1989, ratified by the Lebanese parliament on November 5 of the same year. Fights among different factions broke out again at the beginning of 1990 and after a Syrian offensive bly backed by the air force; General Michel Aoun left the Baabda Presidential Palace and took refuge at the French Embassy from where ten months later he was evacuated by sea to Paris.

After Israel’s withdrawal from the south of Lebanon in 2000, Hezbollah maintains its military power and declares itself Lebanon’s defender (especially in the south).

On April 26, 2005 the complete withdrawal of the Syrian army from the Lebanon’s entire territory was over, including the closure of the Syrian intelligence offices opened in the country. After more than 29 years of occupation, almost 30.000 Syrian troops left the Lebanese territory in less than two months, a withdrawal that took place under the circumstances of the Cedar Revolution that was unfolding in Lebanon, of the international pressures to withdraw and the b echo of the assassination, on February 14, 2005 of the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri[3].

During July-August 2006 a new conflict with Israel took place (or, better said, the confrontation between Hezbollah and Israel in Lebanon) from which we can assess that the winner was Hezbollah, it strengthened its position domestically from all standpoints until today and represents the power without which no political agreement for the governance can be reached. Not only did Hezbollah effectively exploit domestically the 2005 conflict with Israel but it also posed Israel military problems by proving ingeniosity and creativity in conducting the conflict. Its 2006 success was media exploited by setting up an open-air museum presenting the military bravery during the fights, a museum (The Resistance Museum in Jibchit – inaugurated in 2010) which receives yearly a great number of visitors, as a valuable propaganda for the organization’s military as well as political components.

Syria’s civil war which started in 2011 represented another important challenge for Lebanon. The numbers of the Syrian refugees in the small cedars country varied in the course of time in accordance with the intensity of the conflict and is at present around 1 million (it is estimated that the peak was reached in October 2016 when the number of refugees came to 1.5 million). It is a major challenge for a country of 6.8 million inhabitants (2016 est.) already hosting 400,000 Palestinians.

On October 31st, 2016 the Lebanese parliament brought to an end the longest period of the country’s history with no president (29 months since the end of president’s Michel Suleiman mandate – May 2014) after 45 parliamentary sessions in which no candidate had the necessary quorum for being elected. The new president General Michel Aoun could be considered a Lebanon’s legendary personality[4].  His mandate ends in 2022. Nevertheless, the way the Lebanese political stage is conceived and works does not allow the president to take measures short of a wide political accord, something history proved to be extremely difficult to reach in Lebanon. In fact, the difficulties the country went through since 2016, with numerous demonstrations and popular protest manifestations: 2015-2016 - “The Garbage Crisis”, 2019-2020 – protests against the decision to increase the prices of liquid fuels, tobacco and tariffs for on-line communications which later on expanded to other popular discontents such as lack of electricity, of running water, unemployment, economic stagnation, rapid devaluation of national currency, corruption. The economic crisis led to the resignation of the Saad Hariri cabinet and the appointment, on December 19, 2019 of a new prime minister, Hassan Diab – the minister of education in the preceding cabinet.


Short overview of the economic evolution until the August 4

After witnessing a flourishing economic situation in the 1960s and the beginning of the 70s following the development of the banking system, the expansion of tourism and the fact that the Lebanese banks were preferred by the Gulf monarchies for carrying out financial operations resulted from the oil exports and gaining nicknames such as The Switzerland of the Orient or The Pearl of the Orient which caused great envy in the area, Lebanon went through a difficult period which it has not overcome until now. The causes are multiple and this is not the place for an exhaustive approach. The Lebanese diaspora is more numerous than Lebanon’s population and it is estimated at 8-10 million people of whom 1.2 million have Lebanese citizenship and has at its roots the evolution of the country’s political and economic situation over the years. At its beginnings, the diaspora was predominantly Christian yet the situation changed gradually and the percentage of Muslim emigrants grew. The Lebanese diaspora represents a force that the succeeding governments over the years did not succeed in mobilizing enough to contribute to the country’s economic recovery (in 2014 the remittances of the Lebanese ex-pats amounted to 8.9 billion dollar or around 18% of the GDP).

The evolution of the Lebanese economy after the beginning of the civil war until now represented nevertheless a particular situation as a result of the Lebanese’s entrepreneurial spirit and their extraordinary desire of survival and national renaissance[5]. It seems that this spirit has gradually been exhausted to a certain extent and the much sought-after recovery has been delayed beyond the hopes of the majority of citizens. 

The difficulties the Lebanese economy has been confronted with were exacerbated by the lack of natural [6], the dependence on imports and by the change in the structure of the GDP, mainly by the decrease of the banking and tourism industries’ share of the GDP; nevertheless, services provide 83% of the GDP.

Lebanon’s external debt amounts now to around 170% of the GDP and the country, due to failure to repay a 1.2 billion Eurobond outstanding in the spring of 2020, witnessed a massive devaluation of the national currency being the first country in the Middle East and North Africa where the inflation rate exceeds 50% for 30 consecutive days[7]. The situation impacted the common citizen who was subject to numerous restrictions including the withdrawal of foreign currency from his account (for a period it was restricted to 200$/week) or the outside transfers which were limited to 10.000$/year starting with August 2020.


The current political, economic and social situation and the outlook to the end of 2020

On August 4, 2020 an extremely powerful explosion occurred in a warehouse of the Port of Beirut, considered by the expert as the most powerful blast of the last decades in an urban area as a result of the ignition of a quantity of around 2,700 tons of ammonium nitrate[8]. The blast resulted in more than 200 dead and around 6,000 wounded, more than 300,000 inhabitants experienced important damages of their homes and the windows in Beirut were broken on a radius of 10 km. 15,000 tons of grains stored in a nearby silo were destroyed (cca. one month of the country’s needs), the port activity was suspended, the electricity crisis amplified, several important hospitals of Beirut were seriously harmed, under the circumstances of Covid-19 pandemic which affected Lebanon, too.

I will not insist on the causes and the possibilities that led to the disaster as it is investigated by a commission with the participation of international experts, yet I am not the adherent of occurrences or coincidences in case of such events[9]. 

The event brought about the resignation of Hassan Diab on August, 10 and the president Michel Aoun appointed on August 31st, Mustafa Adib[10] as new prime minister.

The French president Emmanuel Macron remembered that his country had an important influence in Lebanon and paid immediately (August, 6) a visit to Beirut which triggered a less than expected reaction of the population that was exasperated by the incapacity of the authorities and initiated, on August 7, a petition requesting that Lebanon revert under French authority; the petition was signed during the first days by more than 60,000 persons[11].

France proposed immediately the draft of an action plan whereby reforms (which were to be made through a permanent consultation with the civil society) have a prominent place (reforms in the economic – electricity field; financial, governance, justice, fighting corruption, etc.). The September 15, deadline set by France for forming a new government has already passed as a result of dissensions for assigning certain portfolios, especially the finance portfolio which is sought after by the Shia parties – Hezbollah and Amal. The last compromise suggested was that the portfolio be taken over by an independent Shia politician. Even that was not enough and the nominated prime minister tendered his resignation on September 26. Thus, the Lebanese crisis goes on at its own pace known at least during the latest years. The existing sectarian algorithm for which no replacement has been found yet[12] continues to play an essential role on the Lebanese political stage.

Emmanuel Macron returned to Beirut on September 1st, for marking the anniversary of 100 years since the end of the Ottoman dominance but especially for discussing the evolution of the political and economic situation. He promised to organize an international conference in Paris in order to secure new assistance for Lebanon. As always, there were voices in Beirut that denounced the French president’s acts as neocolonial. Nevertheless, a great part of the Lebanese political forces continue to back the French initiative according to the latest declarations of the Sunni leader Saad Hariri and Nabih Berri – the leader of Amal and president of the parliament.

Lebanon’s importance on the international arena is proved by the numerous delegations who paid visits to Beirut immediately after the blast and in this regard we mention: the visit of the Turkish vice-president Fuat Oktay together with the minister of foreign affairs Mevlut Cavusoglu on August 8; the Iranian minister of foreign affairs Mohammad Javad Zarif on August 14; the American assistant secretaries David Hale (former ambassador to Lebanon) in August and David Schenker on September 4 (the latter discussed with the leaders of the demonstrates only); the President of the European Council Charles Michel on August 8. It is worth mentioning the appeal made by the latter in his statement: „The local political forces must use this opportunity and unite in a national effort in order to address the immediate needs and moreover the challenges the country is confronted with. It is of utmost importance for Lebanon to implement fundamental structural reforms. Lebanon can count in its efforts on the European Union – but the internal unity is the key”. 

I don’t think, from previous experience, that the repeated appeal to unity was heard and internalized by all Lebanese political forces and the latest example in this regard was the resignation of the appointed Prime Minister Mustafa Adib nominated to form a new government. He wanted to form a government run by the technocrats which was to find solutions for overcoming the crisis and had, in this respect, the French president’s backing.

The sectarian and group interest to which foreign influences should be added (France, Iran, Turkey, the US, Saudi Arabia, Gulf countries) and Russia, too (the Russian minister of foreign affairs Sergei Lavrov arrived in Damascus on September 5 and joined the delegation headed by the vice-prime minister Yuri Borisov who arrived a day before and whose last visit there was in 2012). We mention that president Vladimir Putin paid a visit to Damascus on January 7, 2020. Russia was always a discrete presence in Lebanon but that does not mean it was less interested in expanding its influence in the country and used to that purpose not only its relations with the Palestinian groups in Lebanon, with political formations of socialist orientation but also with Hezbollah. 

Under the circumstances, a new wave of migration emerged and there are more and more Lebanese who lost hope that the domestic situation can recover and are searching for a solution abroad. Unfortunately, those who will leave will be especially the well prepared professionals and with a financial position that can secure them a new beginning in another country, with work capacity and determination. Thus, the Lebanon’s possibilities of recovery will further diminish. A people who for a long period of time went through severe crises and his fiber was weakened by numerous waves of emigration, was subject to immigrants’ pressures and foreign interests is not an inexhaustible reservoir and can be severely affected by these events. How could we otherwise explain Beirut’s revival after the civil war or even the optimism during the civil war when artillery bombardments took place in an area and building was raised in a nearby one? Presently, around 20 hours a day the centralized state network does not supply electricity and the situation is considered to be determined by the mafia of generators and fuel traffickers.

It is not likely that Lebanon’s political and economic situation will witness a significant improvement by the end of the year. Most likely a new government will be formed under renewed international pressures, as it happened in the past but no durable solution and no recovery of the country’s economic and social situation are in sight in this short time horizon.


What are Lebanon’s prospects?

A forecast on a longer period of the evolutions of the Middle East is a risky shot and of the Lebanon’s situation is more than hazard a guess. Given the intertwining of numerous interests and conflicts in Lebanon, the country of the cedars fully deserves the characterization of being a barometer of the geopolitical evolutions in the area and even on a more extensive level. Unfortunately for the Lebanese, when they have fallen prey to those interests[13] they themselves brought the country to the present situation. 

The discovery of great oil and gas deposits in Eastern Mediterranean gave Lebanon hopes that it could escape the difficult economic and financial situation. Exploration operations were launched in February 2020 with the ship Tungsten Explorer by a consortium made up of Total (France), ENI (Italy) and Novatek (Russia) and president Michel Aoun stated that the beginning of drilling operations is an opportunity for “the country’s coming back from the abyss”. It was most probably a statement intended to boost the population’s morale.

In 2022 Lebanon should organize both parliamentary (every four years, the last ones took place in 2018 after more than four years – namely in 2009) and presidential elections (the president was elected in 2016 and cannot run for another mandate). It would be in the sense of the Lebanese tradition that the elections be postponed with no clearly defined time horizon while the surprise would be that elections be carried out and finalized in time. The issue here is not the timing but the conditions in which the elections takes place and especially the replacement of the current sectarian political system which met the needs of the middle of the XX-th century but proved later on its limits.

I’d like to hope and to think that Lebanon will not be stationed in the position of a failed state and will find the resources to become again a democratic and modern country of the Middle East. A position the Lebanese people should prove it deserves it in spite of all outside dangers it is confronted with. It depends first and foremost on the Lebanese! I still trust the descendants of the Phoenicians!

About the author: 
Corneliu Pivariu is a highly decorated two-star general of the Romanian army (Rtd). He has founded and led for two decades one of the most influential magazines on geopolitics and international relations in Eastern Europe, the bilingual journal Geostrategic Pulse. General Pivariu is member of IFIMES Advisory Board.

Ljubljana/Bucharest, 6 October 2020

Footnotes:
IFIMES – International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies, based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, has Special Consultative status at ECOSOC/UN, New York, since 2018.
[2] The four principles of the Pact are:
Lebanon is a completely independent state. The Christian community will cease to identify with the West and, in exchange, the Muslim Community will protect Lebanon’s independence and will prevent the union with any other Arab state;
Although Lebanon is an Arab state having the Arabic as official language, it will not severe the spiritual and intellectual ties with the West to allow for its development in the future;
Lebanon, as a member of the family of the Arab states, will cooperate with the other Arab states and, in case of a conflict among the latter it will remain neutral;
Public positions will be distributed proportionally among the recognized religious groups while the technical positions and the appointments will be made first of all based on the competencies, without taking into account sectarian considerations. The first three positions in the state will be distributed as follows: the president of the republic must be a Maronite Christian; the Prime Minister – a Sunni Muslim; the president of the parliament – a Shia Muslim. The distribution of deputies will be 6 Christians to 5 Muslims.
[3] He was prime minister as well during 1992-1998 and 2000-2004. In 1995 I had the honor of being received by him three times in Beirut.
[4] Corneliu Pivariu – Important Moves on the Geopolitical Chessboard 2014-2017, pp.353-355.
[5] If, during the 1982 Israeli invasion we witnessed powerful artillery bombardments while we were invited to bars and restaurants in Jounieh (on the outskirts of Beirut) that were all open, the quiet periods after the end of the civil war were characterized by extensive reconstruction programs, predominantly in real estate and especially in Beirut, where the traces of war disappeared almost completely.
[6] Lebanon imports around 80% of its consumption needs.
[7] As compared to the official rate of exchange of 1,507.5 Lebanese Pounds (LBP)/dollar ever since 1997, on the parallel market the dollar was sold against 3,000 LBP  in April 2020 and 4,200 LBP/$ in May 2020. On September 11, 2020 the parallel rate of exchange was 7,700 LBP/$.
[8] Ammonium nitrate is used mainly as agricultural fertilizer but in combination with other substances and an ignition explosive it can detonate. Since it is very stable and not expensive, it is used as well at civil constructions works.
[9] For an analysis of the causes one should see which the best answer to the well-known question is: Qui prodest? (Who benefits?). A latest public variant/speculation is that the explosion was triggered from space by using a system of  Fresnel lens type. Probably the reality is less complicated from a technical point of view.
[10] Aged 48, Adib (a career diplomat, ambassador to Berlin 2013-2020) was backed in his nomination by The Future Movement and a group of former Lebanese prime ministers and got the votes of 90 parliamentarians out of the total of 120. His nomination took place a few hours before the deadline of September 1st, set by president Emmanuel Macron.
[11] “With a failed political system, affected by corruption, terrorism, with paramilitary formations, the country drew its last breath. We believe Lebanon must be placed under French mandate in order to acheve a clear and durable governance” – the text of the petition mentions among others.
[12] The last official census in Lebanon took place in 1932 when the Christian population held a slight majority (51%). According to different researches and documents of late the share of the Christians decreased to around 40% (even 33% according to certain sources), while the Sunni and Shia Muslims represents around 55%.
[13] A curator at the Lebanon’s National Museum in Beirut, where the history stops at 1920 was saying that the Lebanese were ashamed of continuing its presentation taking into account what they have done to their country. Probably the situation is quite different, namely that not even in what history is concerned the Lebanese politicians could not agree upon the way it is presented.

Copyright:
Printed texts, analyses, studies, researches, photographies, phono and video reports which are available on this web site and which are provided by the IFIMES International Institute can be transmitted and published by all media and individuals on condition that they use the mark (C) 2004 IFIMES or state the source of the whole text or a part of it. For other information contact: ifimes@ifimes.org

OCTOBER 8, 2020

---

ENOUGH OF DOUBLE STANDARDS!

Dr. Zlatko Hadžidedi

Deutsche Welle recently published a comment on Bosnia-Herzegovina written by Stefan Schwarz, a renowned German politician. In this text, the author advocates a revision of the German policy towards Bosnia, proposing a change of the country's constitution, which needs to be jointly supported by Germany and the US. According to Schwarz, the current Bosnian constitution, imposed on the Bosnians by the American 'peacemaker' Richard Holbrooke in 1995, amputated the country's territory and destroyed its soul. The Dayton operation formally saved the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but has dimantled its vital functions. Moreover, it has rewarded the convicted war criminals with huge parts of its territory, which is now controlled by these corrupt oligarchies as their private property, absolutely guaranteed by the international contract signed in Dayton. Therefore, says Schwarz, the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, commonly considered the most powerful woman in the world, has a great responsibility to use her power to press for a constituional order that would make Bosnia compatible with other European countries.

A systematic dissolution, from Lisbon to Dayton

It is difficult not to agree with Mr. Schwartz in his diagnosis of the Bosnian problems. It is also difficult not to agree about the need for constitutional changes, although the author does not go into specifics. Simply, there is no doubt that the current constitution must be changed if the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina is ever going to start functioning. For, the Bosnian state institutions are, first and formost, blocked by the existing constitutional structure, and only then by the will of the local ethno-nationalist leaders, who only take advantage of it. Yet, the point at which we, as Bosnians who remember the country's recent past, have to disagree with Mr. Schwarz is the thesis that Bosnia's ethnic partition was simply a result of the US-sponsored Dayton Peace Agreement.

For, Dayton was only the concluding part in the process of systematic dissolution of the country's sovereignty, launched and sponsored by the European Union and the United Nations, and carried out by their nominated representatives, Lord Carrington, Jose Cutileiro, Cyrus Vance, Lord Owen, Thorvald Stoltenberg. This process began at the Lisbon Conference, in February 1992, several months before the outbreak of the war, having resulted with the Carrington-Cutileiro Plan, the first internationally sponsored plan for ethnic partition of Bosnia. The very existence of this pre-war plan shows that ethnic partition was not proposed as a provisional solution for the ongoing war, as has been repeated many times ever since, including the comment by Mr. Schwarz. Rather, the war itself, with ethnic cleansing as a tool in the creation of ethnically homogenous territories out of the single territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, served as an instrument in the physical implementation of the concept of ethnic partition. This concept was first prescribed by Carrington and Cutileiro in 1992, and then adopted in all subsequent 'peace plans': Vance-Owen Plan in 1992, Owen-Stoltenberg Plan in 1993, the Washington Agreement in 1994, the Contact Group Plan in 1994, and the Dayton Agreement in 1995. Interestingly, the only concept that has been on the table in all these plans was the concept of Bosnia's ethnic partition. No EU, UN, American or Contact Group initiatives have ever tried to consider any other option: Bosnia-Herzegovina's ethnic partition has always been a must. Even those rare individuals who attempted to challenge the concept itself have even more rarely noticed that it had had a history that did not start in Dayton and that no alternative solution has ever been proposed. Therefore, ethnic partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina was not a clumsy mistake made by Holbrooke and the Americans in Dayton; it has been a strategy adopted by the UN, the EU, and all relevant global powers, a strategy that has not been abandoned to the present day.  

A division of non-divisible, a transfer of non-transferable

This prolonged international consensus about the concept of Bosnia's ethnic partition craves for identification of its authors and explanation of its broad acceptance among the most relevant global powers (which includes not only the EU and the UN, but also all individual members of the Contact Group: United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia). However, let us first take a look at the concept from a theoretical point of view. Political and constitutional theory claims that sovereignty is, above all, non-divisible and non-transferable. What was being proposed as a 'solution' for Bosnia-Herzegovina, from Lisbon to Dayton, was exactly the opposite: a division of the state's sovereignty, with a transfer of sovereignty to its three ethno-religious groups, so as to assign them parts of its territory over which they would gain sovereign control. Under these conditions, these groups have been labelled as 'constituent peoples' – a category otherwise non-existent in political and constitutional theory – as if they posses the primary sovereignty and thereby constitute the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, whose sovereignty is a secondary one, derived from theirs and divided by implication. According to the Dayton Constitution, even the last remnants of Bosnia's divided sovereignty have eventually been transferred to the so-called Office of the High Representative, so that the High Representative has remained the only level at which sovereign decisions can be made. At all other levels, including the level of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, all decisions can be blocked by leaders of the three ethno-religious groups, which practically makes these leaders sovereign. Yet, the current High Representative has abandoned even these, very limited constitutional powers, so that in reality no sovereign decisions can be made above the level of ethno-religious leaders. In other words, as noticed by Mr. Schwarz, it is not their irrational nationalism that creates their blockages on the level of the state; it is the constitutional structure which deprives the state of its sovereignty.

The British 'solution' 

Yet, who was powerful enough to reverse the universally valid constitutional principles, and why has this reversal been applied to Bosnia-Herzegovina, of all the countries in the world? After all, why this has encountered such approval by the most powerful global structures, such as the EU and the UN, as well as the most relevant individual powers, although the principles applied to Bosnia-Herzegovina are exactly the opposite from the principles upon which they are all built? Given the presence of British diplomats in all 'mediating' combinations before and during the war in Bosnia, and given the fact that the concept of ethno-religious partition is a concept the British diplomacy had previously applied in the process of decolonization of India, with the consequent creation of India and Pakistan (including the secession of Bangladesh), and also in Palestine and Cyprus, one may only speculate why the British Foreign Office put the ethnic partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina among its geopolitical priorities. In a broader perspective, it is certain that such partitions have never produced any degree of stability, as its advocates tend to claim; quite the contrary, all these parts of the world have become permanently unstable after application of the British 'solution' in the form of their ethnic or ethno-religious partition. Whether permanent instability along or around particular geopolitical points is one of the pillars of British geopolitics or not, remains to be more broadly explained by its historians; this is not a proper place for that. However, a more fundamental question is, why such a 'solution' applied to Bosnia has been acceptable to so many relevant global players, including the US, Germany and the entire EU? Probably we can never reach a clear and comprehensive answer to this question, either. However, in this very context, a clear response is required to Chancellor Merkel's recent claim that „Bosnia needs more empathy“: Bosnia does not need any degree of empathy – empathy is to be offered to the powerless. What Bosnia needs is that the global powers simply cease with application of double standards, and start applying to Bosnia the same principles, concepts and values they apply to themselves. Above all, that these powers give Bosnia back its innate right to sovereignty.    

<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peace_plans_proposed_before_and_during_the_Bosnian_War>



Dr. Zlatko Hadžidedić is the founder and director of the Center for Nationalism Studies, in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina (www.nationalismstudies.org).



OCTOBER 4, 2020

---

International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES)[1] from Ljubljana, Slovenia, regularly analyses developments in the Middle East, Balkans and around the world. Tereza Neuwirthová of Leiden University, International Studies program is the EU and IOs affairs specialist that monitors the EU Commission affairs from Brussels. In her text entitled “How to Spend it: An Austro-Franco-German Proposal for a European Covid-19 Recovery Programme” she is summarizing the speech of Dr. Mario Holzner, the director of WIIW Institute, at the July Conference held at the Diplomatic Academy in Vienna. 


  ● Tereza Neuwirthová
Leiden University, International Studies program is the EU
and IOs affairs specialist that monitors the EU Commission affairs from Brussels

How to Spend it: 
An Austro-Franco-German Proposal for a European Covid-19 Recovery Programme

The conference named “75 years of Europe’s Collective Security and Human Rights System”, which took place on the 1st of July at the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, brought together experts related to the reality of the Old Continent and its Union over the course of the past 75 years of its post-WWII anti-fascist existence. It was jointly organized by four different entities (the International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies IFIMES, Media Platform Modern Diplomacy, International Scientific Journal European Perspectives, and Action Platform Culture for Peace) with the support of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, numerous academia supporting and media partners). 

The conference gathered over twenty high ranking speakers from Canada to Australia, and audience physically in the venue while many others attended online – from Chile to Far East. The day was filled by three panels focusing on the legacy of WWII, Nuremberg Trials, the European Human Rights Charter and their relevance in the 21st century; on the importance of culture for peace and culture of peace – culture, science, arts, sports – as a way to reinforce a collective identity in Europe; on the importance of accelerating on universalism and pan-European Multilateralism while integrating further the Euro-MED within Europe, or as the Romano Prodi’s EU Commission coined it back in 2000s – “from Morocco to Russia – everything but the institutions”. 

The event itself was probably the largest physical gathering past the early spring lock down to this very day in this part of Europe. No wonder that it marked a launch of the political rethink and recalibration named – Vienna Process. 

The panel under the name “Future to Europe: Is there any alternative to universal and pan-European Multilateralism? Revisiting and recalibrating the Euro-MED and cross-continental affairs”, was focused on discussing the determinants of Europe’s relations with its strategic Euro-MED and Eurasian neighbourhood, the possible pan-European political architecture as well as on the forthcoming post-crisis recovery.
    
On the latter topic, the panellist Dr. Mario Holzner, who is the Executive Director of the WIIW Austria, outlined the policy proposal on the post-pandemic European recovery programme, elaborated by his Viennese Institute in collaboration with the Paris-based research institute OFCE and the German IMK Macroeconomic Policy Institute. The Recovery Fund recently proposed by the European Commission represents a benchmark in the era of stalled European integration, and during the unstable and precarious post-pandemic times it holds a crucial role for overcoming the immense political and economic crisis of 2020. Following on much public debate about the recovery financing, which however has heretofore lacked the proposals for concrete projects that the EU should allocate the funds into, it is now urgently needed to come up with these.

 
WIIW Director Dr. Mario Holzner addressing the Conference

WIIW, OFCE and IMK, three research tanks dealing with economic topics, suggested two main pillars - an EU one, and a national one- for the spending of the Commission’s recovery programme that reaches the amount of €2tn and is to allotted over a 10-year horizon. The spending of the EU pillar is to be channelled into the area of healthcare, eventually giving rise to a pan-European health project under the name Health4EU. Not least, another efficient allocation of the funds located in the programme’s EU pillar is to projects helping to mitigate the risks resulting from climate change, as well as to develop an EU-wide rail infrastructure that would substantively contribute to achieving the Commission’s goals of carbon-neutrality at the continent.

Among other, the proposal introduces two ambitious transport projects- a European high-speed rail infrastructure called Ultra-Rapid-Train, which would cut the travel time between Europe’s capitals, as well as disparate regions of the Union. Another suggested initiative is an integrated European Silk Road which would combine transport modes according to the equally-named Chinese undertaking. 

Dr. Holzner’s experts team put forward the idea to “electrify” the European Commission’s Green Deal. Such electrification is feasible through the realisation of an integrated electricity grid for 100%-renewable energy transmission (e-highway), the support for complementary battery and green-hydrogen projects, as well as a programme of co-financing member states’ decarbonisation and Just Transition policies. Together, the suggested policy proposals provide the basis for creating a truly sustainable European energy infrastructure. 

From the national pillar, it should be the member states themselves who benefit from the funding allocation in the overall amount of €500bn. According to the experts from WIIW, these resources should be focused on the hardest-hit countries and regions, whereas it is imperative that they are front-loaded (over the timespan of three years). 

The overall architecture of the programme’s spending, involving the largest part of the budget, needs to be focused on long-term projects and investment opportunities that would serve as a value added for the European integration, while also allowing to build resilience against the major challenges that the EU currently faces. The proposed sectors for the initiatives which could be launched from the EU’s funding programme are public health, transport infrastructure, as well as energy/decarbonisation scheme. Accordingly, it is needed that the funding programme is primarily focused on the structural and increasingly alarming threat of climate change. 

As stated in the closing remarks, to make this memorable event a long-lasting process, the organisers as well as the participants of this unique conference initiated an action plan named “Vienna Process: Common Future – One Europe.” In the framework of this enterprise, the contributing policy-makers and academics will continue to engage in meaningful activities to reflect on the trends and developments forming the European reality while simultaneously affecting the lives of millions. The European system, formed over centuries and having spanned to a political and economic Union comprising 27 states, is currently being reconfigured as a result of numerous external factors such as Brexit, the pandemic, as well as the dynamics in neighbouring regions. All of these are engendering the conditions for a novel modus operandi on the continent, whereby it is in the best intention of those partaking at this conference to contribute to a more just, secure, and peaceful European future. 


About the author:



Tereza Neuwirthová, of Leiden University,
International Studies program is the EU and IOs affairs specialist that monitors the EU Commission affairs from Brussels.  

Ljubljana/Vienna/Brussels, 29 September 2020

Footnotes:
[1] IFIMES – International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies, based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, has Special Consultative status at ECOSOC/UN, New York, since 2018.



OCTOBER 1, 2020

---

Triangularity of Nuclear Arms Control

Possible Implications of China’s Involvement in Nuclear Arms Talks

Alexander G. Savelyev
 

  In December 2019, the United States officially invited China to enter into a strategic security dialogue. The White House said it hoped Beijing’s consent to this proposal might become the first step towards an international agreement encompassing all nuclear weapons of the United States, Russia, and China. As expected, this proposal was rejected. China said its nuclear arsenal was much smaller than those of the United States and Russia, and it would be able to participate in such talks only when their nuclear potentials were brought to parity with its own.

In March 2020, U.S. President Donald Trump once again declared his intention to ask Russia and China to hold such talks with the aim of avoiding a costly arms race (Reuters.com, 2020). The Chinese Foreign Ministry’s response followed virtually in no time. Its spokesperson Zhao Lijian said that China had no intention of taking part in the so-called China-U.S.-Russia trilateral arms control negotiations, and that its position on this issue was very clear (ECNC.cn., 2020). He called upon the United States to extend the New START and to go ahead with the policy of U.S-Russian nuclear arms reduction, thus creating prerequisites for other countries to join the nuclear disarmament process. There is nothing new about China’s stance. A year earlier Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang, while speaking at a news conference in May 2019, made a similar statement. China refused to participate in a trilateral arms control agreement (Fmprc.gov.2019).

It is noteworthy that while advising the United States and Russia to downgrade their nuclear potentials to its level, China does not say what exactly this level is. One of the rare official statements (if not the sole one) on that score was the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s statement, published on April 27, 2004, that China’s nuclear arsenal was the smallest of all (Fact Sheet China, 2004). Even in that case the Chinese Foreign Ministry did not specify if it was referring to the quintet of the UN Security Council’s permanent members. If so, China’s nuclear arsenal, according to official statistics, consisted of no more than 190 warheads (Britain’s level that year). Such (understated according to most analysts) estimates, have also been mentioned by a number of experts. For example, Harvard researcher Hui Zhang says China in 2011 had 166 nuclear warheads. There are other, higher estimates. For instance, Professor Phillip Karber of Georgetown University believes that China has 3,000 warheads at its disposal (Karber, 2011), while many other researchers call this in question.

The estimate offered by H. Kristensen and M. Korda of the Federation of American Scientists, who issue annual world surveys of nuclear arms potentials, is shared by most researchers and draws no objections from political circles in various countries, including the United States. According to their calculations as for April 2020, the United States had 3,800 deployed and non-deployed nuclear warheads, and Russia, 4,312 warheads. As for China, the same survey says it has 320 non-deployed nuclear warheads (Kristensen and Korda, 2020).

While underscoring the importance of nuclear arms cuts by the United States and Russia to China’s level, Beijing does not specify if this idea applies only to strategic or all nuclear weapons. In the former case, if China’s approach is to be accepted, Russia and the United States would have to slash their nuclear arsenals by 65%-75% (from 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads in compliance with the rules of the still effective New START). But if the total number of nuclear warheads on either side is to be counted, each country’s nuclear potential would shrink by no less than 90%. Only after this will China be prepared to consider in earnest its participation in nuclear arms control talks.

The United States and Russia can hardly find this suitable. At the same time, these countries have not yet officially formulated their specific approaches to and basic provisions of hypothetical trilateral talks and a future agreement on this issue. For the time being, these issues are in the focus of experts’ attention in a number of countries, and they have over the past few years offered a variety of possible formats and parameters of a future “multilateral” treaty. In most cases, experts delve into certain aspects of a future agreement that might be attractive to China. Very few think of what China might lose the moment it enters into nuclear arms control talks or what military-political consequences might follow if China eventually changed its mind regarding participation in such negotiations.

In my opinion, China’s demand for achieving the “comparability” of nuclear potentials as a precondition for beginning a trilateral dialogue stems precisely from its evaluation of the consequences of its participation in the negotiations. This stance is neither far-fetched nor propagandistic, contrary to what some experts and politicians claim, but rests upon major political, military and strategic cornerstones. Disregard for China’s arguments actually reduces to nothing all efforts, above all those taken by Washington, to engage Beijing in nuclear arms talks.

As far as the United States is concerned, the motives behind its attempts to persuade China to join nuclear arms talks are not quite clear. There may be several possible considerations that the United States is guided by in its policy on the issue. One is that Washington may be looking for a way to obtain necessary information about the current state of China’s nuclear potential and plans for its development in the future in order to be able to adjust its own modernization programs accordingly. Another explanation is that the United States may be reluctant to go ahead with the nuclear disarmament policy and hopes to use China’s unequivocal refusal to participate in negotiations as a chance to blame it for the disruption of this process and for dismantling the nuclear arms control system as such. I believe both explanations may be true, but their analysis lies beyond the scope of this article.


OPTIONS OF ENGAGING CHINA IN NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL TALKS

“Americans performed three very different policies on the People’s Republic: From a total negation (and the Mao-time mutual annihilation assurances), to Nixon’s sudden cohabitation. Finally, a Copernican-turn: the US spotted no real ideological differences between them and the post-Deng China. This signalled a ‘new opening’: West imagined China’s coastal areas as its own industrial suburbia.

Soon after, both countries easily agreed on interdependence (in this marriage of convenience): Americans pleased their corporate (machine and tech) sector and unrestrained its greed, while Chinese in return offered a cheap labour, no environmental considerations and submissiveness in imitation.

However, for both countries this was far more than economy, it was a policy – Washington read it as interdependence for transformative containment and Beijing sow it as interdependence for a (global) penetration. In the meantime, Chinese acquired more sophisticated technology, and the American Big tech sophisticated itself in digital authoritarianism – ‘technological monoculture’ met the political one.

But now with a tidal wave of Covid-19, the honeymoon is over” – recently wrote professor Anis H. Bajrektarevic on a strategic decoupling between the biggest manufacturer of American goods, China and its consumer, the US.

Indeed, Washington has not formulated in detail its official stance on engaging China in negotiations yet. Disarmament experts consider a number of options that may be proposed in principle. These options may be grouped into three main categories. The first one is putting pressure on China with the aim of making it change its mind regarding arms control. The second one is the search for proposals China may find lucrative enough, which the Chinese leadership might agree to study in earnest. And the third one is a combination of these two approaches.

As far as pressure on China is concerned, the United States is already exerting it along several lines. For one, China is criticized for the condition and development prospects of its nuclear arsenal. Specifically, it is blamed on being the only nuclear power in the Permanent Big Five that has not reduced its nuclear potential. Moreover, as follows from a statement made in May 2019 by Robert Ashley, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, “over the next decade, China is likely to at least double the size of its nuclear stockpile in the course of implementing the most rapid expansion and diversification of its nuclear arsenal in China’s history” (Adamczyk, 2019). Both officials and many experts have been quoting this postulate as an established fact requiring no proof.

China is also accused of the lack of transparency, that is, refusal to disclose the size and structure of its nuclear forces, programs for their upgrade, and other nuclear policy aspects. The U.S. leadership argues that this state of affairs by no means promotes strategic stability and international security. Some experts believe that China’s involvement in negotiations would help avoid some adverse effects, for example, another nuclear arms race under a Cold War scenario (Zhao, 2020). Rose Gottemoeller, U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security in the Barack Obama administration, believes it may be possible to “make a case for the Chinese to come to the table early on intermediate-range constraints of ground-launched missiles, because they are staring at the possibility of a deployment of very capable U.S. missiles of this kind” ( Mehta,2020).

Apparently, the United States had counted on Russia’s support in such matters, especially as the Russian leadership said more than once that the New START, signed in 2010, was to become the last bilateral nuclear arms reduction treaty and time was ripe for other nuclear states to join the nuclear disarmament process. However, in late 2019 Russia made a U-turn in its stance on China’s participation in negotiations. Speaking at a conference entitled “Foreign Policy Priorities of the Russian Federation in Arms Control and Nonproliferation in the Context of Changes in the Global Security Architecture,” held on November 8, 2019 in Moscow, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that Russia respected China’s position concerning its refusal to participate in the talks. Moreover, he stated that declaring China’s consent to participate in the negotiating process as a precondition looked “openly provocative.” Thus Russia made it clear that it had no intention of putting pressure on China regarding the issue, but at the same time it would have nothing against the Chinese leadership eventually making a decision to join the United States and Russia in nuclear disarmament talks. Russia is unlikely to alter its position even under pressure from the United States, which has long harbored plans for using the prolongation of the New START as a factor for getting China involved in the talks in some way, or even securing its consent to become a signatory to the treaty. Specifically, the U.S. president’s National Security Advisor Robert O’Brian made an unequivocal statement on that score (Riechmann, 2020). Also, in May 2020, the United States came up with an ultimatum that it would not extend the New START until China agreed to participate in it. Moreover, the newly appointed special U.S. presidential representative for arms control, Marshall Billingslea, actually demanded that Russia “bring the Chinese to the negotiating table.

The United States may exert (or is already exerting) pressure on China “indirectly,” for example by using such levers as the U.S.-Chinese trade war and China’s alleged “responsibility” for the spread of the coronavirus (which the United States regards as proven). Such pressures may be largely exerted covertly.

Some military and political experts believe that it is worth exploring compromise options of China’s participation in nuclear arms control. Such options may accommodate the interests of all partakers and match the specific structure and quantitative parameters of weapons subject to control. Establishing transparency in the given sphere would be one of the “simple” ways of involving China in the strategic dialogue. In other words, such transparency would imply mutual disclosure of information about the number of missiles and deployed warheads, their basic parameters, including range, and also specific locations and deployment sites (Tosaki, 2019). It must be noted that this seemingly “least painful” and easy-to-accomplish solution for making China join the international arms control dialogue is in fact least acceptable to it.

The long list of other proposals includes various options of a “mixed” approach to the control of missile systems. For instance, reaching an agreement on a common ceiling for intermediate-range ground-based and air-launched missiles or a similar restriction on any strategic missiles regardless of the type of deployment (ground, sea, or air launched), as well as the intermediate-range missiles of three nuclear powers―China, the United States, and Russia. The proponents of this approach believe that this may provide an approximately equitable basis for talks among the aforesaid states (Zhao, 2020).

All of the aforementioned recommendations―and a number of other ideas―for plugging China into bilateral or multilateral nuclear arms control talks are based on the past experience of negotiations on the issue. In the meantime, the specifics of China’s nuclear policy are left unnoticed or intentionally ignored. It is generally believed that inviting China to participate in negotiations is tantamount to official recognition of its status as a great power responsible, like the United States and Russia, not only for its own security but also for global security. This recognition is often considered a reason enough to expect China to consent to participate in such negotiations and the main problem is seen in the formulation of  concrete proposals for discussion. In the meantime, such an approach looks erroneous.


THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF CHINA’S NUCLEAR POLICY

China’s policy concerning nuclear arms and their role in maintaining national security has remained unchanged for more than 55 years, starting from its accession to the “nuclear club” in 1964. Central to that policy is China’s pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons or threaten to use them against non-nuclear countries and countries in nuclear free zones. It is believed that Mao Zedong made that decision personally in 1964 (Fravel, 2019).

In accordance with this pledge, China, as it reiterates, maintains its nuclear deterrence weapons at a required minimum by declaring its readiness for retaliation against an aggressor in the event of a hypothetical nuclear attack. China vows it does not participate in a nuclear arms race against any country. These provisions have remained unchanged for many years and can be found in many Chinese fundamental military and strategic planning documents, available from open sources (The State Council, 2019), and are repeatedly quoted by the Chinese mass media (Xinhuaneet.com., 2019).

In contrast to the classical nuclear deterrence formula China does not demonstrate its retaliatory strike capabilities; on the contrary, it conceals them for various reasons. Enhancing the survivability of retaliatory strike systems is one. Such “existential” means of deterrence enables the country possessing a relatively small nuclear potential to keep a potential aggressor in a state of strategic uncertainty as it cannot be certain that its first strike would “disarm” the defending opponent by eliminating all of its nuclear weapons with a surprise counterforce strike.

To confirm its adherence to the no-fist use principle, China declares that it limits its nuclear potential to the “minimum” defense requirements, while all upgrade programs are geared mostly to ensuring the survivability and reliability of retaliatory strike systems. China’s nuclear forces have become more survivable due to the creation and deployment of mobile ICBMs, and measures to shelter a considerable part of its nuclear potential, including mobile ICBMs and shorter-range missiles in a network of underground tunnels―the Underground Great Wall of China. Also, other means of hiding nuclear weapons are used, such as mock ICBM silos and shelters for nuclear submarines inside coastal rocks.

As the information about the condition, development prospects and size of China’s nuclear potential remains scarce, its nuclear policy issues are in the focus of attention of many specialists and think tanks in the United States and other countries. Most of them (but far from all) believe that China’s declared policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons and estimates of its nuclear potential (around 300 warheads) agree with reality (Pifer, 2019). But other researchers maintain that under certain circumstances China may revise its attitude to the no-first-use principle and abandon the minimum deterrence concept in favor of gaining opportunities for conducting limited nuclear war. Such conclusions are made on the basis of data showing the growth of qualitative parameters of China’s nuclear forces―greater accuracy of nuclear warheads, the deployment of MIRVs on ICBMs, forecasts for a considerable increase in the overall number of nuclear weapons at the country’s disposal, etc. (Giacomdetti, 2014; Yoshihara and Bianchi, 2019; Schneider, 2019).

> It should be acknowledged that the lack of official information about the condition and development prospects of China’s nuclear arsenal and implementation of programs in the strategic field (creation of a heavy ICBM, research and development of a missile attack warning system, deployment of a missile defense, and others) afford ground for a variety of speculations over China’s compliance with the professed principles regarding nuclear weapons. In the meantime, this by no means contradicts the fundamental principle of China’s nuclear policy―no-first-use of nuclear weapons―which will remain unchanged in the foreseeable future. Even if one assumes that China does participate in the nuclear arms race (which is also a subject of speculations), it is by no means its instigator.

Certain changes are possible, though. China may acquire real capabilities for a limited response to a limited nuclear attack. In other words, the country’s military-political leadership, empowered to make a decision to use nuclear weapons, will acquire extra opportunities and options for retaliation other than a massive nuclear strike against the enemy’s major unprotected targets, such as cities and industrial centers. At the same time there is no reason to say that the improvement of parameters of China’s strategic nuclear forces increases the risk of a first counterforce strike against a would-be aggressor just because the nuclear potentials of China and the two leading nuclear powers are incomparable. In this case size does matter.


EFFECTS OF ARMS CONTROL ON CHINA’S NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND POLICY

Should China agree to participate in negotiations or draft an agreement on control of its nuclear weapons, its nuclear strategy and policy will most likely undergo the most serious changes. And these changes, in the author’s opinion, may be far from positive. They will result not from possible restrictions imposed on China’s nuclear forces or disadvantageous terms of a future treaty forced upon China, but the very fact of concluding such an international treaty.

A close look at Soviet-U.S. and Russian-U.S. nuclear arms control agreements reveals how the parties’ approaches to solving the problems of national security and strengthening strategic stability have been changing. At early stages the two sides managed to come to terms regarding the overall number of ground-based launchers of strategic ballistic missiles, SLBM capable submarines and SLBM launchers. Later, the class of strategic weapons was expanded to incorporate heavy bombers armed with long-range cruise missiles and gravity nuclear bombs. Some types of nuclear weapons, for instance, strategic air-launched ballistic missiles were banned. Next, there followed restrictions on nuclear warheads deployed on delivery vehicles and then their reductions. A total ban was applied to ground-based intermediate- and shorter-range cruise missiles. An attempt was made to outlaw ICBMs with multiple warheads. Each clause of the concluded treaties was scrutinized by the expert community and drew worldwide interest.

In addition, efforts were made to develop a mechanism to verify compliance with the assumed commitments. The first Soviet-U.S. agreements SALT-1 (1972) and SALT-2 (1979) assigned the control function to “national technical means of verification”―intelligence satellites. The contracting parties pledged to refrain from creating impediments to their operation. Also, the signatories undertook“ not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance.” In the next agreements―the INF Treaty (of 1987) and, particularly, START-1 (1991) ― a comprehensive system of control and verification was developed and adopted. It envisaged exchanges of data (including the geographical coordinates of each ICBM silo) and various notifications and on-site inspections, which made it totally impossible to conceal even the slightest violations of these agreements. This system of verification functions within the framework of the still effective Russian-U.S. New START, concluded in 2010.

It is hard to imagine a hypothetical agreement with China not including compliance verification procedures. And it is very unlikely that the system of verification in such an agreement will be “soft,” as was the case with the one established under the earlier SALT-1 and SALT-2 treaties. On the contrary, as follows from statements by U.S. officials, the United States is determined to pay the closest attention to the verification and control of compliance with all future agreements. U.S. Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Christopher Ford has made an explicit statement on this score.

Even if such an agreement does not impose any obligations on China, requiring reduction of its nuclear potential, Beijing will be expected to provide exhaustive information about its nuclear weapons and deployment sites. Also, China will have to give up measures to conceal its nuclear forces, change the locations of mobile missile systems and allow foreign inspectors to visit classified facilities (including the Underground Great Wall of China) in order to confirm that the provided information is correct and proper action has been taken under assumed commitments. Besides, China will have to notify other signatories of the commissioning of new nuclear weapons and withdrawal from operational duty or elimination of older systems, the redeployment of weapons, etc. All these measures will make it possible to keep under full control China’s nuclear potential and nuclear arms delivery vehicles.

These measures, understandable from the standpoint of an arms control treaty, may have truly disastrous effects on China’s entire official nuclear policy. Information disclosure and control measures would make China’s nuclear arsenal totally vulnerable to a first nuclear strike and partially – to a non-nuclear strike. A potential aggressor, possessing a considerable advantage in nuclear weapons and full information about the deployment sites, will have a guaranteed capability to destroy the adversary’s entire nuclear potential. Theoretically, it would spend far more nuclear weapons than the victim of the aggression (in this particular case, China) would lose, but still retain an enormous attack potential. In a situation like this, there will be no weapons available to deliver a retaliatory strike. All this will mean that China’s declared no-first-use policy will lose credibility. In other words, it will turn into a propaganda slogan, with no real resources to rely on to implement this policy in practice.

Apparently, it is precisely these considerations that are behind China’s refusal to participate in nuclear arms control talks, and they will remain in place at least until the strategic situation in this field undergoes fundamental change. One of the most important conditions for China to enter into such negotiations (it says so openly) is further reduction of nuclear arsenals by Russia and the United States to levels comparable with China’s potential. As it has been already stated, this condition, described as a political one, has fundamental strategic, military and technical grounds.


LIKELY CONSEQUENCES OF CHINA’S PARTICIPATION IN A NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL TREATY

As has been said above, China’s consent to enter into nuclear arms control negotiations and conclusion of a corresponding agreement will be unlikely in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, it is worth pondering on what decisions in the military and political field the Chinese leadership may adopt if it has to give in to U.S. pressure. One of the most important decisions is, to my mind, the possibility of China remaining committed to the no-first-use principle.

Currently, this principle is ensured not so much by the quantitative parameters of China’s nuclear arsenal, but as its stealthy deployment, concealment measures, and refusal to provide relevant information. In order to retain a retaliatory strike potential in a situation where the information about the deployment sites of China’s nuclear forces has been disclosed while the amount of nuclear arms available remains considerably inferior to those of the “partner” or “partners,” China will have to exert major efforts to ensure the invulnerability of at least some of them. Doing this will be impossible without a major buildup of the nuclear potential, above all, of the least vulnerable strategic systems (mobile ICBMs and SLBMs). All of this will require considerable expenses and time. Even if the work on a new treaty takes two or three, or even five years, one can hardly expect any considerable changes in the quantitative and qualitative structure of China’s nuclear forces by the moment this work is finalized.

The problem of strategic nuclear forces’ vulnerability may theoretically be resolved (at least to a certain extent) by developing and deploying missile defenses around deployment sites. But this would entail heavy spending, too. Also, such a program can hardly be implemented within tight deadlines. The problem of greater vulnerability of China’s strategic nuclear forces can also be resolved by adopting the “launch-under-attack” concept or “launch on warning” concept. Their adoption might be considered, although with great reservations, to conform to the no-first-use principle, but in this case it will be essential to build a warning system based on early warning satellites and radars. However, still there will be no guarantees that such a system will be able to issue a timely notification to the military and political leadership of a missile attack against China, if such a strike is carried out with U.S. SLBMs having short flight-in time and counterforce capability. Under such a scenario China’s strategic forces will have to remain on high alert all the time. This means that China will be forced to give up keeping missile warheads in store separately and to deploy them on strategic delivery vehicles, thus demonstrating its readiness for instant retaliation in case of an attack warning.

The above arguments prompt the conclusion that China, if it agrees to the drafting and signing a nuclear arms control treaty, will certainly have to depart from the principle of no-first-use of nuclear weapons, with all the ensuing negative consequences. This may also trigger an enhanced arms race and induce China to adopt more aggressive nuclear arms concepts.

It is nakedly clear that China finds it far easier to refuse to hold nuclear arms control talks than address the adverse military and strategic effects its participation in such an international agreement is bound to entail. In this situation the United States should give more thought to its policy of engaging China in nuclear arms control talks and focus on Russian-U.S. strategic relations, including the prolongation of the New START without any linkages and preconditions.

As far as Russia is concerned, its current policy of avoiding pressure on China to make it engage in nuclear arms talks looks reasonable. From the political standpoint ―alongside with other considerations―a trilateral agreement would mean that Russia officially regards China, albeit formally, as a “partner” (if not a “potential adversary”), just as the United States, and that strategic relations among such parties are based on the concept of nuclear deterrence, the balance of nuclear forces, and their capabilities to deliver first and retaliatory strikes. Incidentally, China’s participation would have the same implications for Russia. Lending this dimension to bilateral relations hardly meets the interests of the two countries.




Alexander G. Savelyev,
Dr. of Political Science
Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Moscow, Russia
Center of International Security
Chief Research Fellow


Abstract

Beijing explains its firm unwillingness to join the United States and Russia in nuclear arms control talks by the fact that China’s nuclear arsenal is incomparable with respective potentials of the world’s two leading nuclear powers. China urges Russia and the U.S. to go ahead with the nuclear disarmament process on a bilateral basis, and promises it will be prepared to consider the possibility of its participation in the negotiations only when its counterparts have downgraded their arsenals approximately to China’s level. Washington finds this totally unacceptable and demands that China either join the existing Russian-U.S. strategic New START treaty right away or agree to enter into a trilateral nuclear arms control format. This article studies the prospects of China’s involvement in nuclear arms talks and analyzes the true reasons behind Beijing’s desire to avoid any nuclear disarmament deals at this point. The working hypothesis of this paper is that China’s stance on the above issue is by no means far-fetched or propagandistic, and that it is driven by fundamental political, military and strategic considerations. Disregard for this factor and further forceful efforts to bring China to the negotiating table to discuss nuclear arms control will lead to failure.


Keywords: China, the United States, New START, Russia, nuclear arms control, China’s nuclear doctrine, nuclear disarmament, no-first-use principle.

References

Adamczyk, E., 2019. China Will Double Its Nuclear Warheads in Next 10 Years,” DIA Chief Says. Defense News, 31 May 31[online]. Available at: <https://www.upi.com/Defense-News/2019/05/31/China-will-double-its-nuclear-warheads-in-next-10-years-DIA-chief-says/1621559319133/> [Accessed 11 May 2020].

Bajrektarevic, A., 2020 “The post-Corona epilogue of Sino-American relationship” http://www.diplomatmagazine.eu/2020/05/03/the-post-corona-epilogue-of-an-overheated-sino-american-relationship-we-have-a-winner-will-we-have-a-game-changer-too/

ECNC, 2020. “China Will Not Join So-Called China-U.S.-Russia Arms Control Negotiations”. ECNC.cn [online]. Available at: <http://www.ecns.cn/news/politics/2020-03-06/detail-ifzuhesu4122041.shtml> [Accessed 20 March 2020].
Fact Sheet China, 2004. Nuclear Disarmament and Reduction of. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Fact Sheet China, 27 April.

Ford, C., 2020. US Priorities for “Next Generation Arms Control”. US Department of State. Arms Control and International Security Papers, 1(1), o6 April, p. 4.

Fravel, M/b>., 2019. China Has Not (Yet) Changed Its Position on Nuclear Weapons. The Diplomat, 22 April [online]. Available at: <https://thediplomat.com/2013/04/china-has-not-yet-changed-its-position-on-nuclear-weapons/> [Accessed 5 May 2020].

Gertz, B., 2020. Envoy Says China Is Key to New Arms Deal with Russia.The Washington Times, 7 May [online]. Available at: <https://m.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/may/7/marshall-billingslea-says-new-start-fate-hangs-chi/> [Accessed May 10, 2020].

Giacometti, N., 2014. For Half a Century, China’s Nuclear Strategy Has Been Surprisingly Consistent. Will It Remain So? The Diplomat, 16 October [online]. Available at:
<https://thediplomat.com/2014/10/could-chinas-nuclear-strategy-evolve/> [Accessed 5 May 2020]

Karber, Ph. A., 2011. Strategic Implications of China’s Underground Great Wall. Federation of American Scientists, 11 September [pdf]. Available at: <https://fas.org/nuke/guide/china/Karber_UndergroundFacilities-Full_2011_reduced.pdf> [Accessed June 22, 2020]

Kristensen, H. and Korda, M., 2020. Status of World Nuclear Forces. Federation of American Scientists [online]. Available at: <https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/>> [Accessed 10 August 2020].

Mehta, A., 2020. Arms Control Decisions by Trump Administration Could Be ‘Imminent.’ Will China Be Involved? [online]. Defense News/i>, February 26. Available at: <https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2020/02/26/arms-control-decisions-by-trump-administration-could-be-imminent-will-china-be-involved/> [Accessed 11 May 2020].

MFA RF, 2019. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s remarks at the Moscow Nonproliferation Conference “Foreign Policy Priorities of the Russian Federation in Arms Control and Nonproliferation in the Context of Changes in the Global Security Architecture”.

8 November [online]. Available at: <https://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3891674> [Accessed 12 April 2020]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2019.

Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang's Regular Press Conference on May 6, 2019. [online]. Available at: <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1661163.shtml> [Accessed 11 May 2020].<

Pifer S., 2019. Order from Chaos. . Russia’s Shifting Views of Multilateral Nuclear Arms Control with China.
important_news.htm
Brookings, 19 February [online]. Available at: [Accessed June 22, 2020].

Reuters, 2020. Reuters World News official website[online]. 7 May. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-russia/trump-stresses-desire-for-arms-control-with-russia-china-in-putin-call-idUSKBN22J2GT>. [Accessed 11 May 2020].

Riechmann, D., 2020. Trump Still Hoping for US-Russia-China Nuclear Arms Pact. The Star, 14 February [online]. Available at: < https://www.thestar.com/news/world/us/2020/02/14/trump-still-hoping-for-us-russia-china-nuclear-arms-pact.html>> [Accessed 12 April 2020].

Schneider, M. B., 2019. Nuclear Weapons in Chinese Military Strategy. National Institute for Public Policy. Information Series. Issue No. 441, 3 May 3. [online]. Available at: <https://www.nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/IS-441.pdf> [Accessed 11 May 2020].

Tosaki, H., 2019. Nuclear Arms Control in a Post-INF Treaty Period: A Chance to Engage China? The Japan Institute of International Affairs. JIIA Strategic Comments, No. 9, March [online]. Available at: <https://www2.jiia.or.jp/en/article_page.php?id=18> [Accessed 5 May 2010].

The State Council, 2019. Information Office of the People’s Republic of China 2019.

China’s National Defense in the New Era, July. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press Co. Ltd., р

9. Xinhuanet.com, 2019. China Pursues Nuclear Strategy of Self-Defense: White Paper. Xinhua,

 24 July [online]. Available at: <http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-07/24/c_138253330.htm>
[Accessed 5 May 2020].

Yoshihara Toshi and Bianchi, 2019. Chinese Nuclear Weapons Strategy — Technical-Military Developments and Perceptions of Credibility. Real Clear Defense July 17. 

Zhang Hui, 2011. China’s Nuclear Weapons Modernization: Intentions, Drivers, and Trends.  Project on Managing the Atom, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, [online]. Available at: <http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/ChinaNuclearModernization-hzhang.pdf> [Accessed June 22, 2020].

Zhao, T., 2020. Opportunities for Nuclear Arms Control Engagement with China. Arms Control Today, January/February [online]. Available at: <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2020-01/features/opportunities-nuclear-arms-control-engagement-china#bio> [Accessed 5 May, 2020].


OCTOBER 1, 2020

---

---

---

2020

---

PUBLICATIONS DECEMBER 2020,   PUBLICATIONS NOVEMBER 2020,  PUBLICATIONS OCTOBER 2020,
PUBLICATIONS SEPTEMBER 2020, PUBLICATIONS AUGUSTUS 2020, PUBLICATIONS JUNE 2020,
PUBLICATIONS MAY 2020, PUBLICATIONS APRIL 2020, PUBLICATIONS MARCH 2020, PUBLICATIONS FEBRUARY 2020


PUBLICATIONS OCTOBER 2020

  Lebanon 2020: From “The Pearl of the Orient” to failed state? - General (Rtd) Corneliu Pivariu 
 ENOUGH OF DOUBLE STANDARDS! - Dr. Zlatko Hadzidedic
 How to Spend it: An Austro-Franco-German Proposal for a European Covid-19 Recovery Programme - Tereza Neuwirthová
 Triangularity of Nuclear Arms Control - Possible Implications of China’s Involvement in Nuclear Arms Talks - Alexander G. Savelyev


PUBLICATIONS SEPTEMBER 2020

  Political will is needed to foster multilateralism in Europe – Dr. Franz Fischler says
 Europe and the world at 75: An occasion for the EU to reaffirm its standing on Security policies and Human Rights
  Legacy of antifascism for the common pan-European future - Manfred Nowak
  AI (ARTIFICAL INTELLIGENCE): THE ITALIAN NATIONAL STRATEGY REVISITED - Cristina Semeraro
  Of Privacy, EU and of Human Rights – 75 years After - By Nora Wolf
  Security in the Shadow of Climate Change in the Sahel


PUBLICATIONS AUGUST 2020

  All for Global Citizens: President Fischer on 75 years of triumph of antifascism - Audrey Beaulieu
  Throwback to a powerful and timely HR message addressed to the citizens of the world -Nora Wolf
 The future of Europe depends on its neighborhood – UfM’s Nasser Kamel says - By Guido Lanfranchi
  What will the future look like? - General (Rtd) Corneliu Pivariu 


PUBLICATIONS JULY 2020

   Where do we go from here? – revisiting words of Steve Clemons - Anna Kassai
   From Culture for Peace to Culture of Peace - Anastasiia Pachina
 Towards the pan-European Recalibration - Chloé Bernadaux


PUBLICATIONS JUNE 2020

ASEAN, C-19 and the Vietnam’s Chairmanship - Bich T Tran
Iron Fist for Pacific East - Stephen R. Nagy
Postponing an Oil Production Catastrophe - Dr. Antonia Colibasanu


PUBLICATIONS MAY 2020

The OIC World for a Safer Planet - Ali Goutali and Anis H. Bajrektarevic


PUBLICATIONS APRIL 2020

Leadership for Thought: Non-Permanent members lead the Security Council through COVID-19 - Elizabeth Deheza

PUBLICATIONS MARCH 2020

The Corona Crisis and Israel’s National Security - Itai BRUN and Yael GAT 
Thoughts of Romania’s Foreign Policy on the Background of the European Foreign Policy [1]
Israel-Egypt Cooperation in 2019: Strategic Warming, Civilian Coolness?
The Name of the Rose - De-evolution of Europe - Prof. Anis H. Bajrektarević


PUBLICATIONS FEBRUARY 2020

   Ur-Fascism: Of Silence and EU Rush -  The equation of Communism with Nazism - Anis H. Bajrektarevic
   What is more disruptive with AI: Its dark potentials or our (anti-Intellectual) Ignorance?
   Why Turkey is sending troops to Libya - Giorgio Cafiero
   ALL THOSE CROATIAN PRESIDENTS - By: Tomislav Jakić
  Turkey-Erdogan seeks to achieve the dream of the empire’s rebirth - General (Rtd) Corneliu Pivariu


PUBLICATIONS FEBRUARY 2020

   What is more disruptive with AI: Its dark potentials or our (anti-Intellectual) Ignorance?
   Why Turkey is sending troops to Libya - Giorgio Cafiero
   ALL THOSE CROATIAN PRESIDENTS - By: Tomislav Jakić
  Turkey-Erdogan seeks to achieve the dream of the empire’s rebirth - General (Rtd) Corneliu Pivariu


PUBLICATIONS JANUARY 2020

   Research-Emmy Latifah&Sara Al-Dhahri - Responding to new challenges: OIC in the international Arena
   Revisiting the Ukraine-Russia-EU triangular dynamics - Tanvi Chauhan
   Give me religion that does not polarise society! - Julia Suryakusuma
   De-evolution of Europe - The equation of Communism with Nazism
  Soleimani’s assassination triggers US-Iran standoff -Malik Ayub Sumbal  
  The Sino-US Trade War – Why China can’t win it - Prof. Anis H. Bajrektarevic
 

---

ARCHIVE
December-2020 November-2020 October-2020 September-2020 Augustus-2020 July-2020 June-2020 May- 2020 April-2020 March-2020 February-2020 January-2020	december-2019 november-2019 october-2019 september-2019 augustus-2019 july-2019 june-2019 may-2019 april-2019 march-2019 february-2019 january-2019	december-2018 november-2018 october-2018 september-2018 augustus-2018 july-2018 june-2018 may-2018 april-2018 march-2018 february-2018   january-2018

info@orbus.one
www.orbus.one



GO HOME


 

BALKAN AREA


prof. dr. Anis Bajrektarevic

Editor - Geopolitics, History, International
Relations (GHIR) Addleton Academic Publishers - New YorK
Senior Advisory board member, geopolitics of energy Canadian energy research institute - ceri, Ottawa/Calgary
Advisory Board Chairman Modern Diplomacy & the md Tomorrow's people platform originator
Head of mission and department head - strategic studies on Asia
Professor and Chairperson Intl. law & global pol. studies

Critical Similarities and Differences in SS of Asia and Europe - Prof. Anis H. Bajrektarevic

MENA Saga and Lady Gaga - (Same dilemma from the MENA) - Anis H. Bajrektarevic


HE ONGOING PUBLIC DEBT CRISIS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: IMPACTS ON AND LESSONS FOR VIETNAM - Dr. Nguyen Anh Tuan, Assos. Prof.[1] Nguyen Linh[2]


Carla BAUMER
Climate Change and Re Insurance: The Human Security Issue SC-SEA Prof. Anis Bajrektarevic & Carla Baumer

 
Igor Dirgantara
(Researcher and Lecturer at the Faculty of Social and Politics, University of Jayabaya)


Peny Sotiropoulou

Is the ‘crisis of secularism’ in Western Europe the result of multiculturalism?


Dr. Emanuel L. Paparella
A Modest “Australian” Proposal to Resolve our Geo-Political Problems

Were the Crusades Justified? A Revisiting - Dr. Emanuel L. Paparella


Alisa Fazleeva
Earned an MA in International Relations from the University of East Anglia in Norwich, United Kingdom in 2013. Her research interests include foreign policy decision-making, realism and constructivism, and social psychology and constructivism.

 
Corinna Metz
She is an independent researcher specialized in International Politics and Peace & Conflict Studies with a regional focus on the Balkans and the Middle East.


Patricia Galves Derolle
Founder of Internacionalista
São Paulo, Brazil
Brazil – New Age


Dimitra Karantzeni
The political character of Social Media: How do Greek Internet users perceive and use social networks?
 

Michael Akerib
Vice-Rector
SWISS UMEF UNIVERSITY

  
Petra Posega
is a master`s degree student on the University for Criminal justice and Security in Ljubljana. She obtained her bachelor`s degree in Political Science- Defense studies.

Contact: posegap@live.com




Samantha Brletich,
 George Mason University School of Policy, Government, and Intl. Relations She focuses on Russia and Central Asia. Ms. Brletich is an employee of the US Department of Defense.

Interview on HRT-Radio
Prof. dr. Anis Bajrektarević



Dr Filippo ROMEO,



Julia Suryakusuma is the outspoken Indonesian thinker, social-cause fighter and trendsetter. She is the author of Julia’s Jihad.
Contact: jsuryakusuma@gmail.com 


Gerald Knaus


Mads Jacobsen
Mads is an intern at PCRC. Mads Jacobsen is from Denmark and is currently pursuing his Master's degree in 'Development and International Relations' at Aalborg University...


Dzalila Osmanovic-Muharemagic
University of Bihac, Faculty of Education, Department of English Language and Literature - undergraduate
University of Banja Luka, Faculty of Philology, Department of English Language and Literature - graduate study


Rakesh Krishnan Simha

New Zealand-based journalist and foreign affairs analyst. According to him, he writes on stuff the media distorts, misses or ignores.

Rakesh started his career in 1995 with New Delhi-based Business World magazine, and later worked in a string of positions at other leading media houses such as India Today, Hindustan Times, Business Standard and the Financial Express, where he was the news editor.

He is the Senior Advisory Board member of one of the fastest growing Europe’s foreign policy platforms: Modern Diplomacy.


Damiel Scalea
Daniele Scalea, geopolitical analyst, is Director-general of IsAG (Rome Institute of Geopolitics) and Ph.D. Candidate in Political studies at the Sapienza University, Rome. Author of three books, is frequent contributor and columnist to various Tv-channels and newspapers. E-mail: daniele.scalea@gmail.com


Alessio Stilo,
 Research Associate at Institute of High Studies in Geopolitics and Auxiliary Sciences (IsAG), Rome, Italy, and Ph.D. researcher at University of Padova, is IMN Country Representative in Italy.


Tomislav Jakić
Foreign Policy Advisor to former Croatian President Stjepan Mesić


Zlatko Hadžidedić
Graduate of the London School of Economics, prof. Zlatko Hadžidedić is a prominent thinker, prolific author of numerous books, and indispensable political figure of the former Yugoslav socio-political space in 1990s, 2000s and 2010s.


Mr. Nicola Bilotta
Nicola Bilotta has a BA and a MA in History from Università degli Studi di Milano and a MSc in Economic History from the London School of Economics. He works as a Global Finance Research Assistant at The Banker (Financial Times) and collaborates as an external researcher at ISAG (Istituto di Alti Studi di Geopolitica e Scienze Ausiliari) N_bilotta@lse.ac.uk



Markus Wauran
Date and Place of Birth: April 22, 1943 – Amurang, North Sulawesi, IndonesiaEducation: Bachelor in Public Administration.
Writer was a member of the House of Representatives of Indonesia (DPR/MPR-RI) period of 1987-1999, and Chairman of Committee X, cover Science and Technology, Environment and National Development Planning (1988-1997).
Currently as Obsever of Nuclear for peace.


Sooyoung Hu
Attached to the US-based Berkeley University, Sooyoung Hu is a scholar at its Political Science and Peace and Conflict Studies Department. Miss Hu focuses on international relations, international organizations and its instruments.




Senahid LAVIĆ


Nizar Visram
 Nizar Visram is a Ottawa-based free-lance writer from Zanzibar, Tanzania. Recently retired Senior lecturer on Development studies, he extensively publishes in over 50 countries on 4 continents. He can be reached at nizar1941(at)gmail.com .


Robert Leonard Rope
He studied at the University of Michigan,
He lives in: San Francisco, California: San Francisco, California, USA


Dragan Bursac, Journalist


Dr. Enis OMEROVIĆ


Max Hess
Max Hess is a senior political risk analyst with the London-based AEK international, specializing in Europe and Eurasia.


Ananya Bordoloi
Ananya Bordoloi is a Malaysia based researcher in the fields of international relations, global governance and human rights. Author has previously worked with Amnesty International in research and data collection capacity, and for a publishing company as a pre-editor.


Robert J. Burrowes
 has a lifetime commitment to understanding and ending human violence. He has done extensive research since 1966 in an effort to understand why human beings are violent and has been a nonviolent activist since 1981. He is the author of ‘Why Violence?’ His email address is flametree@riseup.net and his website is here.


Amel Ouchenane is a member of the organization of Security and Strategic studies in Algeria. She is also Research Assistant at the Idrak Research Center for Studies and Consultations.
Ms. Ouchenane was researcher at Algiers University from 2011 to 2018. (Department of International relations and African studies).


Dr. Nafees Ahmad
Ph. D., LL.M, Faculty of Legal Studies, South Asian University (SAARC)-New Delhi, Nafees Ahmad is an Indian national who holds a Doctorate (Ph.D.) in International Refugee Law and Human Rights. Author teaches and writes on International Forced Migrations, Climate Change Refugees & Human Displacement Refugee, Policy, Asylum, Durable Solutions and Extradition issues.



Sinta Stepani
International relations specialists based in São Paulo, Brazil.


Gilles-Emmanuel JACQUET
Assistant Professor of the World History at the Geneva School of Diplomacy and International Relations. He is also senior anlaysit at the Geneva International Peace Research Institute (GIPRI)


Juan Martin González Cabañas
 Juan Martin González Cabañas is a senior researcher and analyst at the Dossier Geopolitico


Dr. Andrew Sheng is distinguished fellow of the Asia Global Institute at the University of Hong Kong and a member of the UNEP Advisory Council on Sustainable Finance.


Srdja Trifkovic, Ph.D., is foreign affairs editor for Chronicles: A Magazine of American Culture. He is a professor of international relations at the University of Banja Luka in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the author of several books. Earlier version of this text appeared in the Chronicles, under the title: “Greta the Swede, or Gretinizing the Global Media”


Wan T. Lee
He is a Hong Kong based scholar and researcher.


Julia Suryakusuma
The writer is the author of Julia’s Jihad
Early version published by Jakarta Post under the title: Cover men's eyes, not women's hair!


Emmy_Latifah

Responding to new challenges: OIC in the international Arena


Sara_Al_Dhahri

Responding to new challenges: OIC in the international Arena


● Itai BRUN 
- Deputy Director of INSS,
Research and Analysis VP


● Yael GAT 
- Research Assist. to Deputy Director for 
Research and Analysis at INSS  


Bich T Tran
is a PhD candidate at the University of Antwerp and a Researcher at the Global Affairs Research Center, Ryukoku University.


Anastasiia Pachina,
Sociologist – Charles University, Prague. She is a Program manager – with the Culture for Peace Action Platform, and a marketing researcher in IPSOS CZ.



Chloé Bernadaux is an International Security specialist (Sciences Po Paris), prolifically writing on the neighbourhood policy, Euro-MED relations, and disarmament affairs. She is the IFIMES newly appointed representative in Paris (UNESCO).


Dr.Antonia Colibasanu is Geopolitical Futures’ Chief Operating Officer. She is responsible for overseeing all departments and marketing operations for the company. Dr. Colibasanu joined Geopolitical Futures as a senior analyst in 2016 and frequently speaks on international economics and security topics in Europe.